National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

NOTICE

The quality of this microform is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Reproduction in full or in part of this microform is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30, and subsequent amendments.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microforme dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

La reproduction, même partielle, de cette microforme est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30, et ses amendements subséquents.

Canada

University of Alberta

The Roots of Russian Nationalism: From the Emergence of the Muscovite State to the End of the Imperial Dynasty

by

Eva Francesca DeMarco ©

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of *Master of Arts*

in

Slavic and East European Area Studies

Department of *Slavic and East European Studies*

Edmonton, Alberta

Spring 1996

National Library
of Canada

Acquisitions and
Bibliographic Services Branch

395 Wellington Street
Ottawa, Ontario
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Direction des acquisitions et
des services bibliographiques

395, rue Wellington
Ottawa (Ontario)
K1A 0N4

Your file Votre référence

Our file Notre référence

The author has granted an irrevocable non-exclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested persons.

L'auteur a accordé une licence irrévocable et non exclusive permettant à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de sa thèse de quelque manière et sous quelque forme que ce soit pour mettre des exemplaires de cette thèse à la disposition des personnes intéressées.

The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her permission.

L'auteur conserve la propriété du droit d'auteur qui protège sa thèse. Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.

ISBN 0-612-10670-5

Canadä

University of Alberta

Library Release Form

Name of Author: *Eva Francesca DeMarco*

Title of Thesis: *The Roots of Russian Nationalism: From the Emergence of the Muscovite State to the End of the Imperial Dynasty*

Degree: *Master of Arts*

Year this Degree Granted: *1996*

Permission is hereby granted to the University of Alberta Library to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly, or scientific research purposes only.

The author reserves all other publication and other rights in association with the copyright in the thesis, and except as hereinbefore provided, neither the thesis nor any substantial portion thereof may be printed or otherwise reproduced in any material form whatever without the author's prior written permission.

7102 - 112 Street
Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
T6G 1J1

9 February 1996.

University of Alberta

Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled *The Roots of Russian Nationalism: From the Emergence of the Muscovite State to the End of the Imperial Dynasty* submitted by *Eva Francesca DeMarco* in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of *Master of Arts* in *Slavic and East European Area Studies*.

David R Marples

Dr D. Marples

T Yedlin

Dr T Yedlin

Zenon E. Kohut

Dr Z Kohut

Dr OS Ilnytzkyij

9 February 1996.

THE ROOTS OF RUSSIAN NATIONALISM

From the Emergence of the Muscovite State to the End of the Imperial Dynasty

Eva Francesca DeMarco

ABSTRACT

A study of the roots of Russian nationalism, beginning with the adoption of Orthodox Christianity and the emergence of the Muscovite state in the late fifteenth century. Chronologically, the scope of this work includes the Kievan period and the period of Mongol domination of Rus'. Particular attention is devoted to the influence of the Mongol administration of Rus' and Mongol imperial ideology on Muscovite autocrats. That the Muscovite state developed as an empire before becoming a nation-state, and thus historically, both legally and politically denied the existence of a distinctly Russian nation as an autonomous entity, is central to this work. The role religion played as an ideological justification of state expansion and as a factor of common identification is considered in detail.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Part I INTRODUCTION 1

Part II RELIGION AND HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS 4
- i *The Role of Religion in Consciousness of Identity* 11

Part III IMPERIAL NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF IDENTITY 28
- ii *Muscovite Imperial Consciousness* 28
- iii *Russian Imperial National Consciousness* 32

Part IV LITERATURE, LANGUAGE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 40
- iv *The Russian Language and National Consciousness* 49

Part V SLAVOPHILISM AND THE POLITICAL RIGHT 53
- v *Pan-Slavism* 59
- vi *Katkov and the Role of the Press* 71
- vii *Public Opinion and the Press* 74
- viii *Neo-Slavophilism* 77
- ix *Black Hundreds* 80
- x *The Duma Parties of the Right* 87
- *Liberal Imperial Nationalism* 90

Part VI THE NATION AND THE STATE 95
- xi *The Nation* 95
- xii *The State* 107

Part VII NATIONALISM: APPROACHES AND FORMS 117
- xiii *Approaches to Nationalism* 117
- xiv *Functional Forms of Approaches to Nationalism* 123
- xv *Russian Nationalism* 127
- xvi *National Movements* 130
- xvii *Russification* 144
- xviii *Anti-Semitism* 149
- ixx *Nationalism* 155

Part VIII CONCLUSION 164

Bibliography 167

PART I

INTRODUCTION

A precise definition of the term 'nationalism' has been attempted by numerous analysts, the result being a multitude of widely varied definitions and classifications. If we are to study Russian nationalism specifically, we need a precise definition of nationalism itself, "for the vague and loose common-sense notion of nationalism employed in everyday speech is quite evidently inadequate to analyse such a complex object as the Russian version of the phenomenon."[1] Any discussion of Russian nationalism as an historical phenomenon must begin with some clarification of the concepts: national consciousness, the nation and the state. In fact, any definition of nationalism in general derives from this kind of *a priori* understanding.

Vittorio Strada defines nationalism as "the label for a particular heightening and extreme form of national consciousness."[2] By this definition, we must therefore first answer the question: 'what is national consciousness?' before attempting to understand 'what is nationalism?'. Ernest Gellner asserts that a nation "is not an inherent attribute of humanity;" that it now *seems* as such "is indeed an aspect, or perhaps the very core, of the problem of nationalism."[3] Thus, it is equally imperative to provide an answer to the question: 'what is the nation?' as it is to define national consciousness. Gellner also insists that any definition of nationalism is "parasitic on a prior and assumed definition of the state, [and that] nationalism emerges only in the milieux in which the existence of the state is already very much taken for granted."[4] I will thus attempt in the work undertaken to understand the three autonomous concepts: national consciousness, the nation and the state; before defining nationalism proper.

---

[1] Marco Buttino, ed., *In a Collapsing Empire* (Milan: Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, 1993), 119-20.

[2] Ibid., 111-12.

The method of classification used in applying these concepts to Russia combines their political and cultural components. Though these components are conceived as distinct and autonomous entities, the state has historically both legally and politically, denied the Russian nation a separate existence. To further complicate matters, the so-called Russian populace has from its very inception been multi-ethnic. A distinctly Russian nation emerged in the eighteenth century; its historical roots, however, are long and complex.

My work focuses on these roots, how they interrelated to form a Russian nation and how Russian nationalism of the nineteenth and early twentieth century might be located in particular relationship to such history. It is a major contention herein that Russia is characterized by two distinct but inseparable forms of national consciousness: cultural; and imperial, meta-national, or political consciousness rooted in the Muscovite state. This is not meant to imply that Russian consciousness of identity is not a highly complex and dynamic phenomenon, nor that this distinction negates the interrelationship between the cultural and political realms. The state, which constitutes the elite minority, is conceived largely in terms of politics. Again, this is not to deny the reciprocal relationship of politics and culture. The differentiation, as such, simply aids in the process of classification. I intend to argue that the rise of the imperial Muscovite state molded the 'Janus-faced'[5] character of Russian nationalism. This necessitates a further distinction between elite, or state-led, and mass nationalism, which will be provided in a subsequent discussion of national movements.

---

[3] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, New York and London: Cornell University Press, 1983), 3-7.

[4] Ibid.

Ultimately, Russian nationalism can be conceived as an ideological justification of state power - a concept which is rooted in the ancient notion of the theocrateic power of autocracy.

---

[5] This is a reference to Ivan III's marriage in 1472 to the niece of the last Byzantine Emperor, Sophia Paleologue, which legitimized Muscovy's right to the Byzantine heritage. Ivan adopted the double-headed eagle as the symbol of all the lands of Rus', a symbol of both state power and ecclesiastical supremacy. During the reign of Vasilly III, the monk Philofei of Pskov proposed to the tsar his theory of Moscow the Third Rome. The greater Rus' was thus counterpoised by the East - the united Tatar khanates and the threat of Turkey - and by the West - united Poland-Lithuania and the threat of the Papacy. This Janus-like quality in Russian nationalism also refers to its "integrative and divisive, modernizing and traditionalist" tendencies, expressed in a manner that is both imitative of and hostile to a particular model. See, Stephen Carter, *Russian Nationalism Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 14; Michael Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People: Studies in Russian Myths* (New Haven: Random House, 1970), 43; Mikhail Agursky, *The Third Rome: National Bolshevism in the USSR* (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987), 7.

PART II

Religion and Historical Consciousness

If we are to understand 'what is nationalism?' according to Vittorio Strada's definition, we must *a priori* understand 'what is national consciousness?' John Breuilly warns us that this type of approach to nationalism - an approach that generally relates nationalism to some previous evolution of national identity - is less tenable than other approaches because a generally agreed upon model of societal, economic and cultural dynamics which can be interrelated with the appearance of nationalist politics or doctrines is impossible to draw. Breuilly feels that attempts to identify various conceptions of national consciousness in history, while nevertheless conceding their deficiency with regard to the true nature of nationalist consciousness, are problematic because such appeals to history are made by nationalism itself. In such appeals, those elements of truth (i.e., the existence of a distinct language and literature, confession or political system - four fundamental components of national consciousness) simply cannot be the starting point for a discussion of modern Russian nationalism.

Rather, "historical achievements" (formed and construed in part by nationalists, and varied in terms of the degree to which they are fabricated) "to which nationalists choose to appeal" should be considered modern nationalism's foundation. To trace these evident elements of truth to nationalism is to transfigure their importance.

Language, literature, confession, and so on, coexist with other historical cultural identities. To raise historical cultural consciousness to the political level is to understand how nationalism alters national consciousness in terms of the relationship of its various components or sources of identity. In other words, nationalism is a modern political phenomenon, which may appeal to history and culture in terms of the various components that constitute a particular national consciousness (language, confession, empire, etc.) in the process of its constructing these components or identities anew.[6]

Modern nationalism originated in the latter half of the eighteenth-century and coincided with the rise of industrialization, manifesting itself in the French Revolution which was a profound factor in its augmentation and diffusion throughout western Europe.[7] Its rise is closely interconnected with notions of secularization (Grotius and Locke), popular sovereignty and democracy (Rousseau), the rights of cultural national individuality (Herder), state power and cultural superiority (Hegel, Fichte, Arndt, Jahn, List) and patriotic messianism and mass mobilization (Mazzini, Michelet, Mickiewicz).[8]

In considering various nationalisms on the basis of comparison, Breuilly's conceptional approach to modern nationalism seems generally sound. The use of comparative methodology, on the other hand, tends toward the search for universalities and thus neglects much that actually contributes to our understanding of nationalism - particularly its peculiar Russian variety, which is altogether neglected in his work. Nationalism is conceived as a phenomenon coinciding with the emergence of the modern European nation-state. Russian nationalism, by contrast, is a highly complex phenomenon which can be interpreted in various ways. Breuilly suggests that one avoid the use of the term 'nationalism' within the branch of history that deals with the evolution of national consciousness. We can ask, however, whether nationalism as politics may be located in particular relationship to such history without attempting to collapse political history into the history of culture.

---

[6] John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State* 2d. ed., (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 13-14.

[7] Hans Kohn, *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in its Origins and Background* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958), 3-24, *passim*.

[8] Hans Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History* (Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand, Inc., 1955), *passim*.

National consciousness is first and foremost, in both a cultural and political sense, nation specific. Strada's definition of nationalism, then, as a transcendent form of national consciousness, is useful in its application to individual case studies mainly because it demands that one first (before attempting to define nationalism itself) consider all those aspects which constitute or call into being the consciousness of a nation: its cultural and political history (confession, ethnomythology, literature and language, social estate, ideology, and economic, legal and political systems) and how these aspects interrelate to form a nation - in other words, how consciousness of national identity evolves and the means by which it is diffused.

This approach admittedly tends to fuse the anthropological or cultural approach to understanding the nation with that of the voluntaristic or political approach which, as noted, constitute relatively autonomous entities. The anthropological or cultural approach derives from the notion that national membership belongs only to those whose culture is shared, meaning, the "system of ideas and signs and associations and ways of behaving and communicating" is the same for all members.[9] Scholars like Breuilly and Ernest Gellner caution against the use of this type of approach as it offers little in the way of a general definition of the nation. In fact, Gellner states, any attempt to define the nation culturally, in an anthropological rather than a normative or voluntaristic sense, "is notoriously difficult and unsatisfactory." This may very well be the case.

Nevertheless, an understanding of a particular nation cannot be accomplished solely by way of the normative or voluntaristic approach. According to the latter, national membership belongs only to those who recognize their shared membership in the nation. Recognition of national membership, hence, the formation of the nation, is achieved by those residing on a particular territory or speaking a particular language, when these members "firmly recognize certain mutual rights and duties to each other in virtue of their shared membership" of the nation. "It is their recognition of each other as fellows of this kind which turns them into a nation, and not the other shared attributes, whatever they might be, which separate that category from non-members."[10] Gellner acknowledges the merit of each of these approaches to understanding the nation and that neither without the other is sufficient. Strada's approach to understanding nationalism through consciousness of national identity is useful because he views both the anthropological and the voluntaristic approaches in an evolutionary and thus inseparable sense. After all, it follows logically that voluntarism is derived anthropologically. Gellner himself admits to this.

---

[9] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 3-7.

[10] Ibid.

A leading western historian of Imperial Russia, Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, has more recently asserted that until the collapse of the Soviet system, Russian history has been devoid of a 'national' stage.[11] Thus, Strada's approach to understanding the roots of Russian nationalism seems critical if we are to determine the soundness of this notion. One can begin with the period proximate to the end of Mongol rule over *Rus'*, through the reigns of Ivan III, Vasilly II and Vasilly III, culminating in the exalted and deified Muscovite state. First, we must attempt to define national consciousness, and specifically, Russian national consciousness.

Hans Rogger's general definition of national consciousness centres on the notion that "a common identity, character, and culture" is sought out and expressed "in art and social life" only by those articulate 'thinking' members of a given community - that is, "those individuals able to emerge from anonymity, to seek contact and communication with one another." In doing so, these individuals are exposed for the first time to foreign ways but are nevertheless intellectually capable of responding to them.[12] Rogger's definition, however, fails to account for the 'inarticulate' members of the community (i.e., the majority), who have allegedly not experienced such exposure. Are we then to regard the majority nation as insignificant to our conception of national consciousness? It can be inferred from Rogger's definition that prior to this so-called 'responsive moment' in Russian history - articulated for the first time only in the eighteenth-century by the intellectual elite - the Russian nation was devoid of a national consciousness.

---

[11] Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *Historical Consciousness and National Identity: Some Considerations on the History of Russian Nationalism* (New Orleans: The Graduate School of Tulane University, 1991), 12.

[12] Hans Rogger, *National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960), 3-4.

According to this perspective, the eighteenth-century intellectual roots of Russian national consciousness were manifested in the form of a national ideology only with the emergence of the intelligentsia in the nineteenth century. This is a point of view widely held by scholars in the field and is certainly not without merit, as will be deduced from our subsequent discussion of the Europeanization of Russia. Rogger goes on to say that national consciousness presupposes not only "extensive exposure" to foreign ways but also the existence of a "secular cultural community" of intellectuals capable of responding to them. In Russia, he asserts, this could only have occurred in the eighteenth century, for prior to this time, though the peoples of *Rus'* had been exposed to the alien ways of the nomadic tribes of China, the Norsemen of Scandinavia, the Germans, Greeks, Poles, Hungarians, Lithuanians, Swedes and Mongols - who dominated *Rus'* from the thirteenth through the fifteenth century, there was no 'secular cultural community' of intellectuals capable of responding.[13] While it cannot be denied that the formation of Russian secularism is an eighteenth-century phenomenon, the question nevertheless arises whether or not this occurrence should be conceived as the emergence of Russian national consciousness; whether the emergence of Russian national consciousness was necessarily determined by the existence of this 'secular cultural community' of intellectuals - those capable of 'articulating' the consciousness of a distinctly Russian national identity. Many analysts of Russian history support this claim.[14]

---

[13] It is of interest to note that princes were often sanctified on secular grounds during the Kievan period, a tradition which was continued into the Muscovite period. For example, Boris and Gleb, the political "passion-sufferers" (*strastoterptsey*) died not "for Christ but in

If the emergence of Russian national consciousness was determined by the existence of this minority secular group - or at least, an attempt at its formation in eighteenth-century Russia - one wonders about the majority religious community which had existed for approximately two centuries prior to this historical moment. Hence, one might infer from Rogger's definition of Russian national consciousness a de-emphasis of the role religion played in the formation and diffusion of consciousness of identity (hence, its historical role in the evolution of Russian national consciousness), or, the relegation of this role to one of antagonism toward

---

Christ, imitating Christ and his passion." "While the usual iconographic mark of the saint is the martyr's crown or diadem, Boris and Gleb are portrayed with the princely caps of the Riurikid dynasty." Other princes, such as Igor Ol'govich, Andrew Bogoliubsky, Grand Prince Michael of Tver, and tsarevich Dimitry (son of Ivan IV) were all sanctified as *strastoterptsey*. Warrier princes such as Alexander Nevsky, Mstislav the Brave of Novgorod and his son-in-law Dormont-Timofei of Pskov were also sanctified on secular grounds: they died for their country (*pro patria*), thus through faith, for Christ not in Christ. Furthermore, laic heroes like Ilya Muromets, who personified the struggle against the steppe nomads, Osliabia and Peresvet, who died in the battle at Kulikovo field in 1380, and Prince Michael Skopin-Shuisky, popular hero during the Time of Troubles, were all sanctified on the grounds of exceptional performance in battle. On the tradition of sanctifying princes and laic heroes, see Michael Cherniavsky's *Tsar and People* (New Haven: Random House, 1970), 7-17.

[14] Ibid., 3-4.

the secular realm and thus also to the development of Russian national consciousness. This is highly erroneous.[15]

The Role of Religion in Consciousness of Identity

Riasanovsky, by contrast, asks whether indeed, the basic Russian identity was not founded well prior to 1700. The basis of such an inquiry must necessarily emphasize the role of Christianity. Indeed, Riasanovsky claims that Russian national identity is ancient on the basis of its Christianity.[16] From its inception in Kievan *Rus'* in 988 to approximately 1450, Christianity provided the means by which consciousness of identity defined itself by a partly affined comparison with its western European counterpart.[17] This can only be regarded as an elite phenomenon, however, as the Kievan populace was predominantly pagan.[18] Throughout the two centuries of Mongol rule (1240-1480), which consequently divided the peoples of Galicia and Suzdal, Moscow and Novgorod, and despite continuous Mongol invasions throughout the period, the Church gained in strength. Numerous monasteries were founded (particularly in the northern forests) and religious life in the towns and villages flourished, as the Mongol khans' primary concern was with maintaining a continuous flow of taxes and tribute from their vassal states to the Golden Horde; religious practice mattered little to them.[19] Kievan princes were persecuted by the Mongols only for political offense, never for religious faith.[20] It is thus not infeasible to suggest that Christianity provided these divided peoples with a certain sense of common identity.

---

[15] Ibid., 2-3.

[16] Riasanovsky, *Historical Consciousness*, 3.

[17] Buttino, ed., *Collapsing Empire*, 114.

[18] Charles J. Halperin, *Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1985), 106.

Gradually, Kievan *Rus*'s official Christian identity distinguished itself from Western Catholicism and later Protestantism in the form of Byzantine Christianity.[21] Proximate to the Council of Florence and the attempted union of the Greek and Latin Churches in 1441, Orthodox Christianity was conceived by the Muscovite elite to be mankind's only source of salvation. Salvation was thus equated with a political perimeter: the Muscovite dynasty.[22] Stephen Carter claims that from this time onward, there existed both a political and a religious Pan-Russianism.[23]

One of the very first foundations of Russian national identity was thus religious, in Risasanovsky's view, based in part on an affinity with western European

---

[19] Robert Massie, *Peter the Great; His Life and World* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), 53.

[20] Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People*, 21, n.45.

[21] Buttino, ed., *Collapsing Empire*, 111-12. Cherniavsky contends that one of the Byzantine sources of Muscovite ideology is provided by the case of Andrew Bogoliubsky, Grand Prince of Suzdal and Vladimir in the mid-twelfth century. Bogoliubsky "acquired the Kiev throne but remained in his patrimony" in the northeast and "sent his armies to occupy and sack Kiev. He was the forerunner of the Muscovite centralizing despots." The case of Bogoliubsky "is the first to reveal in the chronicles the theological status of political power." For this discussion, see Michael Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People* (New Haven: Random House, 1970), 11-14.

[22] Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People*, 106-8.

[23] Carter, *Russian Nationalism*, 13.

Christianity. The subsequent adoption of Byzantine Christianity focused on *pravoslavie*, the Orthodox Christianity which provided Muscovy with a community. This added legitimacy to Muscovy's imperial claim to a privileged and hegemonic position after the fall of Constantinople to the Muslims in 1453. Muscovy was now described as the Third Rome,[24] a concept which has been, in Michael Rywkin's view, "the motto of...Orthodox ideology since...theologians began to assert the Orthodox mission of... autocracy" in the fifteenth century.[25]

In Edward Thaden's view, Moscow the Third Rome became a popular conception from this time forward through its propagation by "polemicists, genealogists, clerks, and monks" who served the Muscovite state.[26] The assertion that the Muscovite tsar was the rightful Sovereign of all *Rus'* through Providence and ancestral inheritance from Prussian and Roman rulers,[27] accorded with official ideology and the image of the tsar as guardian of the Orthodox Church and spiritual patriarch of the people, on the one hand, and strong and ethical champion of state interests and the people's well-being, on the other. While it is true that the conception of Moscow as the Third Rome was "a political and social myth created for the purpose of justifying the position of the Muscovite rulers", in Thaden's view it nonetheless "conformed sufficiently to the needs of...society to become the dominant view of political and social reality for a number of centuries in Muscovite and Petrine Russia."[28]

---

[24] Buttino, ed., *Collapsing Empire*, 111-12.

[25] Ibid., 107.

[26] One can only speculate as to how the notion of Moscow the Third Rome was disseminated among the general populace, if indeed it was. The rapid spread of monasteries in this period might have some significance in this regard. Furthermore, the growth of social and economic interaction between the upper and lower societal orders, which, in Charles Halperin's view, has been greatly underestimated, might have contributed to its having been popularly conceived.

[27] *The History of the Princes of Moscow* traced the descent of Russian princes in a direct line back to the Roman Emperor Augustus. On this lineage, see Michael Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People* (New Haven: Random House, 1969), 41-42.

In Mikhail Agursky's view, the imperial concept Moscow the Third Rome has been an enduring phenomenon to the present day. Its first manifestation as a political philosophy was formulated by the nineteenth-century writer, Fedor Dostoyevsky (1821-1881),[29] and manifested in the form of Slavophile ideology in the latter half of that century.[30] Andrei Zubov asserts that the concept was "very popular" from the sixteenth century on; that the "ancient religious idea of 'cosmocrati' - the universal Empire, seen as an earthly reflection of 'pancratia', the all-embracing kingdom of God," which *Rus'* had inherited "from the ancient civilizations of the East, via Byzantium", was indeed conserved.[31]

If we revert back to our earlier discussion of John Breuilly's approach to understanding nationalism, it is possible to conceive Moscow the Third Rome as an "historical achievement" which altered the political consciousness of the Muscovite elite. We can view the occurrence of this alteration in terms of the relationship of those various identities which constitute consciousness of identity (in this case, religion and state). By raising confession to the highest political level, consciousness of identity was constructed anew. The question which arises is whether we can consider this alteration to have been nationalism proper. Any such notion is unfounded.

---

[28] Edward C. Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism in Nineteenth-Century Russia* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964), 8.

[29] Carter, *Russian Nationalism*, 14.

[30] Buttino, ed., *Collapsing Empire*, 54, n.3.

[31] Ibid., 54.

Walter Laqueur argues that the famous pronouncement of Moscow as the Third Rome made no immediate impression on the ruling elite or public opinion.[32] Nevertheless, the significant expansion and consolidation of the Muscovite state in this period (1462-1598), coupled with the fact that the Orthodox Church paralleled this development with the establishment of Church councils in 1547, 1549, 1551 and 1554, the canonization of twenty-two and seventeen Muscovites in 1547 and 1549, respectively, the acquisition of its own patriarch (Metropolitan Job) in 1589, the elevated status of many Muscovite sees, by 1654 the inclusion of the metropolitanate of Kiev and other dioceses, and its extraordinary wealth; appears to attest to its impression on the ruling elite, at least in the long term.[33]

To argue that public opinion remained unaffected by these developments is to neglect their impact (and other related developments) on Muscovite society and the general populace. Territorial aggrandizement required mass recruitment into the military forces, which included members from all social estates, including slavery.

---

[32] Walter Laqueur, *Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), 3.

[33] Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *A History of Russia*, 5th. ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 126, 198.

In Richard Hellie's view, this led to the rise of the middle-service class, the abolition of St. George's Day, the imposition of the Forbidden Years and the enserfment of the peasantry. Church landownership and the theocratic power of the state created opposition within the Church, between the Josephites and the Non-Acquirers, and within the state, between the tsar and the boyar nobles, which ultimately destroyed peasant self-government and all the achievements of the Government of Compromise. Opposition between Church and state culminated in Ivan IV's liquidation of both the heretics and the conservative Josephites. Ultimately, Ivan's *Oprichnina* which, significantly, included members of the upper and lower strata of society, drove thousands of landowners from their land and virtually destroyed Novgorod and the boyar nobles as a class.[34]

Two factors are of critical importance to our conception of Moscow the Third Rome: first, the geographical contiguity of imperial expansion; and second, the central role of the Orthodox Church. Zubov argues that the state had undertaken neither "Christianization" nor a "civilizing mission" in the newly-conquered territories. On the other hand, Thaden informs us that certain examples of icon art from this period - for example, *The Church Militant*, which is now located in the Tretiakov Gallery in Moscow - give the impression that the state was certainly eager to gain a position of strength through the use of Byzantine political ideas and by a process of self-identification with "the popular image of a Russian national and Orthodox monarchy."[35] This particular icon depicts Ivan the Terrible as one of Muscovy's greatest national and religious heroes, following his defeat of the Tatars at Kazan in 1552, alongside Dmitrii Donskoi, Saint Vladimir, Alexander Nevskii, the Archangel Michael and the Virgin with the Christ child.[36]

---

[34] Alexander Yanov, *The Origins of Russian Autocracy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), 52-59; Richard Hellie, *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), *passim*.

Still, Thaden fails to account for this as a long-standing Kievan tradition of canonizing "defenders of the fatherland" (*Rus'*, the *patria*). Furthermore, the Muscovite rulers feared that their sovereign powers might be encroached upon by the Church, which prevented them from becoming identified solely with its conception of Muscovy as a national and Christian monarchy.[37] Nevertheless, Ivan IV did attempt to Christianize the Tatars of the Volga during his reign.[38] In the first half of the seventeenth century, the government of Michael Romanov attempted to Christianize the non-Slavs (Tatars, Mordva, etc.) in military service to the state with a decree which allowed for the expansion of their service landholdings only by conversion to Orthodoxy.[39] Christianization of the Volga Tatars was again attempted in the eighteenth century during the reign of Elisaveta Petrovna (1741-1761).[40] Zubov argues that because Christian or so-called civilizing ideas did not dominate the political agenda, neither did they dominate the consciousness of the peoples of Muscovy. Obviously, this cannot be determined with any degree of precision.

---

[35] Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism*, 16.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Ibid.

[38] Buttino, ed., *Collapsing Empire*, 54, n.2.

[39] Hellie, *Enserfment*, 55-56.

[40] Buttino, ed., *Collpasing Empire*, 54, n.2.

The populace did, on the other hand, seem to identify with a conception of Muscovy as an Orthodox Christian land. This becomes evident in the light of Cherniavsky's insight into the epithet *Sviataia Rus'* (*Holy Rus'*), which he views as an identification of "the people" separate from the state. The agent of this divergence, he asserts, was tsar Ivan IV. While Thaden's characterization of the tsar as guardian of the Orthodox Church, the people's spiritual patriarch, and champion of their well-being is accurate, according to contemporary official ideology, Cherniavsky does create a certain doubt (admittedly speculative) as to whether it accords with the popular perspective.

Based on the assumption that the epithet *Sviataia Rus'* was commonly used in the folksongs and epics dating from the fourteenth century and appeared in the literature of the seventeenth century, it is neglected in the multitude of excessive literary works devoted to the exalted and deified Muscovite ruler.[41] The first appearance of the epithet, and its only known use in the sixteenth century, is found in Prince Kurbsky's book *History of the Prince of Moscow* as a response to Ivan's second epistle - clearly an attempt to justify the theocratic power of a sovereign ruler. In this work, Kurbsky denounces the tsar for having dishonored himself and all the *sviatorusskie zemli* (lands of *Holyrus'*). The epithet is used eight more times in Kurbsky's *History* in the various forms: *sviatorusskie zemli*, *sviatorusskoe tsarstvo* (tsardom of *Holyrus'*), and *Imperiia* (probably of Polish origin) *sviatorusskaia* (Empire of *Holyrus'*).[42]

---

[41] Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People*, 107.

The problem, as elaborated by Cherniavsky, concerns why the sixteenth-century political writings contain only one consideration of the epithet, given the assumption that it was in common usage at this time.[43] Furthermore, it should be recalled that Prince Kurbsky represented that part of the boyar nobles which ideologically opposed and attempted to restrain the autocracy. As a member of the Government of Compromise, which Ivan ultimately destroyed, Kurbsky was instrumental in the introduction of local self-government, trial by jury, the Assembly of the Land (*Zemskii Sobor*), obligations to the state converted into money terms, eliminating service estates, and restricting Church landownership.[44]

Cherniavsky believes that the answer may be found in Kurbsky's use of the epithet, which in every instance describes the sinister acts of the despotic tsar. Kurbsky thus created an antithesis to the imperial Myth of the Ruler.[45]

---

[42] Ibid., 106-8.

[43] Other examples of epics and songs using the epithet include the song composed for Filaret's return to Muscovy from Polish captivity and the Michael Potok epic. "In the great songcycle associated with the history of Ivan IV, the epithet is not associated with the tsar." *Sviataia Rus'* can, in fact, be located in "satyrical songs that make fun of his marriage with Maria Temriukovna. Here the antithesis seems explicit." See, Michael Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People* (New Haven: Random House, 1969), 111-15.

[44] Yanov, *Origins*, 115; Hellie, *Enserfment, passim*.

[45] Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People*, 107-10.

Sviatorusskie zemli, sviatorusskoe tsarstvo, or *Imperiia sviatorusskaia* "existed apart from the exalted and newly created tsar.[46] Certainly, in this sense, the epithet expresses a political theory consistent with the views of Kurbsky and his ideological predecessors" (the Non-Acquirers and the circle around Maxim the Greek). The *russkie zemli,* Orthodox and pure, had been given in trust to the twelve princely sons of Yaroslav who in common held and ruled over Kievan *Rus'*. Thus, Ivan's self-exaltation and deification as autocratic ruler of All *Rus'*, together with the rejection of his councilors and boyars, caused Kurbsky to view the tsar as a "monster of iniquity".[47]

Cherniavsky agrees with A.V. Soloviev that the epithet was unlikely to have been Kurbsky's invention. More likely, he states, Kurbsky used an epithet familiar to the masses. This attaches greater significance to the official "ideology of silence" (the tendency of Muscovite bookmen to mask social and political reality), which tends to validate Cherniavsky's proposal that the epithet *Sviataia Rus'* was an anti-tsarist and anti-state slogan. Moreover, the period of official silence covers the mid-fifteenth through the sixteenth century, that is, the evolutionary and culminatory period of Byzantine imperial ideology and the deification of the state.[48]

---

[46] In 1520, Iosif, head of the Volokamansk monastery and leader of the Josephites proposed the idea of the "theocratic power of the Orthodox sovereign." For a discussion of the Josephites and Non-Acquirers see, Alexander Yanov, *Origins of Autocracy* (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1981), Chapter 5, *passim.*

[47] Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People*, 48-51, 101-11, *passim.*

[48] Ibid., 108-13.

Thus, with the emergence of the popular epithet *Sviataia Rus'*, which derived out of the Myth of the Ruler - the Orthodox conception of attaining salvation through a saintly ruler - came a possible ideal which served as a basis or principle by which the tsar and the state could be judged. In reality, *Sviataia Rus'* signified a uniformity of purpose which averted all change and could be expected to oppose further social and political change. The task of the state was to conquer this mass inertia. The medieval Myth of the Ruler had been so omnipotent that it concealed any popular ideas or real social phenomena.

However, during the Time of Troubles (1604-1613) the so-called people's myth, developed from the same sources as the Myth of the Ruler,[49] became equally exclusive and unrestricted.[50] With the Polish intervention at the beginning of the seventeenth century, Catholic Lithuanians and Poles were popularly perceived as national and religious adversaries. The traditional conception of the Most-Gentle tsar as *Rus'*s safeguard was re-established only with the election of Michael Romanov by a *Zemskii Sobor* and the foundation of the Romanov dynasty in 1613.[51] Cherniavsky claims that despite the historical origin of the epithet *Sviataia Rus'* as antithetical to the state in the sixteenth century, in the seventeenth century, by contrast, the epithet signifies the contemporary transcendental *Rus'*, that is, the Orthodox people. He looks to the mid-seventeenth century Don Cossack epics: *Tale of the Siege of Azov* and *Lament of the Captives* as evidence of this other existence.[52]

---

[49] The term *Rus'* remained the "popular, common appellation", while *Rossiia* was "used in the titulature of the tsar" by 1654. Cherniavsky contends that this distinction continued in grammatical form through Russian history: *Sviataia Rus'*, not *Sviataia Rossiia*; *Rossiiskaia Imperiia*, not *Russkaia Imperiia*. "The word for a Russian which finally prevailed was *Russkii*, derived from *Rus'*. *Russkii* was expressed among the people by synonyms *krestiane-Khristiane* (peasant-Christians) or *pravoslavnye* (Orthodox). In the eighteenth century poets and writers created *Ross*, or *Rossiianin*, derived from *Rossiia*. This sharpened the antithesis: to be of *Rus'* was to be an Orthodox, a Christian; to be of *Rossiia* was to be of the political state. Hence, two different myths expressing two different Russias...served different functions but drew upon the same sources for their justification." For more on this discussion, see Michael Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People* (New Haven: Random House, 1970), 118-21.

[50] Ibid.

Given the three-year crop failure (1601-1603) and the resulting exhorbitant prices for grain, the depletion of nearly half the population and resort to cannibalism, the extinction of the Riurikid dynasty and consequent series of pretenders to the throne, peasant uprisings, civil war and the Polish and Swedish invasions; the notion of an exclusive and unrestricted myth of the people seems completely credible. Richard Hellie provides an interesting discussion of this period from the perspective of military relations in his *Enserfment* (Chicago and London:

In the Azov tale, *Sviataia Rus'* encompasses all the values which the cossacks defended against the warring Turks: the *Sviatorusskie iconi* (icons), Orthodoxy, the saintly-ruler, and the Muscovite state. The Great Don Army (*Velikoe Voisko Donskoe*) was a politically sovereign entity which dealt with the Turks, Tatars, Poles and Muscovites independently of the state.[53] On the other hand, as Orthodox, they acknowledged the dominion of the tsar. In other words, the cossacks were Orthodox

---

The University of Chicago Press, 1971), *passim*.

[51] Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism*, 16.

[52] In 1637, the Cossacks took Azov. Later that year, the Tatars attacked and took over two thousand Cossacks captive. For more on the Azov campaigns, see Richard Hellie, *Enserfment* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), Part III, *passim*.

[53] Richard Hellie notes that the "free cossacks" unlike the service cossacks "were subject to no government [and] had no definite loyalties...They became subordinate to Muscovy only in 1686." See Helli, *Enserfment* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 208-10.

despite their ethnic Tatar, Ukrainian, Polish or Lithuanian origins. As such, they recognized the Orthodox tsar as the sole ruler. Furthermore, the Don Cossacks maintained the right of entry into the political Muscovite state and were ordered to prevent the entry of "freemen" into Muscovy and the upper river towns. Thus, the distinction between *Sviataia Rus'* and the Muscovite state was implicitly acknowledged by both the government and the cossacks. The only apparent difference lay in the fact that the epithet *Sviataia Rus'* was totally disregarded by tsar, Church and bureaucracy. The Orthodox tsar was the centre of all solemnity and Muscovy's exclusive function, apparent in the expedient Moscow the Third Rome, was from its mid-fifteenth century inception maintained by the ruler. Official consciousness of identity was also represented by the dominant and resistant city of *Moskva*, glorified in all its splendour as the New Rome.

Thus, one might conclude that the epithet *Sviataia Rus'* was a popular expression or the expression of a popular system of thought. In Cherniavsky's view, this is evidenced by its use in the Don cossack epics, which elicit a legal but neither moral nor ideological proscription. The epithet was territorial in the sense that it encompassed the land of salvation, with its symbols of Christian devotion, and the Orthodox people. Its common usage in the popular folksongs and epics did not assert the political structure of the Muscovite state; Muscovy was *Sviataia Rus'* independently of the state.[54]

If we extend Cherniavsky's creative interpretation of the epithet to our discussion of consciousness of identity, it is possible to conceive of the epithet as a symbol of popular consciousness largely suppressed by a powerful political, imperial, or meta-national consciousness, of which it formed an integral and inseparable part. In this sense, the role of Orthodoxy might be regarded as fundamentally integrative.

---

[54] Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People*, 108-13.

With regard to Riasanovsky's question concerning whether the fundamental Russian identity had been firmly established by 1700, in terms of the amalgamation of Orthodoxy and the imperial Muscovite state, official consciousness of identity had already by 1700 developed its 'Janus-faced' character among the elite. The fact cannot simply be dismissed that official consciousness became a rapidly expanding political and historical, meta-national, or imperial identity.[55]

It wasn't long before even the elite began to doubt their Orthodoxy.[56] By the mid-seventeenth century, foreign innovations in the military sphere, trade, science and technology had entered Muscovy.[57] During the reign of Alexis (1645-1676), factionalism within the Church and opposition between the Church and the state culminated in the Great Schism of 1653. This ultimately spelled disaster for the Church.[58] Following its structural reorganization and subordination to the state by tsar Peter I (1682-1725), official consciousness of identity could no longer be defined via the "false non-Orthodox" Europe, but a Europe depicted as worthy of imitation.

---

[55] Buttino, ed., *Collapsing Empire*, 113-14.

[56] Massie, *Peter the Great*, 54-55.

[57] Ibid.

[58] Ibid.

This evidently disquieted the traditional Russian sense of self-identity, culturally, morally, and spiritually. Europeanization was a phenomenon largely confined to the upper classes, which had the duplicitous effect of spurring on nationalist intellectual activity in the secular realm and driving a cultural and spiritual wedge between society and the masses.[59]

Hans Rogger asserts that Russian national consciousness could only have occurred in the eighteenth century with the emergence of the intellectual elite. The profound Western influence motivated Russians to search for their own cultural traditions in order to define their national identity. The process was stimulated in part by an inferiority complex vis-a-vis the rest of Europe.[60] It may be more apt, however, to regard the development of political and intellectual thought in this period as the emergence of a modern national consciousness, a national identity created anew, than its actual inception.[61]

Throughout this century, the Russian government was rather indisposed toward xenophobia and conservative reaction in general, as its primary concern was with accommodating society to the demands of Western technology and civilization. This included the creation of a more administratively efficient civil service, maintenance of order in existent politics and society and elevation of the gentry class to a higher level of culture. It was not preoccupied with national and religious traditions as a means of developing a socially cohesive unit.[62] This is not to say, however, that many did not continue to adhere to these traditions. Evidence, such as the monastic admonishment of foreign heresies and intrigues, the "anti-Western" attitudes of such writers as Novikov and Fonvizin, political hostility toward the German presence in government, military and academic institutions, and even the religious support given to Orthodoxy in former eastern Poland by Catherine II; suggest that a traditional Orthodox ideology existed as a forceful underlying influence.[63] One of the consequences of Europeanization was that for those peoples whose faith remained with the Orthodox tradition, Peter the Great was considered the Antichrist. In Strada's view, two forms of national consciousness: one in the elite, and the other among the populace; were thus created.[64]

---

[59] Buttino, ed., *Collapsing Empire*, 113; Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism*, 4.

[60] Rogger, *National Consciousness*, vii.

[61] Roman Szporluk, *Communism and Nationalism* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 205.

Earlier in this work we discussed Michael Cherniavsky's allusion to the fact that two distinct forms of consciousness of identity had already formed by the seventeenth century, symbolized by the Myth of the Tsar among the elite, and by the opposing myth *Sviataia Rus'* among the populace.[65] Cherniavsky contends that the tension between these two myths, though seemingly extreme in their formulation, was nevertheless inherent. This, he claims, is shown by the polarization of opinion which occurred as a direct result of the Great Schism within the Orthodox Church. The consequent reaction of Old Believers, who strongly opposed Peter I's state, which to them represented a rejection of the traditional image of the saintly-prince or Most-gentle Tsar, created an extreme counterposition that included many of the *streltsy*, most notably their commander, Prince Ivan Khovanskyan.[66] Thus, they embodied *Sviataia Rus'* and its past.[67]

---

[62] Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism*, 17.

[63] Ibid.

[64] Buttino, ed., *Collapsing Empire*, 113.

[65] Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People*, 106-8.

The conception of *Sviataia Rus'* was carried into Peter's reign by all those who held to traditional ways, including the non-schismatic Orthodox, and not solely by those extremist sects disdained as groups of isolated fanatics. In Cherniavsky's view, the ideas of the Old Believers were derived from a shared system of traditional values - devotional symbols, confession, and convention - to which the Petrine state was antithetical. He conceives Old Believer opposition as an expression and utilization of popular consciousness - of *Sviataia Rus'*.[68] Opposition to the Orthodox Church and the Petrine state did not end with the liquidation of the Old Believers but endured through to the collapse of imperial rule. This struggle was rooted in the traditional religious consciousness of the people.[69]

---

[66] Massie, *Peter the Great*, 53.

Richard Hellie notes that the military reforms of 1630-1650 ultimately replaced the *streltsy* with "soldiers, dragoons, lancers and cavalrymen." Their diminished status is significant, and probably accounts to some degree for their involvement in the Old Believer opposition. See Richard Hellie, *Enserfment* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), 207.

[67] Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People*, 108-18.

[68] Ibid.

[69] Massie, *Peter the Great*, 53.

PART III

IMPERIAL NATIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS OF IDENTITY

Beginning with the deification of the state in the sixteenth century and the subsequent emergence of the popular antithetical myth *Sviataia Rus'*, as elicited by Kurbsky and his ideological predecessors, one can conceive the relationship of state and populace in terms of periodic opposition, despite an evidently enduring popular loyalty to both the Church and the state. In Dmitri S. Likhachev's view, opposition has characterized the relationship of state and populace for many ages.

Muscovite Imperial Consciousness

Earlier we discussed Muscovy's conception of an Orthodox Christian Empire which was inherited from Byzantium; Moscow the Third Rome - the imperial ideology of Muscovite autocracy, which was theoretically and symbolically Byzantine. In a pertinent discussion of Cherniavsky's ideas about the "blurring" of Muscovy with the Christian Empire in Constantinople, Charles Halperin notes that prior to the Mongol conquest, the Byzantine emperor - the Basileus - had been the only imperial ruler experienced by the Kievan elite. Following the conquest, however, the chronicles refer to the Mongol steppe khan also as *tsar*. This terminology was applied consistently: the wife of the khan was referred to as *tsaritsa*; the heirs of Chingis khan as *tsarevichi*. By the late fourteenth century, the use of *tsar* for *khan* was thoroughly entrenched in the chronicles: *Chingiz kan* was construed as *Chingis tsar*. Not only were the titles *khan* and *basileus* thus blurred, but also their images. Halperin notes that:

> In the dyptychs (commemorative lists) the khan is accorded the liturgical prerogatives of the basileus. Pictures of the khan even portray him in the regalia of the Byzantine emperor. Using the same title for the khan and the basileus, with the concomitant blurring of the distinctions between them, implicitly accorded the infidel khan the same legitimacy as the Christian emperor. This helped lead to the limited but significant use of the Mongol imperial tradition apparent in the writings of Moscow's bookmen and the political pretensions of her autocrats.[70]

The Muscovite elite had familiarized themselves with the details concerning Mongol succession and thus never made reference to anyone outside of the Golden Kin as anything more than a *kniaz* (prince).

It is Cherniavsky's contention that the Muscovites' use and adaptation of the Mongol imperial tradition began in the fifteenth century and may have been influential in Muscovy's unifying role.[71] This is not to say that the basic political structure of Muscovy did not predate the Mongol conquest. Nor is it to suggest that unification of the feuding principalities was not the result of internal workings. On the other hand, unification may have been accelerated as the Muscovites could build on existing administrative structures necessary for expansion rather than create new ones.[72] Some of these structures helped Muscovy to become the most powerful centre and overcome rival principalities such as Tver' by Muscovites' using the Mongol presence and the techniques of Mongol administration more effectively to their own advantage.[73] Whatever one's view of the role Mongol administration played in the rise of Muscovite hegemony, there is no doubt that by the sixteenth century, autocratic rule was dependent upon many of the political, military, and social institutions patterned after the once dominant Golden Horde. These included tax and fiscal agencies, military organization and armament, bureaucratic parlance, diplomatic modes, the postal system, and certain criminal penalties and liabilities.[74]

---

[70] Halperin, *Golden Horde*, 97-99.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Ibid., 87-90.

According to Halperin, these borrowed institutions were influential in determining the imperial Muscovite outlook.[75] The propagation of this aspect of Muscovy's status as an imperial state was continued for several more centuries. The advantages of this process were obvious to Muscovite autocrats. For example, as successor to the Tatar khans the Muscovite tsar, or *belii tsar* (white emperor), could receive the *yasak* (fur tribute) from those tribes formerly under the Golden Horde.[76] This is not to explain Muscovite power in terms of collaboration with the

---

[73] Ibid., 87-90, 100.

[74] Ibid., 87-90.

[75] Ibid., 100.

To demonstrate this point, Cherniavsky provides a creative interpretation of the figurative illustration on a coin minted in commemoration of the Stand on the Ugra River. On one side of the coin is a Muscovite hero (undoubtedly St. George); on the other side, the Mongol khan's name is replaced by the name of Ivan III in Arabic. This symbolism, it is suggested, honours not the liberation of *Rus'* from the Tatar yoke, but the dynastic succession of "the House of Moscow" from "the Golden Kin." See, Halperin, *Golden Horde* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1985), 100.

[76] Ibid.

Golden Horde. On the contrary, Muscovy had the strength to retain its acquired lands.[77] Nonetheless, the Mongol imperial tradition was made to serve the purposes of Muscovite autocrats.[78]

In the sixteenth century Ivan IV justified his imperial claims to the great powers of Europe with reference to the conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan by Muscovy.[79] Eastward expansion, which was begun by Vasilii III (1505-1533) and continued by his grandson Ivan the Terrible (1533-1584), extended Muscovite power over the Ural Mountains and ultimately into the far eastern expanses of Siberia.[80] Throughout the reign of Alexis (1645-1676), Muscovite territorial expansion was reoriented in a westward direction. Under the Treaty of Pereiaslav (1654) - a now highly controversial issue in the debate on "Ukraine and Russia" - the borderlands east of the Dnieper river (left-bank Ukraine) fell under the protection of the Muscovite tsar. Likhachev advances the Russophile view that this agreement was based on the historic mission of Russia to protect some three hundred other nations.[81] The Ukrainian view, by contrast, sees the agreement not as an act of protection or of liberation from Catholic Poland, rather, as a treaty among equals which was subsequently violated by *Rossiia*'s centralizing policies.[82]

---

[77] Ibid., 87-90.

[78] Ibid., 101-3.

[79] Ibid., 100.

[80] Buttino, ed., *Collapsing Empire*, 107; Martin Gilbert, *Imperial Russian History Atlas* (London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 33.

[81] Dmitri S. Likhachev, *The National Nature of Russian History* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 11-13.

Russian Imperial National Consciousness

Westward territorial expansion continued in the eighteenth century with the annexation of Swedish territory (Karelia, Ingria, Estonia and Latvia, and Russian-controlled Finland), as well as Polish Lithuania.[83] Peter the Great (1682-1725) opened up Baltic Sea outlets by westward expansion, thus actualizing the change from *russkoe tsarstvo* to *rossiiskoe gosudarstvo* (from Muscovite tsardom to Russian Empire).[84] During the reign of Catherine II (1762-1796), all of Belorussia and the Ukrainian lands west of the Dnieper River (right-bank Ukraine) - with the exception of Galicia, which was annexed by Austria in 1772 - were transferred to Russia as a result of the partitions of Poland in 1772, 1793, and 1795. This was a matter less of protection, liberation, or unification, than expansion.[85] Roman Szporluk asserts that these partitions were legitimized through the alleged historical and ethnic unity of the Kievan state, thereby denying a separate national identity of the two other East Slavic groups: Belorussians and Ukrainians. He notes also that in the nineteenth century the Russian public regarded these territories as ethnically Russian.[86]

---

[82] Robert Conquest, ed., *The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986), 15-17.

In the official Soviet view of the Pereiaslav agreement, the Ukrainians constituted a distinct nation, which by this act of 1654 had united with Russia. Though the tsars later annexed additional territory from Ukraine, such acquisitions had the benefit of uniting more Ukrainians in a common state.

[83] Gilbert, *History Atlas*, 36.

[84] Buttino, ed., *Collapsing Empire*, 107.

[85] Conquest, ed., *Last Empire*, 15-17.

Richard Pipes points out that "empire-building", a process begun in sixteenth-century Muscovy and continued throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, proceeded along territorial borders, defeating and assimilating many foreign ethnic groups. The temporal and geographic proximity of the processes leading to both nation-state building and empire-building resulted in two indistinguishable phenomena. This process shaped the distinctive imperial character of Russian national consciousness.[87] While Pipes insists that as a result of the blurring of the processes of nation-state and empire-building the Russians have never really had a sense of who they are as a distinct nation, other scholars (i.e., Likhachev and Zubov) conceive of Russian national consciousness as a cultural phenomenon. This notion is based on the argument that while the imperial state was fortified by the conquest and absorption of many peoples and lands, national cultural originality was nevertheless largely preserved.[88] Cultural originality was not only preserved to a large extent, Zubov asserts, but indeed so was ethnic homogeneity, maintained to some degree by the political system itself, which was (by the nineteenth century) comprised of "provinces ('gubernia' and 'oblast') with absolutely equal rights to the centre." Some of these provinces and regions which covered the vast expanse of the Russian territory, he asserts, retained substantial differences (local self-government, for example) as a result of their historical and cultural differences. Thus, nineteenth-century imperial Russia was, in his view, a state in which all nations and territories, other than the Jews, had equal rights.[89] (This exception will be pursued in further detail in our subsequent discussion of anti-Semitism).

---

[86] Conquest, ed., *Last Empire*, 159-60.

[87] Ibid., 157-58.

[88] Ibid., 157; Buttino, ed., *Collapsing Empire*, 54-55.

Zubov insists, however, on the cultural homogeneity of three nationalities: Russians, Ukrainians and Belorussians, the populations of which constituted 80 percent of the total empire population in 1897 (44.3% Great Russians, 30.1% Ukrainians, 7.2% White Russians).[90] Szporluk takes particular issue with this view, arguing that the theoretical and practical denial of the separate Ukrainian and Belorussian identities by Nicholas I's Official Nationality policy was based precisely on the ancient principle of dynastic identity. That the Polish conception of the Ukrainian, Belorussian and Lithuanian territories as Polish lands did not change, even well after the cessation of an independent Polish state in 1795, is highly significant. In the nineteenth century, Poles and Russians fought for control of those lands. The Poles, however, based their territorial claim on a national political concept, that is, on the basis of commonly-held rights and institutions; the Russian claim was based on an alleged common ethnicity or linguistic identity.[91]

Clearly, consciousness of Russian national identity was subsumed under a meta-national or imperial consciousness. The nation-state and empire are often considered synonymous. Still, there is a tendency among scholars to emphasize the distinction between political and cultural consciousness of identity. Though this distinction seems unavoidable in any attempt to understand the complex phenomenon of Russian national consciousness, one must also consider their reciprocal relationship in this regard.[92] While it is true that the imperial state conditioned Russian national consciousness,[93] the question remains whether this process actually denied the Russians a consciousness of self as a distinct cultural nation separate from the state.

---

[89] Buttino, ed., ibid. See also p. 55, n.8.

[90] Ibid., 59, n.16.

[91] Conquest, ed., *Last Empire*, 159-60.

In Elie Kedourie's view, the argument that a national culture cannot exist without political independence is nonsense.[94] He maintains that various groups which do not possess political sovereignty nonetheless have long had a national culture. National culture thus does not require national independence. On the other hand, Walter Urban feels this to be true only if complete cultural liberty is granted to national subjects by the state. Where the state prohibits cultural freedom, demands for national liberation and ultimately political sovereignty will arise.[95] Urban has obviously neglected the early nineteenth-century Slavophiles, whose aspiration to cultural freedom did indeed stop short of a demand for both national liberation (at least, as he understands it - in terms of the rule of law, or the *Gesellschaft* Paradigm) and political independence, preferring instead, and justifying, autocratic rule in Russia. The imperial state did grant certain rights to the various cultural elements within the empire, but it must be acknowledged that these rights accorded with the ruling elite's *amour propre*.[96]

---

[92] Buttino, ed., *Collapsing Empire*, 111-12.

[93] Likhachev, *National Nature*, 14.

[94] G. R. Urban, *End of Empire: The Demise of the Soviet Union* (Washington D C: The American University Press, 1993), 111.

[95] Ibid., 111-12.

This notion can be traced back to the period of Mongol domination of *Rus'* through Charles Halperin's discussion of Cherniavsky's insight into the ancient chronicles. The "bookmen" (writers, redactors, scribes, copyists) of the Kievan past had customarily explained victory or defeat in struggles with nomadic tribes in terms of God's gratification of, or discontentment with, his people; never before had they been summoned to the task of rationalizing absolute defeat. Rather than confront the ideological awkwardness of Mongol conquest, the bookmen skillfully manipulated the fact of Mongol hegemony by proffering a continuum of the relations between Kievan *Rus'* and the steppe khanates, without ever acknowledging the change of suzerainty. Thus, an "ideology of silence" veiled what Mongol rule over *Rus'* intellectually implied.[97]

Some scholars, notably Likhachev, emphasize the point that the aggressive character of Russian domestic and foreign policies cannot be conceived in terms of culture. Acts of aggression, such as the annexation of Novgorod and the partitions of Poland, were carved out not by the populace, but by the state.[98] On the other hand, cultural and political consciousness frequently condition each other in the sphere of ideology and politics and thus cannot be completely detached.[99] Hellie points out that the politically sovereign, but nonetheless Orthodox, Ukrainian cossacks, under the leadership of Bogdan Khmel'nitsky, offered their assistance to the Muscovite state in achieving the goals of the Smolensk War: recovery of Smolensk from the Poles, and annexation of the Ukraine. In May-June 1648, prior to the time the Muscovite government exerted direct control over the Ukrainian cossacks, they took Kiev.[100] This tends to emphasize the role of Orthodoxy in terms of its usefulness to the state:[101] Orthodoxy provided the foundation for loyalty to the state.

---

[96] Ibid.

[97] Halperin, *Golden Horde*, 5-10.

[98] Likhachev, *National Nature*, 11-13.

During the reign of Nicholas I (1825-1855), himself deeply devoted to the Orthodox cause, the Church was more harshly subjected than hitherto to the regulatory bureaucratic control of the government.[102] The political outlook of Count S.S. Uvarov and his theory of Official Nationality - the formulation of Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationality - proved to be a cogent theory, certainly moreso than that of his predecessor, Admiral Shishkov.[103] Shishkov's main service to Alexander I (1801-1825) had entailed the formulation of patriotic declarations concerning military policy and goals of the state. Alexander had not seriously considered Orthodoxy and Russian nationality as educative subjects until late in his reign. In the early 1820s his policy change was swayed by the organized activity of conservative officials of Church government (Metropolitan Seraphim of St. Petersburg, Minister of War A.A. Arakcheev and Admiral Shishkov, among others) to eliminate foreign religious persuasions in Russia.[104]

---

[99] Buttino, ed., *Collapsing Empire*, 111-12.

[100] Hellie, *Enserfment*, Part III, *passim*.

[101] Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism*, 12.

[102] Ibid., 13.

[103] Ibid., 19-21.

Prince A.N. Golitsyn, director of the Ministry of Ecclesiastical Affairs and Public Instruction, had been a strong supporter of the influence of foreign religious groups and practices in Russia. His main opponent was the monk Fotii Spaskii, Archimandrite of the Iurev Monastery near Novgorod, who beseeched Alexander to deal firmly with the perpetrators of these foreign persuasions and to abolish the ministry outright. In 1824 Golitsyn was removed from his ministerial post and the ministry was abolished. The Holy Synod subsequently repossessed its former position in the Russian bureaucracy, the Over Procurator regaining direct access to Alexander. Admiral Shishkov received the appointment of Minister of Public Instruction and was thus now in a position to block the spread of foreign and non-Orthodox ideas in Russia and to develop an educational system based on faith and loyalty to the tsar. However, Shishkov's proposed program of December 1824 remained at the planning stage upon his retirement in 1828.

When Uvarov assumed Shishkov's position as Minister of Public Instruction in 1833 the state endeavoured to pursue Russian nationality as a source of social and moral cohesion. This was to be accomplished through Uvarov's articulation of the formula Autocracy, Orthodoxy, and Nationality.[105] Uvarov was particularly concerned with the growing unrest at Moscow University, emphasizing to Nicholas I that Russian youth ought to be protected from European ideas. Nevertheless, his notion of adapting universal enlightenment to Russian national life totally neglected the culture and customs of the masses, whose role was considered to be passive and minor. Official Nationality in its practical application meant: the promotion of Russian patriotism through the teaching of national subjects in upper class education; support for Russian national culture, particularly the Russian language, in Poland and the Ukrainian and Baltic provinces; and education of the general populace in loyalty to government and faith in Orthodoxy. It is unfortunate that so little is known - apart from official statements - about how Russian national consciousness was affected by the diverse peripheral non-Russian cultures within the empire.

---

[104] Ibid., 18.

---

[105] Ibid., 18-19.

PART IV

LITERATURE, LANGUAGE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

Vittorio Strada and Dmitri S. Likhachev both suggest that one turn to literature to grasp the significance of the imperial essence of Russian national identity.[106] Indeed, Likhachev claims, literature and the written language are the voice of all national cultural ideals, meaning the superior and most illustrative cultural aspects.[107] He looks to the written literature of the Kievan period (proximate to the inception of Christianity in *Rus'*) which, he suggests, originated in the pursuit of high ideals. *A Philosopher's Speech*, for example, the first of *Rus*'s literary works and the foundation for the ancient chronicles, expressed a concern with *Rus*'s position and possible future role in world history. Hilarion's sermon *On Law and Grace*, the second renowned literary work of this period, expressed similar concerns. Likhachev explains that from the outset meditation on the future has been a feature of so-called Russian literature, from the chronicles of ancient *Rus'* to the works of Chekov, Herzen and Dostoevsky.[108]

In Charles Halperin's view, as noted, the concerns of the tsars and "bookmen" of the Kievan period were one and the same. By the late fourteenth century their use of the Mongol imperial tradition in contemporary chronicles and annals had the duplicitous effect of solving and creating problems. On the one hand, the Chingisid principle was useful in terms of the Muscovite authors' justification of their own actions. Dmitri Donskoi's convenient departure from *Moskva* just prior to its being captured, plundered and destroyed by Tokhtamysh (1382), for example, was explained by the bookmen as a display of respect for Chingisid legitimacy. This was false and the bookmen were fully cognizant of this fact.[109] On the other hand, use of the Chingisid principle *de facto* recognized Mongol rule as legitimate and exposed an inappropriate respect for infidel ideology. The notion of a Christian emperor as legitimate heir to the Mongol khans of the Golden Horde was a profound ideological betrayal of Orthodox Christianity and the very concept of a Byzantine Christian Empire. Consequently, contemporary sources rarely revealed the use Muscovite autocrats made of the Chingisid principle and the notion of Muscovy as the successor state of the Golden Horde.[110]

---

[106] Buttino, ed., *Collapsing Empire*, 114.

[107] Likhachev, *National Nature*, 13.

[108] Ibid., 15-16.

Paradoxically, assimilation of the Mongol imperial tradition was concurrent with the failure, or unwillingness, to concede intellectually the fact of the Mongol conquest. Halperin attempts to resolve this inconsistency by considering the essence of the Mongol administration of *Rus'*. Contemporary history-writing, he asserts, was allowed the pretense of an independent state largely because the princes retained their thrones and the Mongols' physical presence was intermittent. Furthermore,

---

[109] Halperin, *Golden Horde*, 99.

[110] Ibid., 101.

Mongol raids on and destruction of the towns evidenced not foreign rule but foreign aggression. Thus the real political situation in *Rus'* was veiled with remarkable skill by the bookmen in observance of the will of the political elite: princes, nobles and ecclesiastics who regularly attended and dealt officially with the Mongol khans at Sarai. Both the impact and the possibilities of the Chingisid principle were felt directly by the Muscovite elite, hence, its incorporation into their own political ideology; a contradictory but practicable and advantageous posture.

The Muscovite bookmen were acutely aware of one fundamental and overriding political feature of the Chingisid principle: that only direct descendants of Chingis Khan could become khans; and they consistently finessed this feature to suit their own purposes. According to Halperin this awareness is evident in the tale of the Vozha River battle (1378), the *Chronicle Tale* (1380), and the tale of Tamerlane's attack on *Moskva* (1395), all of which deal with the usurpation of the title *khan* by the allegedly illegitimate Horde ruler Mamai. Emir Edigei's siege of *Moskva* is recounted in the chronicles with notable attention given to the Chingisid principle (Edigei, with four *tsarevichi* serving in his army, is given permission to attack by the *tsar,* but abandons this endeavour for Sarai where he must protect the *tsar* against a *coup d'etat).* For the writings of this period (the Kulikovo era), this explicit attention to the Chingisid principle is critical, given that from the perspective of Orthodox Christianity all unorthodox rulers were equally illegitimate.[111] The Muscovite bookmen fully understood the elaborations of Mongol succession and used them for their various ideological purposes.[112]

---

[111] Ibid., 99.

Still, the notion that the general populace was familiar with this literature lacks credulity. On the other hand, the twelfth-century *Tale of the Host of Igor* (*Slovo o Polku Igoreve*)[113] is considered by some scholars (i.e., Carter and Cherniavsky) to be the earliest literary work that elicits a self-awareness, whether one views it as 'national' or not.[114] In this work, *Rus'*, the *Russkaia zemlia*, is betrayed in the princely struggles with the nomadic steppe tribes; the author appeals to the Riurikid princes for an end to their incessant feuds and the unification of *Rus'*, the *patria* or common fatherland, as a strategic defense. Another epic, the *Slovo o pogibeli russkoi zemli* (*Tale of the Conquest of the Lands of Rus'*), which was to follow the tale of Igor, may also be considered part of the process of self-identification. Like Igor's tale, this literary work is concerned with the Mongol invasions of *Rus'* - the fatherland of all those born to and residing on the *svetlaia zemlia* (Illuminated Land), or *svetlorusskaia zemlia* (Illuminated land of *Rus'*). Cherniavsky interprets the meaning of this epithet by reference to the unifying power of Christianity in a politically chaotic and divided *Rus'*. 'Illuminated', in this case, meant illuminated by the light of true faith, by the light of Christianity. Here one sees the means by which self-identity might be achieved in the midst of political crises. This was a means of identification taken from the princely myth, however, for the term *svetlyi* in Igor's tale is an epithet intended not for *Rus'*, but for the prince.[115]

---

[112] Ibid., 97-99.

[113] Carter, *Russian Nationalism*, 13; Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People*, 104.

[114] Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People*, 104.

Soloviev contends that the ideological and etymological origination of the fifteenth-century epithet *Sviataia Rus'* lay in the epithets "bright", "enlightened" and "illumined". While not denying the soundness of this view, Cherniavsky asserts that this transferrence was indirect. The sun imagery of "enlightened" or "illuminated" *Rus'* was a reference to the Grand Princes, who were considered to have provided *Rus'* with the illumination which made her "bright". Vladimir, the Beautiful Sun (*Vladimir Krasnoe Solnyshko*) was the first of such references, which ended with the monk Philotheos's letter to Vasily III. Thus, if the earlier epics signified an image of the aggregate land, this tradition remained largely invalidated by the vital and omnipotent princely myth.[116]

It is important to bear in mind that a concern with the meaning of Russia's history and the possible path of her further development in modern Russian literature has its roots in the medieval chronicles, which express similar concerns. In the sixteenth century this theme takes on the issues of the new role of autocracy and the best form of government for Muscovy. The most compelling evidence of this is the correspondence between Ivan IV, who defended the divine inheritance of autocracy, and his opponent, Prince Andrew Kurbsky, who upheld the historical role of boyardom in relation to the ruler. This bitter exchange took place over a period of fifteen years (1564-1579).[117] Many scholars contend that a concern with Russia's history and future development coincided with the Europeanization of Russia and the flowering of Russian literature and literary criticism in the eighteenth century.[118] While this is accurate, it must be acknowledged that the concern itself is ancient.

---

[115] Ibid., 104-5.

[116] Ibid, 106, n.15.

In the seventeenth century religious writings flourished in Muscovy. The most notable of these works is Avvakum's autobiography which, significantly, was written in the spoken idiom. Sylvester's *Domostroi* (House Manager), an instruction to heads and other members of Muscovite households on proper management and conduct, reflects the ritual, pious, severe and patriarchal essence of Muscovite society.[119] Other literature of the seventeenth century, Riasanovsky notes, elicits an essence altogether different from that of the *Domostroi*. Riasanovsky attributes the appearance of romance, satire and adventure in contemporary Muscovite stories to the influx of Western lay literature coming indirectly through Poland, the Ukraine and the Balkans. Sometimes the line of transmission was even more direct. These stories were very popular. Moreover, popular "traditional oral literature continued to thrive in the Muscovite period" in the form of tales, songs, byliny (epic poems), religious poems and the *skomorokhi* (a popular form of entertainment which combined music and rudimentary theatre performed by travelling performers), also familiar since Kievan times.[120]

---

[117] Riasanovsky, *History of Russia*, 201-2; Yanov, *Origins*, 222-24.

[118] Szporluk, *Communism and Nationalism*, 205, 208, citing Tibor Szamuely, *The Russian Tradition*, Robert Conquest, ed., (London: Secker and Warburg, 1974), p. 147.

[119] Riasanovsky, *History of Russia*, 202.

Russian literature of the eighteenth century displays a profound Western influence. The introduction and development of the major Western literary forms of expression (poetry, drama and the novel) predominated in literary circles. Writers such as Antioch Kantemir (1709-1744), the founder of Russian *belles lettres*, Michael Lomonosov (1711-1765), renowned for his odes, Alexander Sumarokov (1718-1777), "the father of Russian drama", Gabriel Derzhavin (1743-1816), Catherine the Great's constant eulogist, and Denis Fonvizin (1745-1792), the great Russian satirist; all represent the readiness of eighteenth-century educated Russians to translate, adapt and assimilate Western literature.[121]

Once again a concern with world history and Russia's position therein became prominent. One of the most outstanding literary proponents of Official Nationality - Nikolai Karamzin (1766-1826), whose twelve-volume *History of the Russian State* (1816) was considered by contemporaries to be the classic Russian history, deserves attention in this regard. As official historian Karamzin made salient his affiliation to such scholars as Pogodin, Shevyrev, and Ustryalov, the traditional authors of Official Nationality. In his *Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia* (1811), as well as in his *History*, Karamzin's political belief in the powerful autocratic state was clearly and indubitably expressed.[122] His appeal to Russian nationality, however, is considered to have been one of relative moderation among many such appeals in Russia during the Napoleonic wars of 1812-1815.

---

[120] Ibid., 59, 203.

[121] Ibid., 292-93.

In Seton-Watson's view, the period of the Napoleonic wars was a milestone in the formation of Russian national consciousness.[123] Napoleon was increasingly revered as a threat by both the nobility, who perceived his army as the instrument of a modern European great power policy, and by the general populace, which perceived it as the anti-Christ's host. This common perception had the effect, in his view, of drawing the upper and lower classes together perhaps for the first time in Russian history.[124] Napoleon had compelled the reformers of Russia - even those admirers of French models - to defend traditional Russia; a reality that even came to be idealized by some.[125]

Proximate to the Napoleonic Wars the development of a Russian literary language, already expedited by Karamzin beginning in the late eighteenth century, reached an altogether new height in the poetic genius of Alexander Pushkin (1799-1837). The Russian victory and the new literary splendour created great pride in Russia. The war had left an indelible sense of solidarity among the peasant soldiers. Thus, the period beginning with the Russian victory over Napoleon, onward, is regarded by Seton-Watson to be the period when loyalty to the tsar and Orthodoxy meshed with loyalty to the Russian nation. Although this is more evident among nobles, middle-ranking officials and successful merchants than among peasants, he claims, the lower classes were nonetheless affected.[126]

---

[122] Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825-1855* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959), 178.

[123] Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism*, 17-18; Conquest, ed., *Last Empire*, 18-20.

[124] Ibid.

[125] Ibid.

Still, one must be careful not to confuse national consciousness with patriotism. The lower orders of social organization had served in the military forces in defense of the *patria* well prior to the Napoleonic wars; patriotism was present among them throughout the course of Russian history. Certainly officialdom tended to exaggerate national patriotism in the period of Napoleon's onslaught, as is evidenced by one of its most prominent exponents, Admiral Shishkov. Shishkov propagated the immorality and contaminatory influences of revolutionary ideas in Russia and even condemned the use of French intrusions into the Russian literary language, advocating instead the use of Old Church Slavonic which, in his view, paralleled the morally pure Orthodox confession.[127]

The Russian Language and National Consciousness

Hans Rogger notes that a "concern with language has ever been intimately connected with a people's search for identity [and] has often been made to bear the main burden of proof of nationality."[128] This is particularly true for the "ethnicist" view of nationalism, which very often emphasizes language as a unifying and identifying factor for nations. It is also especially true for Russian chauvinism, which has periodically sought to impose the Russian language as the primary language of the greater empire. Rogger rightly asserts that the emergence and development of a Russian national secular literary language was an eighteenth-century phenomenon. The roots of Russian national consciousness took hold in this period as a result of Europeanization. He views the development of a Russian literary language and the attempt to invalidate all foreign intrusions in it as a deliberate attempt to create a cultural self-awareness and confidence.[129]

---

[126] Ibid.

[127] Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism*, 18.

[128] Rogger, *National Consciousness*, 85.

It must be pointed out, however, that this self-awareness manifested as a result of "the deepened and intensified process of cultural contact, which called into being the Russian intelligentsia"; it should not be seen as a result of the origination of this process. This is not in any way to diminish the importance of the period in the evolution of Russian national consciousness. It is true that the intelligentsia found confirmation of itself as a class through the "deepened and intensified process of cultural contact." Confirmation of the intelligentsia as Russians assumed a multiplicity of forms: as remonstrations against the deleterious effects of foreignisms on Russian speech; as demands for the return to its purity; and as testimonials to its antiquity, wealth and equality (even superiority). The importance of language manifested also as a search for simple uniformity and the desire to create a common literary standard which would testify to Russian national cultural independence and provide the means for its further development.

---

[129] Ibid.

According to Rogger, the cause for concern with the problem of language in this period dates back to the inception of Christianity in *Rus'* in the late tenth century, for it was at this time that the peoples of *Rus'* inherited their first written language: Church-Slavonic, embodied in the form of the sacred texts. The Kievan elite understood Church-Slavonic but it was nevertheless quite different from the spoken language of everyday life. By the fifteenth century Church-Slavonic had relinquished its puristic and scholarly character. The clergy reacted with hostility to this alteration by purging literature of its vulgarisms. As a direct result of this, a spoken idiom evolved while Church-Slavonic, over the next three centuries, remained distinct.

By the early eighteenth century, Church-Slavonic (then the sole literary language) proved to be inadequate for Peter the Great's westward reorientation and expression of his "civic, secular, and technical aims." In Rogger's analysis of the period the inflow of foreign innovations peaked with the intensification and deepening of cultural contact mainly because the gentry were recruited *en masse* into continuous military and bureaucratic state service. Performance of these new tasks required an adequate level of literacy which the average landowner did not possess. This linguistic vacuum was consequently filled by the influx of foreign words and phrases, which had the effect of revealing the grammatical arbitrariness, orthographical impropriety and lexiconic diversity of the Russian language. In the latter half of the century, particularly throughout the reign of Catherine II, Rogger asserts that the gentry became increasingly aware of the special position it held in society.

Moreover, its official recognition gave rise to the development of a literary culture which fully expressed its distinct identity as a class.[130] It is against the background of the main preoccupations of the eighteenth-century intellectual elite: the wealth of both the spoken idiom and Church-Slavonic as a literary language, deliberations concerning how they stood in particular relation to each other and to a modernized written or literary language; that one must view the aspiration to a Russian national literary language and a national literature.[131]

The role foreign words and phrases were to play in this quest is rooted in the course of Russian history. Their continuous influx, whether from Byzantium, Poland-Lithuania, Germany or France, in terms of the nature and impact of mode, grammar and terminology, had been revealed well prior to the eighteenth century. Rogger's acknowledgement of this fact thus highlights one of the major tenets of national consciousness as he understands it: exposure to foreign ways. Response to this exposure, however, could in his view only have occurred in the eighteenth century when the influx of foreign words, phrases and literary innovations had reached its apex. Nonetheless, the contention that a modern language can be considered proof of nationality is erroneous.

Eighteenth and nineteenth-century Russia is identified by most scholars in the field as the emergent and developmental period of Russian national consciousness. This serves as an important reminder that national consciousness is understood and defined as an elite phenomenon; national consciousness is what the elite classes say it is.

---

[130] Ibid., 66; Riasanovsky, *Official Nationality*, 178.

[131] Rogger, ibid., 86-89.

PART V

SLAVOPHILISM AND THE POLITICAL RIGHT

Alexander Yanov points out that the emergence of The Russian Idea - a Russian imperial-national ideology and political doctrine which is rooted in eighteenth-century conservative thought and evolved from early nineteenth-century Slavophilism (certainly without any intent to diminish the power of Russian imperial ideology of this period) - was both a cultural and political phenomenon.[132] While the Slavophiles do not represent a popular consciousness of identity, Slavophilism did harken back to certain traditional values, which do. The Slavophiles themselves were an elite group of Moscow intellectuals of noble origin; they included Konstantine Aksakov (1817-1860), Ivan Aksakov (1823-1886), Aleksei Khomiakov (1804-1860), Ivan Kireevskii (1806-1856), Petr Kireevskii (1808-1856), Yuri Samarin (1819-1876), Aleksandr Koshelev (1806-1883) and others, all dubbed the Slavophiles by their opponents, the Westernizers.[133]

The particular relevance of Slavophilism to our understanding of Russian imperial, or meta-national, consciousness is apparent in the clearly defined constituent of The Russian Idea and its religious makeup.[134] The Russian Idea, as

---

[132] Yanov, *Russian Challenge*, 20. See also Index, "Russian Idea", 300.

[133] Ibid., 19; Riasanovsky, *Historical Consciousness*, 6-7.

[134] Laqueur, *Black Hundred*, 14.

Alexander Yanov explains,

> proceeded...from the belief that the contemporary world was suffering from a global spiritual crisis 'carrying humankind headlong toward catastrophe'...It pointed to the inability of the secularized, materialistic and cosmopolitan West to come to grips with this crisis, whose historical source lay in the secular Enlightenment: in the West's rejection of religion as the spiritual basis of politics and in its inability to realize that not the individual but the nation is the foundation of the world order conceived by God; that 'humankind is quantified by nations'.[135]

Strada also discusses the tendency in Slavophile thought "to see the Russian Christians as a kind of chosen people with a vocation for saving the world from decadence and spiritual corruption." The Slavophile controversy can thus be located within the meta-national paradigm: "We, They" (Russia and the West), familiar since the inception of Orthodox Christianity and the pronouncement of Moscow as the Third Rome in the fifteenth century.[136]

Andrzej Walicki makes the important point that the West had an unqualified influence on Slavophile thinkers in the sense that their absorption with the fate of Russia was in fact profoundly Westernized, despite their views of the West. Indeed, the Slavophiles were both thoroughly familiar and enthralled with European intellectual thought (Shelling, Feuerbach, Hegel, Fourier, Kant, Marx) and it was within this body of thought that they pondered Russia's destiny. One of the peculiarities of this catalysis was Russia's backwardness. According to Slavophile thought, Russia could not only learn from the European experience but also capitalize on its achievements.[137] Increasingly, the "superiority of true Russian principles" based on the "supreme historical mission of Orthodoxy and Russia"[138] would embrace the whole of Europe and ultimately the whole of humanity.[139]

---

[135] Yanov, *Russian Challenge*, 24.

[136] Buttino, ed., *Collapsing Empire*, 114.

By contrast, both Walicki and Michael Boro Petrovich describe Slavophilism generally in terms of its pure romanticism and humanitarianism, thus regarding its expressed interest in the "brotherly peoples abroad" as one limited to promoting religious, literary and linguistic ties.[140] Even within these confines, however, tsars Nicholas I and his son, Alexander II, viewed Slavophilism with distrust.[141] With regard to Nicholas I's Russia, Riasanovsky explains, Slavophilism tended to be something of a paradox. For example, while in the name of a religious ideal the Slavophiles espoused a doctrine condemning all compulsion and legalism, they nonetheless accepted the need for government and tended to support an autocratic regime. By relegating the entire burden of authority and compulsion to the tsar - the personification of autocratic rule - society could thus be liberated from the political realm. In addition, autocracy could be justified on historical grounds, with its roots in ancient Muscovy. Yet, Riasanovsky continues, justification of autocracy on these grounds "remained historical and functional, therefore relative, never religious and absolute." Moreover, the Slavophiles advocated peasant emancipation and individual rights to private "conscience, speech, and publication" and opposed capital punishment and bureaucracy. Thus, they conceived the relationship between the government and the people to be one of mutual non-interference. This evoked the hostility of the government, which censored or prohibited Slavophile publications.

---

[137] Szporluk, *Communism and Nationalism*, 205.

[138] Riasanovsky, *Historical Consciousness*, 8-9.

[139] Buttino, ed., *Collapsing Empire*, 114.

[140] Karel Durman, *The Time of the Thunderer: Mikhail Katkov, Russian Nationalist Extremism and the Failure of the Bismarckian System, 1871-1887* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1988), 25-26.

[141] Ibid.; Hans Kohn, *Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953), 130-32; Walicki, *Slavophile Controversy*, 147-48, 527.

Karel Durman explains that "the early Slavophile period...has to be understood in the framework of a regime dwelling heavily on legitimist Holy Alliance principles and strictly prohibitive to any open sermon running counter to it."[142] Nicholas I himself accused the later Slavophiles (Ivan Aksakov, Khomiakov, Koshelev, Samarin and Pogodin) of rebellion against legitimate Prussian and German authorities concealed under the aegis of Slavic humanitarianism. Slavic unification, he asserted, would not be achieved through disorder but only through God's will.[143] Nicholas nevertheless failed to prevent the Slavophiles from clinging to ideals which far exceeded those of the Holy Alliance.

Indeed, from the perspective of the ruling German dynasty, Slavophile anti-Westernism was directed primarily against the Germans. In Yurii Samarin's *Letters from Riga* the Baltic Germans were accused of oppressing Russians. This accusation resulted in Samarin's arrest (in March 1849) and forced repentance on the orders of the tsar.[144] Alexander II also distrusted the Slavophiles, whom he regarded as the motivating force behind the people's increasing lack of confidence in their government.[145] "True Russian feelings," which made themselves known this time in the "enmity" to Count Karl Nesselrode, demonstrated once again the anti-German bent in Slavophile thought. Nesselrode, Durman explains, was long despised as a "German" whose interests lay in maintaining the Holy Alliance rather than with Russian concerns in the East. Following the defeat of the Russians in the Crimean War and the subsequent Treaty of Paris (30 March 1856), which only humiliated the Russians, Alexander removed Nesselrode from office and appointed one of his strongest opponents, Prince Alexander Gorchakov, Minister for Foreign Affairs.[146]

---

[142] Durman, *Time of the Thunderer*, 25-26.

[143] Ibid.

These so-called true Russian feelings of the early Slavophile period were later expressed in ideas described as Panslav or Pan-Russian, to which we devote our attention below.[147] First, it is important to emphasize the point that while it is clear that the Slavophile/Westernizer controversy was a discussion about the content of Russian nationality, much confusion has resulted from the simplified view that the Slavophiles and the Westernizers were the sole participants in this debate. In fact, as Szporluk notes, a third participant was the autocratic state itself.[148] Riasanovsky clearly acknowledges this presence, distinguishing between nineteenth-century conservative romantic nationalism, prevalent amongst intellectuals, and Official Nationality, characteristic of tsar Nicolas I (1825-1855) and other conservative exponents of autocracy - those most interested in retaining their social position.

---

[144] Agursky, *Third Rome*, 9.

[145] Durman, *Time of the Thunderer*, 28.

[146] Ibid., 22-23.

[147] Ibid., 25-26.

[148] Conquest, ed., *Last Empire*, 158-59.

In Strada's view, three forms of national consciousness now existed: one in the intellectual realm, the official version, and that of the common people - the majority. Unfortunately, we know much more about the sense which the intellectuals and ruling elite had of Russia than about the masses in this regard. Our knowledge of the masses is vague. They might have upheld the tradition of a mythical tsar or a myth of *Sviataia Rus'*, preserving in their collective memory the peasant rebellions of Bolotnikov and Zarutsky, during the Time of Troubles (1601-1614), Ivan Balash, at the end of the Smolensk War (1632-1634), Stenka Razin (1666-1671), K. Bulavin (1707-1709) and Emelian Pugachev (1773-1775).[149] What is certain is that Russian national consciousness was developing an accretive complexity within the context of Europe. As a result of this development, the three consciousnesses of identity delineated above became further differentiated. While this applies to some degree to the ruling class it is more evident in the intelligentsia, which had divided into opposing groups.[150]

---

[149] Hellie, *Enserfment*, Part II, *passim*.

[150] Buttino, ed., *Collapsing Empire*, 113.

Pan-Slavism

One such intellectual current which evolved from Slavophilism, was Pan-Slavism. According to Petrovich and Walicki, Slavophile Panslavism was initially inspired by two events: Konstantin Aksakov's memorial *On the Eastern Question* (6-18 February 1854), in which he called for Russia and Slavdom to conquer Constantinople; and the formation in January 1858 of the Moscow Slavic Benevolent Committee, which marked the expropriation of Pan-Slav nationalist political aims and the gradual abandonment of its authentic Slavophile foundation.[151]

The establishment of the Slavic Committee was proposed by three women attending the tsaritsa: Princess Vasilchikova and Countesses Bludova and Protasova. The proposal was intended as an initiative to help Orthodox Christians to resist Latin and Jesuit influences from the West, and benefitted Moscow proponents of the "Slav-Orthodox cause" - Ivan Aksakov, Khomiakov, Koshelev, Samarin, and Pogodin.[152] Aside from these founding members, the Committee's membership was augmented by nobles, high officials, officers and intellectuals. The nobility included some prominent families, such as the Volkonskys, Orlovs, Golitsyns and Obolenskys. Among the officers were: General Prince Sviatopolk-Mirskii, General Kruzenshtern, Colonels Fadeev, Svistunov and Kishelsky, Cossack atamans Ivanov and Kravtsov, etc. Officials included the Minister for Public Instruction Kovalevsky, Senator Kruzenshtern and the Governor of Vilna Zherebtsov.[153] Though membership was small and the envisaged programme to provide aid to Orthodox institutions and schools in Slavic lands and extend invitations to students to study in Russia rather modest, the actions of the Slavic Committee are nevertheless given the distinction of having inspired the formation of the "Moscow Panslav-nationalist party".[154] Mikhail Katkov served the Moscow party as the voice of contemporary Russian conservative and nationalist opinion[155] in the context of a Russia defeated in the Crimean War (1854-1856); that had failed in its attempts to subjugate the Caucasus and Central-Asia to Russian rule (1856-1862); and which was threatened by the spread of radical nihilism internally.

---

[151] Andrzej Walicki, *The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 588; Michael Boro Petrovich, *The Emergence of Russian Panslavism 1856-1870* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), 132.

[152] Durman, *Time of the Thunderer*, 25-26.

A demarcation of the St.Petersburg and the Moscow currents of opinion soon became evident. The Moscow current was further differentiated by traditional Panslavic sentiment, best personified by Ivan Aksakov, and the "national direction" led by Katkov. According to the contemporaneous account of Austrian Ambassador to Russia, Count Wolkenstein, Aksakov and the Panslavs viewed the Near-Eastern mission as Russia's primary task, the foundation of her existence and the realization of her destiny. For Katkov and the "pure" nationalists, the Balkan and Bosphorus policies amounted to only one theory, albeit crucial, in the broader view of Russian aspiration. Panslavism meant faith in Russia, Russian interests and an independent Russian national policy. The Russian nation would not recognize any moral obligation to other nations.[156] In Durman's view, this was nothing but the espousal of pure anti-Western Machiavellism. Governments had no obligation, morality had no significance, Katkov's sermon ran, other than the benefit of their own nation and country. Benefits were to be obtained and the interests of the state furthered only by a position of strength; through an offensive foreign policy. Thus, national self-interest, not abstract justice nor magnanimity, was to be the politician's exclusive concern. The power of the state Katkov recommended be unrestrained; the abuse of state power, a problem to be solved by other states. Both Nikolai Danilevsky, in his book *Rossiia i Evropa* (*Russia and Europe*) (1871), and General Rostislav Fadeev, in his pamphlets *Vooruzhenye sily Rossii* (*Armed Forces of Russia*) and *Mnenie o Vostochnom voprose* (*Opinion on the Eastern Question*), propagated these very ideas.[157]

---

[153] Ibid., 479-80, n.17.

[154] Ibid. 25-26.

[155] Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism*, 56.

It must be understood that Russian expansion in this period was perceived by both Katkov and Danilevsky to be of critical importance. If Russia failed in this matter, then her position as a Great Power would be lost; she would be driven from Europe and relegated to the status of an Asiatic khanate.[158] Russia's diplomatic achievement through the Concert of Europe was of secondary importance to its great-power policy. In Katkov's view, Russia was both militarily and economically prepared for intrepid measures in the realm of foreign policy, and those who disputed this would be stigmatized as nihilists, enemies from within. It was on these basic premises that Katkov drew the dividing line between those whose opinion corresponded with his own - the national Russian party - and those opposed - the anti-national and anti-Russian party. Both parties agreed on one fundamental issue: that the tsar should break from the permanent obligations of the Holy Alliance. In this view, which was regarded by the other powers as isolationist, Russia's alliance with Austria and Prussia weakened her overall influence.[159]

---

[156] Durman, *Time of the Thunderer*, 40-41.

[157] Ibid., 106.

[158] Ibid., 41.

Such was the pure nationalist line of the Moscow current of opinion in the Slavic Committee.[160] In February 1858, following the dramatic increase of both internal and external tensions, Alexander II gave his support to the Committee.[161] According to the tsar and his government, the Holy Synod, the Orthodox Church and the Slavic Committee, the most serious and immediate danger lay in the Balkans, where Catholic and Protestant propaganda and educational work were increasing among the population. The Slavic Committee pointed out that in Bulgaria, twelve European societies were disseminating Jesuit and humanist teachings to eliminate Russian influence. Alexander maintained the need for Church unity and the

---

[159] Ibid., 42.

[160] Ibid., 25-26.

[161] Ibid., 28.

Bulgarian claim for an autonomous Church was flatly rejected.[162] Katkov, Aksakov and several other members of the Committee condemned this approach on the grounds that a Russian defense of the "Phanariots"[163] would annul the Russian Orthodox succession to the East and force believers to turn to Roman Catholicism.[164]

Katkov had indeed "raised the curtain" on the Eastern question. As editor of a leading newspaper, and thus able to reach a wide audience, he also encompassed the Polish question. The Polish uprising of 1863, which had enhanced patriotic feelings among the Russian reading public, marks the beginning of Katkov's campaign against the Poles.[165] This campaign was begun in the first issue of *Sovremennaia letopis* (*Contemporary Chronicle*) (1863), which then became the Sunday supplement to *Moskovskiia vedomosti* (*Moscow News*). The Polish Question, like the Eastern Question concerned the destructive influence of western propaganda; this time it dealt directly with Polish agitation in western Ukraine. Katkov regarded this as an effort by the Polish Party to expand its influence over a new territory where Poles, it was avowed, constituted only one-seventh of the total population. In the first issue of *Russkii vestnik* (*Russian Messenger*), before the actual fighting broke out in Poland, he made reference to the historic life-and-death struggle between Russia and Poland for mastery in Eastern Europe. He therefore considered any concession made to Polish patriotism to be not only inadmissible but also a death sentence for the people of Russia.[166]

---

[162] Ibid., 25-26.

[163] Ibid., 34.

"Phanar, the Greek quarter in Constantinople, was the centre of their enormous influence within the Ottoman Empire." The Phanariots had "jealously protected their overall control of the Eastern Orthodox Church" and had imposed "much higher taxes than did the Turkish state," hindered development in education and use of the national language. See Karel Durman, *Time of the Thunderer* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1988), 480, n.4.

[164] Ibid., 35.

[165] Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism*, 46-47.

The campaign, however, was apparently not, in Katkov's view, effective in silencing opposition within Russia. Thus, he recommended that all the "healthy forces" rally around the tsar and his government and wage war upon their enemies. In Durman's view, this was nothing more than an unreserved vigilante movement against the Polish gentry. Katkov intended that this people's militia would assume the duplicitous task of crushing internal enemies and, in the event of war, guarding internal safety within the empire. This could be accomplished in the immediate term given the upsurge of patriotic enthusiasm which would, if not utilized, slowly dissipate and perhaps disappear altogether. This idea, Durman claims, was in fact realized after the assassination of Alexander II in 1881 and again in the infamous Black Hundreds movement at around the turn of the century. Among the elite, however, with the exception of some bureaucrats (the Miliutin brothers) and supporters (Bludov), Katkov instilled a fear strong enough to withstand what they perceived to be a revolutionary *garde civique nationale*, or extreme form of Russian nationalism.[167]

---

[166] Ibid., 47.

Over the course of this crusade against the Nihilists (the internal enemy) and Poland (the external enemy), Katkov evolved his concept of the integrity of the Russian state. This concept made explicit the aim of Russian political unification. Throughout the vast expanse of the empire, which comprised the entirety of Russia's possessions, no political nationality was to be recognized save the Russian one. This was not a question of coercion, persecution or constraint of non-Russians, or tribes (*plemiona*) as he refered to them. Rather, it was simply the natural order of things. According to this logic the Russian language played a dominant role. All religious denominations had to use Russian in Church services and prayer books. Russian patriotism was regarded as the main ingredient for state unity and even Poles, Finns, and Germans were to regard themselves as Russians first and foremost.[168]

Once it became clear that all of Europe, with the exception of Prussia, sided with Poland in the 1863 revolt, the national-Russian direction became ascendent.[169] Anti-Polish hatred infected the Russian masses as it had Russian society. The majority of those who had previously supported the emancipation of the peasants and other reforms now united with reactionaries in refusing the Poles the right to limited self-government. Some even advocated brutal repression of the Poles (the Miliutin brothers, Cherkasskii and Koshelev). Those few who openly defied the popular current were publicly destroyed by Katkov and his military supporters, who were revered as Russia's heroes and saviors.[170]

---

[167] Durman, *Time of the Thunderer*, 62-63.

[168] Ibid.

[169] Ibid., 54.

In 1864 Katkov and Count Mikhail Muraviev initiated a campaign to Russify Poland, the Baltic region, Lithuania, Belorussia and areas of western Ukraine, which the upper landowning stratum of the Poles had laid claim.[171] The programme, which was proposed to tsar Alexander by Muraviev, aimed at destroying the Catholic and Lutheran Churches, the Polish gentry, and German barons. It further envisaged an administrative purge and Russian Orthodox, official and scholastic hegemony. Aksakov and the Panslavists in Moscow hailed Muraviev for instilling fear in the Poles and restoring Orthodoxy in the region. For these acts, Muraviev was presented with an icon of St. Michael the Archangel by the Slavic Committee. Response to Muraviev was quite different in St. Petersburg, however, as a majority of the elite opposed his policies. This hostility took on a familiar pattern of intense rivalry between Moscow (the old capital) and St. Petersburg (the new),[172] a resentment which was both incited and exploited by Katkov. Prior to the Polish uprising his polemics were directed at the radical nihilists. Following the uprising, however, his negativity focused on "cosmopolitanism and internal division", aimed primarily at Herzen, Grand Duke Konstantine and others, such as the ministers Valuev, Golovnin, Adlerberg and Zamyatin, Third Section chief Prince Dolgorukov and

---

[170] Ibid., 54-55.

[171] Ibid.

[172] Ibid., 61.

Governor General of St. Petersburg Prince Suvorov, all of whom favoured conciliation with the Poles.[173]

The notion of Moscow as the national core and quintessentially Russian, was fully elaborated by both Katkov and Aksakov. In Durman's view, Moscow represented the ambition of the declining and impoverished landed gentry, the old merchant, artisan and bourgeois classes, as well as their opposition to the St. Petersburg bureaucracy. To the Muscovites, the radical intelligentsia and the St. Petersburg bureaucrats were responsible for the unseemly character the Russian village had assumed following the Great Reforms of 1861. "Extreme nationalism and messianic dreams" thus provided them with refuge.[174] By 1866 Katkov's hostility, to which, as noted, the authorities themselves (Interior Minister Valuev in particular) were now subjected, had intensified. Katkov asked Alexander II himself to settle the dispute between himself and Valuev.[175]

On 16 April 1866 the revolutionary, D. V. Karakozov, attempted to assassinate the tsar. This provided Katkov with an unforeseen advantage. Patriotism rose to feverish new heights and Alexander lacked the courage to defy Katkov - his most loyal guardian. Katkov was mildly admonished by the tsar. The message, conveyed by Shuvalov, allegedly read:

> In the first period you defeated Herzen; all Russia applauded you. The second period was that of the Polish question. You sized up the

---

[173] Ibid., 61-62.

[174] Ibid., 29-30.

[175] Ibid., 67.

> situation. In the third you went before the government, proclaiming a national policy. You captivated everyone; and, willy-nilly, they followed you. In the fourth, you engaged in the struggle with the government. Since you had been victorious in everything else there was cause here to fear that you might also win a victory by discrediting the government.[176]

Nonetheless, Katkov maintained his position of strong support for the government through the requisite elimination of all those who opposed national unity. On 2 July Alexander granted him an audience which, in Durman's view, confirmed Katkov's unambiguous victory over Valuev, who was forced to admit the incompetence of the government and his own inability.[177]

Katkov's proposal of a national regeneration, given new life and vitality by the patriotic mobilization which followed the Polish uprising, had imbued the Moscow doctrine with greater coercive power.[178] The Poles were not singled out in this respect. The attempts of Finns, Germans, Georgians, and Armenians at achieving, or at least maintaining, certain independent rights and privileges within the empire also incited Katkov's anger. Furthermore, he demanded that the traditional privileges of the Baltic Germans be abolished and that local administration, the judicial system, and property rights accord with the Russian model. The introduction of these changes were thought to be necessary for the attainment of a single political Russian nationality.[179]

---

[176] Ibid., 68.

[177] Ibid., 65-69.

[178] Ibid., 30.

[179] Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism*, 48-49.

Katkov was particularly concerned about the Baltic German nobles' attempts to maintain and even strengthen their dominant position in the Baltics, opposing all concessions to their political demands, which included the administrative unification of Estonia, Livonia and Kurland into a single province. He contended that Prussian eastward expansion would result from such a concession, relegating Russia's union with the provinces to nominal status only.[180] Katkov asserted that unification with Russia was the express desire of the Baltic peoples who were oppressed by the Germans and insisted that this patent truth was unrecognizable only to the St. Petersburg government. The campaign deeply annoyed Alexander, who accused Katkov of advocating disunion within the empire.[181]

Katkov's second campaign against the disobedience of non-Russians opened with complaints about the intolerable use of public educative institutions and religion as agents of Germanization in the Baltics. He recommended that one of the primary subjects of educational instruction be the Russian language and that Russian be officially recognized in public life.[182] The Baltic Germans and Katkov were sworn enemies.[183]

In June 1867, at the time of an ethnographic exhibition, the Slavic Congress was held in Moscow. The Congress is considered by some experts to have been the event which manifested the real political nature of the Slavic Committee. Tsar Alexander, Prince Gorchakov and other dignitaries, generally displeased with the event, nevertheless gave audience to the Slavic guests and practically indulged the press in its Panslavist, anti-Turk, and anti-Austrian propaganda due to an overwhelming display of public enthusiasm. Katkov realized the opportunity provided by the Congress to impress upon the Russian government the noble, obligatory, and beneficial role of emulating France, which had assumed protection of the Romance peoples, and Prussia, which had unified Germany; Russia was equally obligated to all Orthodox and non-Orthodox Slavs who would benefit by the completion of the nationality principle and the provision of a modern European equilibrium. Russian national interest required only the protection of the independent Slav and Orthodox peoples. The Congress itself, however, revealed Katkov's real goals.[184]

---

[180] Ibid.

[181] Durman, *Time of the Thunderer*, 75.

[182] Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism*, 48-49.

[183] Durman, *Time of the Thunderer*, 489, n. 20.

In Durman's view, extremist Panslav-nationalism was equally distinct in the demand of Katkov and his like that the Slavs lose their so-called dialects, which amounted to little more in the words of Professor Lamanskii and Shebalskii, respectively, than a "token of servile polition and spiritual slavery", a mere remnant of "the feudal or appanage period"; and resign themselves to Russian as the universal literary language.[185] Increasingly, the Slav guests understood that their Russian hosts conceived of Panslavism as Pan-Russianism, the dominance of the Russian language and the Orthodox confession over all Slavs, and an external Russification policy (toward the Austro-Hungarian and Balkan Slavs) similar to internal policy in this regard.

---

[184] Ibid., 99-100.

[185] Ibid., 100.

The event was considered by Muscovites to have been unquestionably triumphant. That the Panslav-nationalist current represented not merely a few hundred exalted nobles, intellectuals and officers but Russian society in general was a reality and no longer an abstraction. Moreover, society now understood the Slavic question in its "Katkovian interpretation"; that is, that the borders of the Slav union were to be Russian again after centuries of endeavour and progress. For this reason, Slavs in political life were to be considered, above all, Russians.[186]

Katkov and the Role of the Press

The role of the press cannot be ignored, for in no other country was the press more powerful in this period. Indeed, the press was deemed the only formidable challenge to the autocratic government.[187] Throughout the first decade of Alexander II's reign the Russian press expanded considerably with the establishment of 66 newspapers and 156 journals.[188] Prior to this time, some twenty odd publications including the periodicals *Moskvitianin* (*The Muscovite*), *Maiak* (*Lighthouse*), Puskin's *Sovremennik* (*The Contemporary)* and Uvarov's *Journal of the Ministry of Public Instruction*, the newspaper *The Northern Bee* and the magazine *The*

---

[186] Ibid., 101.

[187] Ibid., 6-7.

[188] Ibid., 16-17, 477, n. 17.

Reader's Library; all disseminated the views of Nicholas I's Official Nationality, which dominated the press. As minister of education, Uvarov attempted to eliminate all possible intellectual opposition or subversion in the realm of Russian journalism.[189]

Katkov began his career in journalism as an independent publicist in 1855; in the wake of Alexander's ascendance to the throne.[190] Having been granted by the tsar a license which confirmed this independence from the control of Moscow University, he and his associate, Professor Pavel Leont'ev, set up the monthly *Russkii vestnik* with the appendix *Sovremennaia letopis*. Henceforth, Katkov was able to analyze current events with full approval from the tsar.[191] Thus, armed with the means to influence public opinion Katkov developed a major weapon.[192] First as coeditor then editor of the daily *Moskovskiia vedomosti*, he was now able to broaden his reading audience while continuing publication of the monthly *Russkii vestnik*.[193] Circulation of the daily increased rapidly. Katkov's editorials not only reflected the genuine wishes and feelings of the public, but were avariciously read even in the remote provinces. Awareness of this only encouraged him in his increasingly brash criticism of the Polish Kingdom and, eventually, of the wan and aimless decisions of the autocratic government itself. According to Feoktistov, the later dominant personality of the press, Katkov was the first unconnected and accessible man in Russia who by sheer force of conviction attained a hitherto inconceivable control over Russian national consciousness through his *Moskovskiia vedomosti*, which was passed from one person to the next until it was literally shredded; his name was known across all of Russia.[194]

---

[189] Riasanovsky, *Official Nationality*, 76.

[190] Durman, *Time of the Thunderer*, 14.

[191] Ibid., 484, n. 4.

[192] Ibid., 16.

[193] Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism*, 45-47.

Evidence of his dominance appeared in the form of collective letters from widely varied social estates and regions of Russia. Throughout his lifetime Katkov's address on Strastnyi Boulevard became a virtual pilgrimage site for petitioners.[195] Words of veneration were articulated by such high dignitaries as the Grand Duchess Helen, Bludov, and Kovalevskii. *Moskovskiia vedomosti* was read daily to the tsar and the tsarina. Katkov also became an elected member of the most exclusive English Club, the Moscow Duma, and the Moscow and Kiev university learned societies.[196] The significance of Katkov's journalism and overall public presence as a devoted champion of Russian national interests is indubitable. Unlike other contemporary publicists (i.e., Pisarev, Chernyshevskii and Ivan Aksakov) Katkov published almost uninterruptedly over the next two to three decades his *Russkii vestnik* and *Moskovskiia vedomosti*.[197]

---

[194] Durman, *Time of the Thunderer*, 56-57.

[195] Ibid., 59.

[196] Ibid., 60.

[197] Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism*, 39.

Public Opinion and the Press

Nevertheless, Durman explains, the prevalent view of public opinion in this period remains that expressed by George Kennan: that its association with international politics is frivolous. The general populace had neither knowledge nor means of making judgements on foreign policy matters. Only the tsar, at least theoretically, had the unqualified power to arbitrarily structure Russian foreign relations. Between tsar and people only those "few hundreds, or possibly thousands" from the elite classes were empowered with at least some degree of influence, whether direct or indirect, upon the decisions of the tsar and those ministers responsible to him. These included members of the high Court, high bureaucratic and military officials, senior clergymen, prominent businessmen, editors, publicists and writers.

Durman, on the other hand, feels that public opinion in Russia in this period is unmistakable, regardless of all distinction and restriction. The great debate on the emancipation of the serfs (1857-1861) ushered in its emergence. Although relatively few in number, those politically conscious members of the populace, which also included intelligentsia, medical professionals, artists, scientists, students, merchants and artisans, were not only capable of judgement but also of its impetuous articulation.[198] Indeed, sympathy and support for Panslav nationalism could be found in people of widely varied political, personal, and social outlook.[199] One of the most familiar citations in this regard is taken from a former Slavophile who viewed the evolution of Pan-Slav nationalism as

---

[198] Durman, *Time of the Thunderer*, 6.

[199] Ibid., 30-31.

> some sort of patriotic and Orthodox doctrine, which on the one hand aimed at universal Russification and on the other hand at converting everybody not to the Orthodox Christianity of the people, but quite simply to a police religion taken over by Y. Samarin from the savage Latvians and Esthonians who have commercialized their religious conscience...Hence it was able to spread all over the Russian Empire in the early 1860s, and to gain the approval of mammas and generals everywhere, to draw into its fold all the little boys eager to get on in the world. Slavophiles shot up overnight, like mushrooms, together with patriots of a very suspect kind.[200]

The Orthodox Church evolved accordingly. Katkov was recognized, from the time of the Polish uprising, by Metropolitan Philaret and the Orthodox hierarchy as their spokesman.[201]

Russian society and even the general populace underwent a similar evolution.[202] Although the masses' conception of Russia's role in the international context may rightly be considered to have been primitive, they nevertheless expressed themselves with regard to certain government decisions (i.e., concerning the Eastern question).[203] According to Ivan Aksakov, using *Russkii mir* as his voice, "two-thirds of all donations"[204] to assist Serbia and other Southern Slavs in resisting Austrian intimidation came from the masses. "The money for collection flows in, in a steady stream, despite the paucity of funds, the absence of interest from the government and its diplomatic stand in the matter." Allegedly, response to Aksakovs appeal came from the "dark people", "the overburdened simple poor".[205] Dostoevsky also felt that the overwhelming Russian majority, who "knew nothing about the Slavs," did know that there were "Orthodox Christians under the Mohamedan yoke." In his view, a popular national consciousness had emerged during the Russo-Turkish War. Thus, it should not be a surprise to anyone, he wrote, that the masses fervently sympathized with such a war, particularly based on the wan contention that they knew neither history nor geography. "What they need - they know."[206]

---

[200] Walicki, *Slavophile Controversy*, 471-72.

[201] Durman, *Time of the Thunderer*, 63-64.

[202] Ibid., 30-31.

[203] Ibid., 6.

[204] Ibid., 511, n. 23.

Ultimately, once Katkov had broken completely with certain of his liberal views (i.e., the positive merits of reform and allowance for certain sovereign political developments), his fundamental ideal became so narrow that the majority of educated society found it intolerable and his influence significantly declined.[207]

Another outstanding Russian Pan-Slav theorist of imperial-nationalism was the second-generation Slavophile, Nikolai Danilevsky (1822-1885),[208] who propagated the notion that Russia's historic mission could only be fulfilled by the achievement of great military power status vis-a-vis Europe. This involved the expansion and consolidation of the Slavic realm, including the reposession of Constantinople and the restoration of the Eastern Roman Empire. Danilevsky's notion of a great Slavic

---

[205] Ibid., 166.

[206] Ibid., 474, n. 7.

[207] Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism*, 54-56.

[208] Agursky, *Third Rome*, 27.

Federation precluded all European influence and is thus considered by Yanov to have combined the notions of expansionism and isolationism - the two main ingredients of The Russian Idea, or the Slavophile ideology of imperial-nationalism. The second-generation Slavophiles included Ivan Aksakov and Konstantin N. Leont'ev, who propagated absolute state power as the national goal.

The Russian Idea was nevertheless revised by a third generation of Slavophiles, or neo-Slavophiles, which included Sergei Sharapov, editor of the journal *Russkoe Delo* (*Russian Affairs*) , Mikhail Skobelev, Yu. M. Odinzgoev, V.M. Purishkevitch and N.E. Markov. Whereas Danilevsky had perceived both France and Germany as the main enemies of Slavdom, Sharapov and Skobelev now singled out Germany in this regard. Only through war with Germany could the Slavic utopia of a Russian empire dominating Eastern and Central Europe as well as Central Asia be achieved.[209]

Neo-Slavophilism

According to the periodization of Walicki and Petrovich, the Slavophile period was followed by a Panslav period which ended with the Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878), though Walicki perceives Slavophile Panslavism to have already become chauvinist nationalism by the end of the Crimean War (1856).[210] The Panslav period was then followed (after the failed diplomatic effort at the Berlin Congress of 1878) by a nationalist or Pan-Russian period, during which time the original

---

[209] Yanov, *The Russian Challenge*, 34-42.

[210] Walicki, *Slavophile Controversy*, 588.

Slavophile teachings ultimately corroded into national egotism and Russian nationalism became a dogma.[211] Most experts agree with this periodization.[212] What is certain is that the Slavophile belief in an Orthodox brotherhood could not endure the subsequent experience in its original messianic cast.

The appeal of aggressive or violent nationalism, despite the rising tide of socialism and anti-imperialism in the intelligentsia, was strong. Durman asserts that its attraction for numerous intellectual government officials and professionals appealed, potentially, to the basest instincts of the lower classes. The influence of those numbering in the hundreds, or possibly thousands, upon the judgements of the tsar and his ministers was substantially more powerful than Kennan is willing to concede. Indeed, national extremist groups had a strong representation among the elite and wielded significant influence on the Russian public, whose sentiment was utilized in turn for the purpose of creating splits among decision-makers. At crucial moments these groups were capable of enforcing a solution which countered the will of the government, thus holding sway over the tsar himself. National extremism, vivified by the tremendous force of tradition, appeared to infect Russian development both internally and in the realm of foreign policy. Furthermore, it aroused chauvinist and public opinion in various ways in Europe and contributed significantly to overall instability. Clearly, from the foreign perspective, though somewhat exaggerated, there lay an inherent danger in Russian national extremism.

---

[211] Durman, *Time of the Thunderer*, 6-7, 25-26.

[212] Buttino, ed., *Collapsing Empire*, 114.

Through the Panslavs a new uneasy Russian nationalism had emerged. With their network of official connections (nobles, Orthodox Church, court and military officials, and diplomats) the key European countries felt that this nationalism might eventually divert or even direct the tsar's policy.[213]

The Russian political Right regarded liberalism and parliamentarianism with disfavour and feared that the latter would work to the advantage of socialist revolutionaries and the Jews.[214] They favoured instead tsarist autocracy and encouraged the Russian masses in these tendencies.[215] In November 1905 the Russian Assembly, the oldest of the Right formations, declared itself a political party and published its program. Henceforth, the increasingly radicalized stream of the Russian Right formed in Moscow and St. Petersburg.[216] This was not an entirely spontaneous occurrence, but one partly organized by the state[217] which, at various times, supplied these groups with resources and weapons. Their activities, to which the authorities reacted with passivity, included strike-breaking, intimidation of the political Left, and anti-Jewish pogroms and murder.[218] Among their number were The White Flag, People's Union, The League of Struggle against Sedition, Autocracy and Church, For Tsar and Order, The Fatherland Union, The Union of Russian Men, and The Union of the Russian People - all averse to each other[219] but later commonly known as the Black Hundreds, which existed from approximately the turn of the century to the end of imperial rule[220] and reappeared in contemporary form in organizations such as *Pamyat*.[221]

---

[213] Durman, *Time of the Thunderer*, 6-7.

[214] Due in large part to the Russian translation and publication of the German anti-Semitic forgery *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* by G.V. Butmi (1905) and S.A. Nilus (1911, 1917), the Jews were regarded by the Russian Right as agents of foreign capital and strategists of world domination over all existing states by means of democratic, liberal, and socialist tactics. The Jews were thought also to be conspirators to revolution, specializing in mass strikes, political assassinations, induced alcoholism in workers, increased food prices and the spread of infectious diseases. See, Stephen Carter, *Russian Nationalism* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 33.

[215] Carter, *Russian Nationalism*, 31.

[216] Hans Rogger, *Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), 192-93.

[217] Agursky, *Third Rome*, 113.

Black Hundreds

The Black Hundreds were notorious for their violent anti-Semitism and anti-intellectualism. Laqueur contends that they had a following among the masses, which contributed to the deep-seated concern among more moderate nationalists and society in general, that anarchy and mass violence would result. The relationship of upper-class monarchists to the landed gentry had always been restive; so too had the relationship of monarchists and gentry to the masses. Anti-Semitism seemed to be their only common ground, for the gentry, naturally, was most interested in preserving its property and privileges while the masses wanted radical economic reform.

---

[218] Carter, *Russian Nationalism*, 30.

[219] Agursky, *Third Rome*, 113.

[220] Laqueur, *Black Hundred*, 17.

[221] Richard Sakwa, *Russian Politics and Society* (London: Routledge, 1993), 106; Carter, *Russian Nationalism*, Chapter 8, *passim*.

The primary motive behind the formation of The Fatherland Union, however, was political, and may be seen as an immediate reaction to the Rescript of 18 February 1905, signed by tsar Nicholas II to Minister of the Interior A.G. Bulygin, which promised a future consultative assembly. The formation of a staunchly conservative union of men was proposed by B.V. Stuermer, who was to become, in 1916, the chairman of the Council of Ministers. The first chairman of the Fatherland Union was Count A.A. Bobrinsky. Tsar Nicholas, true to his conviction that the masses strongly supported the autocracy and that the destabilization of political reform was a Jewish and intellectual phenomenon, received a delegation of the union. At this reception Nicholas was presented with its elaborate plans for a new representative assembly (*Zemsky Sobor* or Land Council), to be elected according to the various strata of the population. Unlike a Duma or a parliamentary legislature, a *Zemsky Sobor*, they held, did not violate the autocratic principle and was in keeping with Russian tradition.

Neo-Slavophile ideas about a *Zemsky Sobor* were embraced by another group known as the Union of Russian Men, founded by Count P.S. Sheremetyev, Prince A.G. Shcherbatov, and led by Sergei Sharapov.[222] These men believed that no distinction should be made between classes; that tsar and populace should unite. They were nonetheless opposed to officialdom and singled out bureaucrats, capitalists, Count Witte, the Jews and Freemasons for attack. The Church was to be deprived of any support by the state and missionary rights would be retained exclusively by the Orthodox Church. Evidently, the programme of the Union of Russian Men was designed to attract the counter-revolutionary masses.

---

[222] Carter, *Russian Nationalism*, 31; Agursky, *Third Rome*, 113.

The St. Petersburg group which was to have the most significant impact on reform in Russia, in terms of its domination of the political right, emerged in November 1905: the Union of the Russian People (URP). The initial stimulus to the formation of the URP, as in the case of both The Fatherland Union and The Union of Russian Men, consisted in opposition to the Duma and the restoration of *samoderzhavie*, embodied in the principles of Autocracy, Orthodoxy and Nationality. The URP was founded by a former physician, Dr. A.I. Dubrovin, who became head of the party's Directorate, together with a former assistant to Interior Minister von Plehve, V.M. Purishkevich, who became a deputy to Dubrovin. On 23 December 1905, tsar Nicholas was proffered the Union's insignia which, significantly, he accepted on behalf of himself and his heir. Indeed, the Union had held great sway with the tsar, who tended to regard its voice as that of the silent Russian masses.[223] Official encouragement also came from the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich and P.I. Rachkovsky, Head of the Police Department Political Section. It was their belief that the formation of right-wing extremist groups, now quite considerable in number in Moscow and St. Petersburg, signified a strong counter-revolutionary potential. While it is true that the Black Hundred did attack the political left, both physically and polemically, their campaigns targeted mainly liberals (Kadets) and capitalists.

---

[223] Carter, ibid., 32.

Laqueur contends that the "militant workers" were perceived by the URP to be truthful but misdirected people who, with the proper patriotic guidance, might be redirected back to Black Hundredism; capitalists, with the exception of owners of large tracts of land, were the perceived enemy and beyond all hope of redemption.[224]

Membership in the URP comprised many intellectuals (B.V. Nikol'sky, a law lecturer, and A.A. Milyukov, son of the famous poet), and some plotters and profit-seekers. G.V. Butmi, who published *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* - a notorious anti-Semitic forgery - was a key ideologist of the union. Dr. Dubrovin himself provided the Union with monetary support and arms and, according to speculation, may have been responsible for the murders of Jews in the Kadet and Trudovik Parties. That Dubrovin received subsidies from the Ministry of the Interior as well as from Stolypin - as a registered party - is reinforced by the testimonies of some of its members given to the Provisional Government. After 1908, however, Stolypin's distrust of Dubrovin caused him to deal directly with Purishkevich. The URP subsequently splintered into various groups and divisions. Purishkevich formed his own group, The Union of the Archangel Michael. In 1911, N.E. Markov II replaced Dubrovin in his organizational capacity. Dubrovin formed a new organization, which, although under the same name, rivaled Markov's party. Ultimately, Dubrovin's *Russkoye Znamya* (*Russian Banner*), the organ of his party, was financed solely by a rich benefactress.

---

[224] Laqueur, *Black Hundred*, 26.

Paradoxically, the economic policies of the URP, formally approved as a result of pressure from workers' and peasants' delegates, were radical, at least in part. Advocation of a limited work week, a higher standard of living for peasants, and credit made readily available to peasants, even some sort of agrarian reform, proved to be somewhat awkward for the URP in later years.[225] In terms of national defense, the URP out-and-out ignored warnings of German military preparations against Russia and the immense reconstruction of the German navy, decisively opposed a Russian military buildup, and called only for the policy that had been advanced by the German lobby in the Russian government: to struggle against the "yellow peril", i.e., to attack China.[226] This elicits more the sentiments of radical nationalism than it does a sound national defense policy.[227] In addition, the URP demanded that Russia remain inconspicuous in Europe, reject any Slavic interest, and oppose any involvement in the Balkans that might potentially embroil Russia in a European war.[228]

In February 1906, the first congress of right-wing organizations was held in St. Petersburg. The URP and a total of thirty other groups sent representatives to voice their collective opposition to the constitutionalism and parliamentarianism manifest in the October Manifesto and the forthcoming Duma (Second), respectively. With regard to the Duma, the right-wing organizations feared exploitation of the new freedoms, as they were spelled out in the Manifesto, by the revolutionary left. They did, however, consider the possibility of participating in the Duma based on the notion that it might eventually be converted to a consultative *Zemsky Sobor*. In Hans Rogger's opinion, the congress may have been influential in the drafting of the Fundamental Laws of 6 May 1906 which, in its final version, deprived the Duma of much of its power.[229]

---

[225] Ibid., 25.

[226] Agursky, *Third Rome*, 113-14.

[227] Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 37.

[228] Agursky, *Third Rome*, 113-14.

In any case, Nicholas II's bitter disappointment with the right-wing organizations, excepting the URP, was largely a result of their overall incompetency and passivity. The URP's appeals for pogroms had won favour with the tsar and were printed on the state printing presses. Furthermore, the union had received millions of rubles through official channels. In late 1905 Dubrovin had already begun mobilizing the masses through sympathetic clergymen, patriots, police, and local administrations. Laqueur asserts that this proved to be unexpectedly easy, as the URP's message was as clear to its social constituency as it was to its official political one. Evidence of this consists, in part, in a "mindset" embodied by the contemporary and frequently used term *Okhotny Ryad*, which conveyed the Black Hundreds' message. At around the turn of the century,

> Okhotny Ryad...a well-known quarter in the centre of Moscow...housed Moscow's game and meat market. It was inhabited by owners of small shops, usually first-generation Muscovites, rough and not well

---

[229] Rogger, *Jewish Policies*, Chapter 7, *passim*; Carter, *Russian Nationalism*, 30-33; Donald W. Treadgold, *Twentieth Century Russia* 6th.ed. (Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987), 59.

> educated, who had arrived from their villages to make the most of the opportunities there. At the same time they were bewildered and afraid because of the pace of social change and the rapid economic ups and downs. They were staunch believers in monarchy and church; they tended to hate the intelligentsia and the non-Russian minorities because these were disturbing the peace and the social equilibrium. To say that this was the lower lower middle class would be correct, but would also be to say very little, for Okhotny Ryad was more of a mindset than a social category.[230]

By and large, scholarship tends to reject this kind of social conjecture, which is not to say that it is without merit.

Whatever one's perspective, it is clear that the Black Hundreds, although publicly aggressive, were not politically auspicious. Despite the split in the movement after 1907 and the consequent debilitation of its organizational structure, many local newspapers and periodicals, as well as some more mainstream conservative publications which supported the Black Hundreds (periodicals put out by the army, church publications, even *Pravitelstvenny vestnik*, the official organ of the government, and *Novoye vremya*), continued to appear.[231]

Thus, extreme Russian nationalism of the early twentieth century developed very much with the favour of the monarchy and the blessings of the Church, which were bestowed upon them by such distinguished bishops as Metropolitan Antony (Khrapovitsky, 1863-1936), Vladimir of Moscow, Aleksei of Taurida, Flavian of Kiev, and particularly Anatoli of Volhynia and Archbishop Hermogen of Saratov, a teacher of Stalin.[232] Revivalist preachers were also prevalent in Russia in this period and enormously popular among the masses. In 1907, Father Ioann of Kronstadt, for example, was considered to be the most renowned (indeed, more so than the patriarch himself) and best-loved miracle worker of his time.[233] Though his status in the Church hierarchy was insignificant, Chekhov himself nevertheless reported in a letter to a friend about his visit to Sakhalin, that he had seen in every house a picture of Father Ioann. It is thus highly significant to note, as Laqueur does, that Father Ioann was also a nominal member and first to bless the flags of the URP.[234] Through the figure of Ioann of Kronstadt is manifest the mindset inside the church with regard to the extreme right.[235] In sum, the URP was an essential part of the system which supported it both monetarily and politically.[236]

---

[230] Laqueur, *Black Hundred*, 19-20.

[231] Ibid., 26-27.

The Duma Parties of the Right

In February 1908, the Duma Right accounted for approximately eleven percent of the total Duma membership. This was an inconstant alliance of churchmen, the most conservative and apprehensive members of the landed gentry, and right-wing extremists, united by the conviction that only the autocratic government could stave off the impending revolution. Support for the parties of the Right came from senior government and court officials. Any effort made to convert public opinion to their views was of secondary importance to their attempts to similarly persuade the tsar and the Russian government. The efforts of the government to win the support of the masses were negligible. The creation of new legislative chambers had provided all Duma parties, including opposition and revolutionary parties, with a venue for the unrestrained expression of public opinion. Furthermore, due to this parliamentary privilege, their opinions were published unfettered. With preliminary censorship having been abolished in 1905, the press organs gave to public opinion an unprecedented freedom and significance. The press proliferated. In 1900, 125 daily newspapers circulated in Russia; in 1913, 856.[237]

---

[232] Agursky, *Third Rome*, 113; Laqueur, *Black Hundred*, 51.

[233] Laqueur, ibid., 47.

[234] Ibid., 48.

[235] Ibid., 48-50.

[236] Ibid., 28.
On 1 August, 1990, the URP was reestablished at a Soviet Army meeting house in Moscow; *Russkie vedomosti* 4 (1991) published its new program. See, Laqueur, *Black Hundred* (New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993), 17, n.3.

The other side of this licence, however, revealed that the importance of having been granted civil rights in 1905 was significantly diminished by the temporary emergency regulations enforced over much of the empire until 1914. In an effort to erode the organizational attempts of opposition parties and prevent their cultivating mass support in the provinces, the government applied these regulations to editors with relative success through the imposition of heavy fines and imprisonment. The overall effect of these actions restricted the freedom of the provincial press without seriously impairing publication of the major national papers, which were backed by sufficient wealth and strength to resist government restrictions.

---

[237] D. C. B. Lieven, *Russia and the Origins of the First World War* (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1983), 118-20.

The Third Duma (1907-1912) was artificially dominated by the landed gentry (Octobrists and Nationalists), as had been heralded by the electoral laws of June 1907. Thus the political role of the gentry had been aggrandized at a time when many in this class were in economic decline. In Lieven's view, the post-1907 franchise (1907-14) failed to necessitate mass support for the political Right.[238] Nevertheless, Seton-Watson contends that the parties of the Right appealed to a wide range of social forces. Russian nationalism in this period was not restricted to the ruling elite, as is most commonly thought, but also infected the Russian working class.[239] Be that as it may, the political Right's impotency with regard to mass peasant support was clearly its major weakness. The peasants were determined, above all, to seize the landowners' estates, which all but ensured the impossibility of an alliance of the conservative rural classes against the urban liberal socialists.[240]

In the realm of foreign policy, tsar Nicholas II had no interest in overseas colonization, which constituted a significant part of the events leading to the First World War. Nor did the Franco-Russian alliance motivate Russia to act aggressively on behalf of French interests in Alsace or Africa.[241] It nevertheless remains extremely difficult to evaluate with any degree of precision the authority of the extreme Right over the policies of tsar Nicholas II and his government. D.C.B. Lieven asserts that the key influential figures were members of the old ruling elite, militaristic in spirit and fully conscious of ancestral achievements. Though the impact public forces had begun to make on state policy was limited, their influence generally tended toward extremism and intemperance.[242] Whatever one's point of view with regard to the influence of the extreme Right on the foreign policy decisions of Nicholas II and those ministers and officials around him, their stance in connection with Russia vis-a-vis Germany was one and the same. This was as clearly articulated by officials in the pro-Slav Ministry of War, the Council of Ministers, and the Foreign Ministry, as by neo-Slavophile intellectuals.

---

[238] Ibid., Chapter 3, *passim*.

[239] Conquest, ed., *Last Empire*, 20-23.

[240] Lieven, *Origins*, 118-20.

[241] Ibid., 27.

Liberal Imperial Nationalism

Hostility toward Germany also manifested itself in the form of imperial nationalism in the "liberal conservative" writings of Peter Struve (1870-1944). Struve had been a Social Democrat (Marxist) until he was expelled from the party by Lenin and Plekhanov. He nevertheless regarded himself as a socialist until 1907, when his reform program deviated to one of improving Russia politically and socially through education and national unity (i.e., from radical to conservative liberalism). Two articles of import in this regard: "*Velikaia Rossiia*" ("Great Russia"), and "*Otryvki o gosudarstve i natsii*" ("Fragments on State and Nation"), published in 1908 in *Russkaia*

---

[242] Ibid., 64.

Mysl' (*Russian Thought*);[243] promulgated the notion of an assertive foreign policy of Russian imperial expansion into the Black Sea basin. Struve justified this contention on the grounds that economic and military control of the basin could be attained peacefully through its traditional cultural influence over, and accessibility to, the area.[244] His Balkans policy was similarly legitimized. Furthermore, Struve contended that Russian activity in the Balkans would receive support from Britain and France; support which had been denied Russia in its East Asian expansion. His recommendation that Poland serve as a Russian link to the Austro-Hungarian Slavs also aimed at support from England, which he deemed necessary in light of the increasing threat posed by Germany. The realms of Russian economy and culture were to be developed internally by according Jews full civil liberty, hence, allowing them to pursue their "natural" activity as executors of Russian expansion.[245]

In July 1914, the outbreak of war between Austria and Serbia, hence, an international war, seemed imminent. Struve firmly believed that Russia's "imperial tasks and Slav mission" would be completely realized by the war. Following Turkey's defeat, he predicted, Russia would dominate the Straits, while defeat of the Austrians would allow for the annexation of Galicia and the reunion of the Austrian and German regions of Poland under Russian auspices.[246]

---

[243] Richard Pipes, *Struve Liberal on the Right 1905-1944* (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 1980), 88, 499.

[244] Ibid., 90-91, 180-81.

[245] Ibid., 91.

[246] Ibid., 209-10.

Struve's views with regard to Ukraine and Belorussia deserve special attention, for they display a total disregard for cultural and political national distinction between the three East Slavic peoples, despite the fact that Ukraine had laid claim to national self-determination. Like Solzhenitsyn, he believed that an All-Russian nationality transcended ethnic diversity (though this applied neither to the Poles nor to the Finns). That the

> intelligentsia's "Ukrainian" idea [should] strike the national soil and set it on fire the Russian nation...will result in veritable disaster for the state and for the people. All our 'borderland' problems will pale into mere bagatelles compared to such a prospect of bifurcation and - should the 'Belorussians' follow the 'Ukrainians' - 'trifurcation' of Russian culture.[247]

Struve perceived Russia not as a multinational empire but as a national state. The basis of this view was culture, not ethnicity; that is, the dominant All-Russian culture which provided the foundation for Russia's political unity. As the English language functioned in America as an intermediary of a broader cosmopolitan type of culture, so too should the Russian language (as distinct from the Ukrainian and Belorussian "dialects") function throughout the Empire.[248]

The Kadets, of whose Central Committee Struve was a member, were profoundly embarrassed by his pronouncements and disassociated the party from his private views. As the war served to exacerbate the debate over Ukraine,[249] Struve responded by turning his wrath on Russian liberal opinion in general, declaring that

---

[247] Ibid., 210-12.

[248] Ibid., 210-14.

[249] Ibid., 214.

Russia's educated majority utterly detested the Ukrainian movement despite all outward appearances. This led to bitter exchanges between *Birzhevye vedomosti* (*Stock Exchange News*), to which Struve contributed, and *Rech'* (*Speech*) and *Den'* (*The Day*). The disputes focused upon the question of the compatibility of liberalism and nationalism, to which Struve responded favorably. Indeed, he pronounced the ill fate of liberalism if it failed to acknowledge itself as "Russian and national."[250]

Upon his return from Lwow, where for three weeks as representative of the All-Russian Union of Zemstvos he had assessed popular attitudes toward Russia, Struve publicized his conclusions about Ukrainian culture "as a strictly regional phenomenon" requiring intensive Russification. Annexation of Galicia was, in his view, inevitable . With this, Struve isolated himself completely from the Kadets, who formally condemned his opinions and, in essence, forced his resignation from the party.[251]

Struve had been an outstanding prolocutor for the liberal rendition of Russian Listianism. In his book *The National System* (1841), Georg Friedrich List (1789-1846), who is regarded as "the father of German economic nationalism and one of the most extreme pàn-German imperialists",[252] promulgated his theory of economics, which fused nationalism with industrialization.[253] List's work, though translated into Russian in 1891,[254] was already familiar to Witte when he published his *National Economy and Friedrich List* in 1889, and is considered by Pipes to be the source of Struve's *Critical Remarks on the Question of Russia's Economic Development* (1894).[255] As Minister of Finance, Witte had proclaimed himself an advocate of List, whose economic theory provided him with the foundation for his system of economic development in Russia. Witte, however, rejected List's recommendation that liberal political reforms accompany industrial and commercial development, and pursued instead a policy which isolated the economic aspects of industrial development from their social and political context in order to aid the autocratic regime, a profoundly contradictory and insurmountable posture.[256] Szporluk categorizes Witte's industrialization program as "an Official Nationality form of economic nationalism." In Theodore H. Von Laue's view, List's theory is fundamental to understanding not only Witte, but also Soviet industrialization.[257]

---

[250] Ibid., 215-16.

[251] Ibid., 216-18.

[252] Hans Kohn, *Idea of Nationalism*, 322

[253] Szporluk, *Communism and Nationalism*, 220.

---

[254] Ibid., 210.

[255] Ibid.

[256] Ibid., 209.

[257] Ibid., 210.

PART VI

THE NATION AND THE STATE

The Nation

Hugh Seton-Watson emphasizes the correlation between state development and historical consciousness[258] and, like most analysts, considers Russian national consciousness to have emerged only in the eighteenth century. In his view, a nation (here he could have reduced terminological confusion by substituting "shared culture" for "nation") may exist without recognition of itself as such, but is born only with national self-recognition. National consciousness and national birth emerge simultaneously. The nation is defined as a substantial group of people whose belief in a common cultural legacy (language, literature, confession, and folklore; a composite of interdependent economic interests; and a complex of historical myths and memories - usually variously combined, or even all-inclusive) is shared. Still, the nation so defined is not a nation because it does not recognize itself as such, despite its belief in commonly-held cultural and economic attributes, and is thus devoid of a national consciousness. National consciousness emerges only when "all classes in one nation [share] a feeling of common membership." This feeling occurs when a substantial minority...becomes convinced that its

---

[258] Conquest, ed., *The Last Empire*, 17.

> community is a nation, puts forward claims for political recognition and political institutions of its own, and is at least passively accepted in a leadership role by most members of the community.[259]

Hence, national birth and national consciousness emerge with the occurrence of elite claims to political recognition.

This is reminiscent of the distinction Ernest Gellner makes between the nation in an anthropological or cultural sense, and the nation in a voluntaristic or normative sense. Seton-Watson emphasizes the elite role of promulgating claims for political recognition (with reference to the formation, centralization and expansion of the Muscovite state) in the formation of national consciousness, but fails to recognize that his definition of national consciousness (hence, of the nation - by virtue of its simultaneous occurrence) is inherently problematic. One would assume, in light of these definitions, that he would hold to the view that the Russian nation was born with the emergence of the Muscovite state; this is not the case. In fact, Seton-Watson questions the very existence of the nation in seventeenth-century Russia due to its subservient status vis-a-vis the Church and monarch. This not only contradicts his own definition of national consciousness, which posits the passive acceptance of the minority leadership by the majority, but clearly precludes the majority from his definitions of the nation and national consciousness. It should also be recalled that in his view the nation is born and becomes nationally conscious simultaneously with the emergence of the state, or at least some form of political sovereignty. One wonders how the emergence of the Muscovite state can have been a powerful factor in the formation and diffusion of national consciousness, when the very existence of the nation - even in the seventeenth century - is, in his view, dubious. Even if a Russian nation, as such, did not exist in the seventeenth-century, national consciousness cannot be determined on the basis of one of many existing social estates.[260]

---

[259] Ibid., 14-15.

It is highly significant that the formative stage of national consciousness is relegated to an elite group: the articulate members of the community, the substantial minority, which assumes some sort of leadership role that is accepted (at least passively) by the majority. Many analysts adhere to the notion that the actual emergence of Russian national consciousness is strictly an intellectual phenomenon of the Petrine period which, as Breuilly cautions, is inappropriate.[261] Some of the approaches considered in this work attribute the emergence of Russian national consciousness to its articulation by the nineteenth-century intelligentsia - the Slavophile/Westernizer debate on the content of Russian nationality - with almost total disregard for its eighteenth-century intellectual roots, let alone the impact of the Muscovite state.

---

[260] Richard Hellie provides a compelling discussion of war and military service as a means of economic and social intercourse among the various social strata of the Muscovite period. See, Richard Hellie, *Enserfment* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1971) *passim*. Charles Halperin asserts that recent archeological discoveries provide evidence of the interaction of peasants and slaves with other higher social estates. In his view, such interaction has been greatly underestimated. See, Charles Halperin, *Golden Horde* (Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1985), 79-81.

[261] Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 405-7.

G.R. Urban attempts to resolve this problem by borrowing from the principle propounded by Ernest Renan (who is also cited by Gellner), that "a nation exists when so many people express the view that, by solidarity, sentiment, and 'a plebiscite of every day', they are a nation."[262] This tends to highlight the populace in defining the nation as well as the anthropological derivation of political recognition. Elie Kedourie alternatively suggests that any definition of the nation which rests on a daily plebiscite cannot be distinguished from "the family...the village community...friendship, collegiality," nor from social ties in general, which, redolent as the image may seem, explains next to nothing about the nation.[263]

This then identifies the problem with attempting to understand the nation and national consciousness in an anthropological, or cultural, rather than a voluntaristic sense. On the other hand, political recognition, particularly in the case of Russia, tells us very little about cultural tradition. Without an understanding of the latter, we cannot even begin to understand how, when, and why the nation recognized itself as such. Though Strada insists that separation of the political from the cultural is inevitable in any conception of national consciousness, he nonetheless attempts to resolve this paradox. He considers the fundamental characteristics of national consciousness to include the name of the "national-ethnic community" (Russian)[264] which, as Cherniavsky explains, has its historical antecedent in the term *Russkie'*, or of *Rus'*. The terms *Ross* or *Rossiianin* derived from *Rossiia* which, in the seventeenth century, was co-terminous with the political state. The second characteristic of consciousness of identity, Strada asserts, is the historical and impermanent territory; the third, the state - the political and organizational entity which unifies the populace; and the fourth, a composite mythical historical consciousness, which is considered to be no less important to the constitution of consciousness of identity than the name, the territory, and the state. Indeed, Strada claims that the cultural nature of myth and history make them essential prerequisites of national consciousness.

---

[262] G.R. Urban, *End of Empire* (Washington D.C.: The American University Press, 1993), 108.

[263] Ibid., 108-9.

[264] Here it is important to bear in mind the fact that the "national-ethnic community" in our case has, from the beginning of its history, been multi-ethnic. (continued...)

By "myth and history" Strada is refering to the expression of that sense of a particular national historical significance, which forms the basis of another aspect of national consciousness - the sense of membership in a common cultural system of ways of everyday life (*byt'*), traditions, institutions and beliefs. Cultural solidarity, Strada continues, also involves a commitment to this shared system of ways of life, traditions, institutions and beliefs, either consciously or unconsciously.[265] By the latter he may well have in mind what William Sewell describes as "the relatively anonymous and impersonal operation of 'ideological state apparatuses', 'epistemes',

---

[264] (...continued)
Thus, the combination of "national" and "ethnic" with regard to the "community" is inherently misleading and historically inaccurate. Furthermore, Strada makes no semantic distinction between the terms *Rus'* and *Rossiia*. See p.22, n.49 in this work for this distinction.

[265] Buttino, ed., *Collapsing Empire*, 111-12.

'cultural systems', or 'structures of feeling'."[266] Together, myth and history and cultural solidarity create the possibility for the existence of a distinctly national consciousness.

Furthermore, national consciousness appears to vary widely on at least two reasonably constant levels, the first of which is manifest in time and space, as both form and degree of national consciousness may be highly differentiated according to historical era and geographical and cultural scope - so different that we may have doubts as to how legitimate it is to extend into the past our conception of the nation, particularly in the case of Russia. The second level is manifest within an individual ethnic unit and is concerned both with historical development, on the one hand, and with varying descriptions (according to social differentiation) of national consciousness at any given point in time, on the other. Strada cautions against adopting an eternal view of national consciousness which renders it absolute in character and thus reduces all conceptional possibilities to a single static or stereotypical identity. Moreover, the expression of national consciousness through a "We", which comprises the name, territory, state, and myth and history of a given nation, is conditioned at both levels by the existence of an analogous "They" or "Other".[267] This kind of conditioning is not only fundamental to our understanding of Russian national consciousness, but virtually shapes its very definition.

Seton-Watson's definition of the nation altogether neglects organizational status or authority and is thus devoid of a political character. In this sense, the nation is a contingency, the emergence of which is separate from, but intended for, the state. Politicization of the nation thus occurs with state independence.[268] Ernest Gellner is forced to admit, on the other hand, that some nations emerge without the state, while some states emerge without the nation. To conceive of the emergence of the nation without the state clearly depends on one's definition of the latter. Any conception of the emergence of the state without the nation, however, is somewhat disturbing. Again, we must ask ourselves whether the voluntaristic idea of the nation did not presuppose the prior existence of the state.[269]

---

[266] Szporluk, *Communism and Nationalism*, 79-80.

[267] Buttino, ed., *Collapsing Empire*, 111-12.

My main objection to understanding the nation as a contingency independent of the state is that it neglects their reciprocal relationship. Ultimately, understanding the interrelationship between the nation and the state, in all its complexity, contributes more to our understanding of national consciousness and thus nationalism, than does appropriating it to separate contingencies. Seton-Watson, too, admits to the inextricable connection between the history of nations and states. Nevertheless, his definition of the nation, as such, is separated from the state. In his theory concerning the formation of the Russian nation, Richard Pipes professes that state-building in fact preceeded the formation of the nation, thus leaving the Russians without a sense of who they are - in other words, devoid of a distinctly national consciousness. As a result of this reversal of stages - the formation of a multi-national empire before the completion of nation-building - Russians have never been certain "what is Russia" and what is not.[270]

---

[268] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 3-7.

[269] Ibid.

If, on the other hand, we apply Gellner's question - concerning whether the voluntaristic idea of the nation did not presuppose the prior existence of the state - to Russia, the answer proves to be difficult and highly controversial. Seton-Watson acknowledges, too, that the answer to the question "Who are the Russians?" in historical terms, yields no single explanation.[271] In the tenth century, it seems clear that a substantial group of people lived in the Dnieper River valley, spoke a Slavic or Norse language, and contributed, through the overlordship of the Norsemen (Varangians), to the federation of Kievan *Rus'*. Proximate to the adoption of Christianity in 980 AD, and now under the authority of Constantinople, Vladimir I (978-1015) and Yaroslav (1019-1054) expanded the Kievan territory north and east, spreading Christianity and Slavic culture among the Finno-Ugrians. Upon the death of Yaroslav in 1054, Kievan *Rus'*, now divided among his sons, fragmented as a result of their incessant feuds, which continued throughout the hundred years before the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century. Most of the Kievan principalities became vassal states to the Tartar khans. As Roman Catholicism began its spread eastward, the southwestern parts of Kievan *Rus'*, including Kiev, came under Lithuanian and then Polish suzerainty.[272]

---

[270] Conquest, ed., *Last Empire*, 157-58.

[271] Ibid., 15-17.

[272] Ibid.; Gilbert, *History Atlas*, 11-12.

The historical controversy begins with the emancipation of *Rus'* from the Tatar yoke in the late fifteenth century. Three very different doctrines have been put forward, all claiming to be substantiated by historical fact. The first, or classical Russian, doctrine suggests that the Muscovite state formed as a result of the gradual emancipation and subsequent unification of the vassal states of central and northern Russia from the Tatar yoke, under the leadership of Muscovy. As the alleged heir to Kievan *Rus'*, Muscovy liberated the southwest from Catholic Poland with the Armistice of Andrusovo in 1667 and the imposed protectorate over, and subsequent partitions of, Poland in the eighteenth century. According to this view, the Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians formed an East Slavic group, whose residentship now corresponded with the territorial boundaries of the Muscovite state. Their reunion with Muscovy in these centuries was an act of "liberation" from Polish rule. The official language was "the Great Russian speech of Muscovy", and those of the "Little Russians" were rendered dialects of the "Russian" language.

The second, or Ukrainian doctrine, is one proposed by contemporary Ukrainian nationalist and Polish historians. According to this doctrine, Muscovy was neither heir to Kievan *Rus'*, nor were its peoples purely Slavic. Rather, Muscovy was strongly influenced by Mongol Asiatic-despotic traditions, and merely inherited some remnants of Byzantine-Slav culture. Its people constituted a mixture of Finno-Ugrians and Tatars. The only commonality between this "alien" culture and Kievan culture was its acquisition of a Slavic language, which in time could be clearly distinguished from the Kievan or Ukrainian language.[273]

The third, official Soviet, doctrine purports that the Soviet acquisitions of 1939 (eastern Galicia and Volhynia, in accordance with the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement) and 1945 (the ceding of Ruthenia, which was formerly part of Hungary but was under Czechoslovakian rule in the prewar period - to the Soviet Union) signified the final act in reuniting Ukrainians with Russia. This was neither an act of domination nor expansion.[274] Whatever one's view, none of these three doctrines is completely convincing, though each has some merit and can be supported by historical fact. In any case, it is generally acknowledged that the Russian state formed from the principality of Muscovy and rapidly expanded into the Russian empire. The Russian language is that of the Great Russians.[275]

Still, the question remains: "When did the Russians become a nation"? As noted earlier, Seton-Watson is doubtful whether a Russian nation existed even as late as the beginning of the seventeenth century. At this time, the masses were unduly loyal to Church and monarch, regarded themselves as "slaves of the tsar", and were deeply devoted to the *russkaia zemlia - Sviataia Rus'*. Any sign of a horizontal link providing all classes with a feeling of shared membership in a nation were, in his view, few and largely insignificant.[276] This seems to suggest that because the so-called enslaved masses gave their allegiance to Church and monarch (even if only "passively" - which does not provide a completely accurate account if we consider the frequency of urban uprisings, peasant rebellions, and conservative reaction in this century), the existence of a nation is doubtful. This is logically problematic, particularly in light of Seton-Watson's own definition of the nation. Slavery is a social estate. "Social estate" constitutes part of the total makeup of consciousness of identity. True, the linkages were more vertical than horizontal in seventeenth-century Russia, but this does not negate the existence of a body of mutual economic interests among the various classes. Seton-Watson erroneously implies that a nation cannot exist if the ruling class exploits the masses.

---

[273] Conquest, ed., *Last Empire*, 15-17.

[274] Ibid.

[275] Ibid.

[276] Ibid., 17-18.

Furthermore, Cherniavsky has shown that the history of the epithet *Sviataia Rus'* was in common usage in the seventeenth-century epics and folksongs, and that its reemergence occurred in a period of new developments in self-identification. Throughout the Time of Troubles, the Polish and Swedish invasions (1610-1618) and many years of social unrest, autocracy and Orthodoxy were threatened. Salvation, which had traditionally come from the central authority, now came from the populace, as the tsar, Church, and state hierarchy was virtually absent. *Sviataia Rus'*, while distinct from its sixteenth-century anti-state origins, was nonetheless differentiated from the Muscovite state; it transcended the historical concept of *Rossiia* and identified the Orthodox Russian populace as its concentrated essence.

The election of tsar Michael Romanov by an Assembly of the Land (*Zemskii Sobor*) in 1613, was, in his view, conceived as an expression of the popular will.

Sviataia Rus' henceforth became the land of salvation, symbolized by its icons, saints, people, and ruler. There were nevertheless concrete limitations to this new conception, as indicated by its historical origin: *Sviataia Rus'* represented the immutable essence of *Rus'* throughout the Time of Troubles, when the visible form of *tsardom* was gone.[277]

Szporluk asserts that under Nicholas I, the Russian nation was defined by tsarism as subject to autocracy, devoid of a role in government, and not represented. He weakens his thesis by going on to say, in agreement with Pipes, that the Russian nation was denied an identity separate from the state. This requires some qualification, however. Szporluk is not suggesting that the subjected peoples of Russia played no role in the process of national self-identification. Rather, tsarism counteracted attempts to form a nation separate from the state. The Slavophile/Westernizer debate on the content of Russian nationality, for example, was counteracted by the Official Nationality policies of Nicholas I. From the Middle Ages on, public and civil law had been indistinguishable; the tsar maintained the status of sole political ruler and sole owner of the territory and its residents. Thus, in both a political and legal sense, the formation of a modern Russian nation was restricted by the state.[278]

---

[277] Cherniavsky, *Tsar and People*, 108-13.

[278] Szporluk, *Communism and Nationalism*, 206-7.

The State

Still, the state is, by almost every scholarly account, differentiated from the nation. Some scholars claim that in Russia a developmental divergence of state and nation occurred from the time of Peter the Great, while others locate this occurrence many centuries prior to the Europeanization of Russia.[279] Cherniavsky, for example, provides us with sufficient reason to believe that the roots of this divergence might be found in the sixteenth century with the emergence of the popular anti-state epithet *Sviataia Rus'*. Many scholars in the field locate the source of this divergence in the rapid and vigorous expansion of the Muscovite state, which exceeded the development of the nation. Indeed, it is the conclusion of most scholars that, as a consequence of this asymmetrical development, Russian national identity was blurred practically out of existence.[280] In light of such beliefs, it is necessary to determine "what is the state?" and, furthermore, whether the rapid growth of the Muscovite state denied the nation a separate identity.

Seton-Watson defines the state as a "legal organization based on a hierarchy of officials...[which] may be inhabited by numerous language groups and religious or communal groups that coexist fairly amicably."[281] Ernest Gellner, borrowing from Max Weber's definition of the state, adds to this legal organization its political and authoritative character. The state constitutes that "special, clearly identified, and well centralized...disciplined...political authority...institution or set of institutions...agency or group of agencies" (those to whom authority is delegated). The state's primary concern (whatever else may be its concern) is maintaining order in society. It possesses the exclusive right of legitimate violence, the ultimate sanction of which is the use of force. Thus, the state is the existence of agencies which specialize in the enforcement of order (i.e., police forces and courts), and have differentiated themselves from social life in general.

---

[279] Laqueur, *Black Hundred*, 4; Likhachev, *National Nature*, 14.

[280] Conquest, ed., *Last Empire*, 17.

[281] Ibid., 14-15.

Nevertheless, Gellner is not entirely satisfied with this definition, for legitimate control is not, for some states, a monopoly - for example, a feudal state. Objection to sectional violence between its fief-holders may be overlooked if responsibilities to their overlord are also met. Throughout the period of Mongol rule of *Rus'*, the state not only tolerated, but assisted private wars. Charles Halperin notes that the Golden Horde allied itself with Muscovy at various times in the early fourteenth century, thereby deliberately weakening rival cities like Tver'. In later decades, the Horde allied itself with Tver', having a similar effect on Muscovy. At one time or another, all the principalities sought this kind of alliance with the Tatars.[282] The Tatar overlords lacked the will, rather than the means, to enforce their monopoly of legitimate violence. In many respects, *Rus'* nonetheless remained a recognizable state. Weber's defining principle does, however, seem valid in its application to the Muscovite and Petrine states.

The state also constitutes, in Gellner's view, the critical and specialized development of the social division of labour, without which the state does not exist. The pre-agrarian stage of human history neither presents the state as an option, nor even invokes the question of the state as an order-enforcing institution, for the political division of labour is inapplicable to small bands of hunters and gatherers. Most agrarian societies, on the other hand, have been vested with some varying form of the state, though the existence of the state is voluntary in the agrarian stage of human history. The existence of various forms of the state in the post-agrarian, industrial age is neither optional nor avoidable.[283]

---

[282] Halperin, *Golden Horde*, 87-90.

Halperin maintains that the autocratic state appeared only after the dissolution of the Golden Horde in the sixteenth century.[284] He nonetheless pays particular attention to the Mongol influence on the political development of the state and concludes that this influence was immense, though not the determinant of Muscovy's political future. Rather, Mongol influence expedited the formation of the Muscovite state; it did not cause its appearance. Halperin begins by analyzing the impact of the Golden Horde on the rise of Muscovy to preeminent status.[285]

There are two schools of thought with regard to Muscovy's rise to power, neither of which can be considered the sole explanation of the expansion of Muscovite power, however. The first school, which originated with Karamzin in the early nineteenth century, argues that Muscovy's power resulted directly from its alliance with the Horde, and was thus the recipient of its political and military support. However, in his analysis of Muscovite institutions, with the aim of determining how control and administration of Muscovy's new domains operated, Halperin concludes that Mongol military support did not give rise to Muscovite power.

---

[283] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 3-7.

[284] Halperin, *Golden Horde*, 97-99.

[285] Ibid., 87-90.

Karamzin also believed that the Mongols (along with the voluntary collaboration of the princes) contributed to the growth of the autocratic state by destroying the *veche* (democratic town meeting), because of its role in resistance. The princes, in his view, tended to regard the *veche* as an annoyance. Whatever one's point of view, evidence suggests that the *veche* posed no such threat to the Golden Horde, which left domestic politics to the princes. Another theory of autocratic rule promulgated by Karamzin is based on the notion that the Golden Horde crippled the social power base of the nobility (*boyarstvo*) who in, fifteenth-century Muscovy, monopolized the highest government offices. Halperin explains, by contrast, that neither aristocratic privilege nor influence was restricted by the Mongols. This is not to say, however, that the nobility cannot be perceived as having presented an obstruction to the growth of the Muscovite autocracy.[286]

The second school of thought, propagated by the nineteenth-century historian, S. Soloviev - a theory widely held today - argues that the specific design of Mongol policy was intended to discourage the rise of Muscovy as a centre of power. Rather, internal forces created its position of strength, and thus gave it the unique advantage of leading the opposition to Mongol rule. In Halperin's view, however, Mongol influences gave rise to Muscovy's internal strength. In this sense, the contribution of Mongol administrative practices may be seen as having been highly significant in this ascendancy to power. For example, the Mongols' "assessment and collection apparatus" was undoubtedly borrowed by Muscovy when it appropriated authority over the collection of taxes and tribute and passed it over to the Horde khanate at Sarai. Assumption of the harsh Mongol tax system gave Muscovite princes the opportunity to extract greater revenue than ever before. Furthermore, the Muscovite princes were able to desegregate newly-acquired territories and exploit their maximum monetary potential. This practice continued even after taxes and tribute ceased to be passed on to the Horde. The Mongol *baskaki* (tax collectors) were replaced by Muscovite *danshchiki*. The job they performed was one and the same. This replacement could not have occurred with any degree of success unless the Muscovite *danshchiki* had not possessed the necessary expertise and control. Muscovite governmental forms were also significantly influenced by the Mongols. Nevertheless, the way in which these forms were used was determined by the Muscovite princes not by the Golden Horde.[287]

---

[286] Ibid., 95-97.

A less credible but nonetheless pervasive theory of Muscovite autocracy rests with the accusation that political morality was debilitated by the despotic and capricious nature of Mongol rule, indoctrinating in the elite assurances of raw power, and in the masses, blind subservience. As the Muscovite autocrats appropriated the mantle of Mongol khans, the masses obeyed them with the same submissiveness.

---

[287] Ibid., 97-99.

This theory tends to ignore the practices of the Riurikid princes in the Kievan period. The murder of Boris and Gleb by their brother Sviatopolk, Vasil'ko's blinding, Andrei Bogoliubsky's sack of Kiev in 1169, and numerous other examples, suggest that these practices did not originate with the Mongols. Furthermore, the repeated urban uprisings indicate that the submissiveness of the masses is something of a myth, and that their spirit was not successfully broken by the Mongols.[288]

Nor would it be correct to suggest that unification and Muscovite domination resulted strictly from Mongol policies and influences. Though the momentum for national unification in Vladimir-Suzdalia was provisionally Mongol, unification was accomplished through the distinctly indigenous political entity of the grand principality of Vladimir.[289] Unification required a complete bureaucratic administration, but Muscovy would not have effected such a bureaucracy until this need arose. The Mongol legacy provided the incentive for a superior bureaucratic apparatus as the Muscovite autocracy assumed power. An absolute monarch, on the other hand, is not intrinsic to a centralized bureaucracy. Absolutism, in both its theory and its revelatory symbolism, derived from Byzantium.[290] As the new Muscovite khanate could not proffer itself in the Chingisid form without undermining its Christian foundation, the Tatar origin of the governmental structures it did appropriate are simply not acknowledged in the sources. To do so would have been irreconcilable with literary convention, which dealt with the Mongols solely as religious enemies. This sense of Orthodox Christian identity, hence the importance of religion, determined which of the Mongol institutions could be utilized by the Muscovite state to suit its own needs. Orthodox Christianity thus served to discard the Islamic forms of the Golden Horde and further constrain the role of Muscovy as the successor.

---

[288] Ibid., 95-97.

[289] Ibid, 8-10, 87-90.

[290] Ibid., 101-3.

In terms of the effects of the Muscovite borrowing of Mongol political forms on Muscovite history is concerned, Halperin concludes that they were "significant but not wholesale"; "profound but not permanent."[291] Practical concerns induced the Muscovite autocrats to adopt Mongol models as they saw fit, but their commitment to them had no predetermined limit. Nonetheless, the relative importance of the Golden Kin (Chingisid descendants), and deference to the Chingisid principle, remained long after the end of Mongol rule. Testimony of this is Ivan IV's abdication (1575-1576) to a Chingisid, Symeon Bekbulatovich. Even in the nineteenth century, noble status was granted to members of the Golden Kin upon demand. Deference to the Chingisid principle remained at least partly because the mantle of the khans was assumed by the Muscovite tsars.[292] However, their regard for Mongol traditions and principles waned with the advent of absolute Russian military superiority. No longer was the invocation of claims to succession to the Horde, nor the maintenance of expertise in Chingisid lineages, necessary. Peter the

---

[291] Ibid.

[292] Ibid.

Great's Europeanization rendered interest in the Golden Kin all but irrelevant.[293]

It is ironic that the Mongols contributed to the very factor which eventually caused their demise: the emergence of a single, unified Muscovite principality. The Mongols also promoted international trade, from which Muscovy profited, and protected the Orthodox Church, which gained tremendous material and ideological strength. The Mongols defended Muscovy against Polish and Lithuanian rivals and furnished the later Muscovite state with many of its models for the military, public revenue, and the bureaucracy.[294]

The later Muscovite state was a service state. Members of all classes performed their requisite duties according to prescription, and remained, for the most part, in their delegated place within the social order.[295] The Petrine state was also a service state. In the eighteenth century, the gentry (largely the creation of the Muscovite princes) was mainly comprised of the descendants of those who had served the state during the previous three centuries. They received control of a large part of the land and controlled the serf population in exchange for their services to the state.[296] As the political and social mainstay of the tsar's power, they generally accepted autocracy as the superior and only practicable governmental system for

---

[293] Ibid.

[294] Ibid., 8-10.

[295] Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism*, 7.

[296] Ibid.

Rossiia. To think otherwise meant risking their special societal status.[297] Granted, the gentry were resentful of their obligation to serve the state in the early eighteenth century. However, after being freed from this obligation in the late mid-century, many remained in military and bureaucratic service. The French Revolution had significantly enhanced their perception of autocratic government as the mainstay of progress and social stability. Still, certain barriers such as the gentry's relatively low level of culture and education, and general disinterest in civic affairs and social life, precluded their close cooperation with the government.[298]

During the years immediately preceding the Napoleonic wars, the bureaucracy had grown rapidly. This development, as well as the apparent influence of Michael Speransky over tsar Alexander I, alarmed the gentry. Speransky's specific measures included the requirement that promotion within the bureaucracy be decided solely on the basis of merit. His general plans for governmental reform were contained in the ideal of a Russia governed by an official bureaucracy comprised of recruits from various layers of the populace, who would be selected according to efficiency in state service. Alexander II's reforms, which followed the Crimean War, accomplished little in the way of altering the predominant position of the gentry in government circles. And while they were obligated to concede the serfs' emancipation, they nevertheless controlled the commissions and committees assigned to undertake the details of emancipation.[299]

---

[297] Ibid., 9.

[298] Ibid., 10.

The service gentry comprised the larger part of the defenders of nineteenth-century Russian conservative national ideology. All those who had formulated the ideology, including Constantine Pobedonostsev, Ivan Aksakov, Nicholas Strakov, Rostislav Fadeev, and Constantine Leont'ev, had been university or service school students and had served the state in a military or bureaucratic capacity, though not always to their liking. Some had even spent the greater part of their lives as adults in service to the state.[300]

---

[299] Ibid., 11.

[300] Ibid., 12.

PART VII

NATIONALISM: APPROACHES AND FORMS

Approaches to Nationalism

Nationalism is approached in various ways; each has merit, and none can be singled out as *the* correct approach. They simply reflect different explanatory preferences for different forms of nationalism. The sociological approach, taken by Walter Urban and Anthony D. Smith, for example, elucidates nationalism in the language peculiar to modernization and independence.[301] On the other hand, the sociological approach may also treat nationalism as a ruling class ideology developed for the purpose of concealing class conflict through the creation of a "false consciousness."[302] One might view the fifteenth-century Russian Myth of the Tsar or the concept of Moscow the Third Rome in this light, but should refrain from calling this nationalism.

The motivational approach, as it is posited by political scientist, S. Handman, views irredentism, oppression, precaution, and prestige as the main kinds of incitement to nationalism.[303] Any and all of these motives might be applied to the period proximate to the emancipation of *Rus'* from the Tatar yoke. Nevertheless, this must be treated as state ambition, not nationalism. Hugh Seton-Watson distinguishes irredentism, independence, and nation-building types of motivation for nationalism, which pertain also to the Muscovite period of Russian history, notably the reign of Ivan IV (1533-1584).[304] Again, these efforts cannot be regarded as nationalism. With regard to these various types of motives, some scholars debate the positive or negative character of nationalism. Elie Kedourie, for example, explains nationalism as "an unfortunate accident dating from the early nineteenth century and giving rise to imperialism, war, and ultimately fascism."[305] Gellner, on the other hand, dismisses this notion on the grounds that nationalism is an authentic and perhaps fundamental motivation of political organization.[306]

---

[301] Carter, *Russian Nationalism*, 4.

[302] Ibid., 12.

[303] Ibid.

According to John Breuilly, nationalism can be approached broadly, in terms of concepts, feelings and actions. In the realm of concepts or ideas, nationalism is conceived essentially as the occupation of intellectuals. Hans Rogger, like numerous other scholars in the field, takes this approach to Russian nationalism. Regarding feelings or sentiments, nationalism is conceived essentially as the nation's cultural consciousness, i.e., its feelings, habitudes, and values. Here the focus tends to centre on the evolution of language and other common identities such as religion, ethnomythology, literature, and art. Strada's approach to Russian nationalism may be depicted as such but, like Rogger, cannot be limited to this approach. In the third instance: "actions," nationalism is conceived as "organisations and movements" which seek to give voice to the interests of the nation, the focus being "political action and conflict." Breuilly himself makes use of this approach to nationalism.

---

[304] Ibid., 5.

[305] Ibid., 4.

[306] Ibid., 5.

As noted, one can attempt to admonish or rebuke the accuracy of one or another of these approaches to nationalism, but each has its merit. Approaches to nationalism simply differ; none is right or wrong. For example, a concentration upon nationalist ideas elicits the manner in which such ideas are originally contrived and subsequently diffused throughout a population, and how they might affect political conduct. If one's focus is upon national culture, it might be argued that "folk" ways or the "standard national cultures" eventually become the object of intellectual and political reference. Carter views nationalism in this light; generally known as the ethnicist or nationalist view of nationalism. If, on the other hand, politics is given more weight than ideas or culture, the tendency to see action as political movements, which refer to nationalist ideas and exploit national sentiment to win support, is all but explicit. Many scholars of nationalism in general adhere to this approach, particularly with regard to modern nationalism (i.e., Seton-Watson, Gellner, Miroslav Hroch, Breuilly, and John Dunlop - to name but a few of the most prominent specialists in the field).

When considering these approaches to nationalism, it is essential to bear in mind three things: first, that ideology, motivation, ideas, sentiment, and politics are not the same thing - that each is an autonomous entity; second, that each also interrelates with the other in important ways; third, that any approach which insists that nationalism is really the product of one of these subjects to the exclusion of the others simply does a great injustice to an extraordinarily complex subject.[307] While Breuilly acknowledges the importance of this encompassment, he is nonetheless highly critical of general studies and theoretical works, the focus of which tends to centre on nationalism as a mindset formed by earlier events: in other words, nationalism as conveying the voice of national consciousness, or as the embellishment of a political doctrine by intellectuals. The one postulate characteristic of these various approaches, in his view, is that national identity gives rise ultimately to nationalism, or that nationalism is the striving toward national identity. Breuilly thus attempts to elicit the deceptiveness of this idea.

> To focus upon culture, ideology, identity, class or modernization is to neglect the fundamental point that nationalism is, above and beyond all else, about politics and that politics is about power. Power...is principally about control of the state. The central task is to relate nationalism to the objectives of obtaining and using state power; to understand why nationalism has played a major role in the pursuit of those objectives.[308]

To understand the role nationalism plays in such a pursuit, Breuilly suggests a close examination of the relationship between nationalism and politics. Only when we understand this relationship should consideration be given to the various identities which constitute national consciousness, the nation, and the state.

Thus, although he considers nationalism to be a form of politics best understood by political analysis, he cautions against neglect of its various social components or identities and the ideas with which nationalism becomes associated in this effort.[309] Breuilly completely neglects Russian nationalism in his work. He bases such an exclusion on the implied premise that in Russia, political action against the state didn't amount to very much; in other words, it may be considered insignificant. Rather, any attempt to define the Russian version of nationalism could be accomplished only in terms of foreign policy and the internal repression of anti- and non-nationals. At first glance, this tends not to contradict the fundamental premise of the undertaken work, as noted in the Introduction: that the 'Janus-faced' phenomenon of Russian nationalism was molded by the imperial state. This is not to say, however, that antithesis to the state should not be considered, particularly on the basis of its political 'insignificance' as Breuilly so defines it. This notion will be elaborated in detail when we attempt to define nationalism proper. Suffice it to say, that antithesis to the state is herein considered to be an essential component of the peculiar breed of Russian nationalism.

---

[307] Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 405-7.

[308] Ibid., 1-2.

Breuilly further suggests that the restriction of our definition of nationalism to politics - that is, the inclusion only of statements which explicate the notion of a distinct nation, making this the basis of all political demands - enables us to remove from consideration many characteristically ethnocentric statements. This is accomplished only by considering nationalism to have arisen in close association with the modern state. Clearly, Breuilly would not deny the existence of a national consciousness in medieval Russia, nor that there were active patriots. He argues only that these phenomena not be called nationalism.[310] Despite one's inclination to agree with Breuilly, the problem in this approach is that Russian nationalism is not considered nationalism proper outside the realm of Nicholas I's Official Nationality. This approach thus denies Russian history its most critical stage with regard to the evolution of Russian nationalism: the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

---

[309] Ibid., xii-xiii.

Other approaches to nationalism include the communications approach, put forward by Karl Deutsch and dealt with (although differently) by Benedict Anderson and Ernest Gellner. This approach posits the formation of a national consciousness through the evolution of networks of communication, which relates to both the form of national consciousness in, and the extension of, nationalism. The problem with this approach is the implication that increased communication leads to national solidarity.[311] Marxist approaches to nationalism generally emphasize internal class conflict and inter-state economic conflict in close association with the rise of capitalism. Here nationalism acts as an alternative to class in mass politics as a means of securing legitimacy and popular support of the state. The approach taken in this work might be labelled Marxist in the sense that Russian nationalism is largely, though not exclusively, conceived in terms of the interests of the ruling and elite classes, the social basis of which has historically been narrow. This does not, however, deny the variegated appearance of Russian nationalism.[312] Psychological approaches to nationalism are numerous. Generally, they posit nationalism as the fulfilment of an identity need. One might view the emergence of the sixteenth-century epithet *Sviataia Rus'* and its popular expression during the Time of Troubles in this sense, but again, this should not be labelled nationalism. Many scholars approach the Petrine crisis and the subsequent emergence of the Russian intelligentsia in terms of identity need within the context of Europe. Mikhail Agursky and John Plamenatz relate this identity need: a people's need to transform themselves vis-a-vis a civilization perceived to be superior, to nationalism. Gellner relates nationalism to the appeal for cultural identification as a result of social dislocation induced by rapid change, such as the transition to modernity. Valid as this approach is, it tells us very little about politics.[313]

---

[310] Ibid., 3.

[311] Ibid., 406.

Functional Forms of Approaches to Nationalism

Approaches to nationalism, Breuilly informs us, are very often functional in form, the purpose of which is to describe rather than explain. Functionalism indicates the part that something plays according to a general routine, and often complements accounts of nationalism which aim toward a particular objective. For example, functionalist accounts of nationalism are often closely associated with psychological accounts. Sociological accounts of nationalism often deal with binary classifications, such as: traditional and modern, masses and society, and generally view the rupture of relationships and values peculiar to tradition and the general populace as a consequence of rapid change, resulting in the establishment of relationships and values peculiar to modern society. Here functionalism could describe the effects of nationalism - its function being that of assisting the change to modern social life - but not the reason for its appeal. Some scholars of Russian history account for Peter the Great's Europeanization of Russia in terms of funcionalist sociology. Here the function of an emerging Russian nationalism aided in the transition to modernity; the notable effects could be described in the form of a new European identity. Nevertheless, it is not a widely held viewpoint that Peter's Europeanization constitutes Russian nationalism as such, a viewpoint promulgated by Agursky. Rather, one of the effects of Europeanization was the emergence of a traditional form of national identity. Europeanization was thus a profound catalysis which resulted in an emerging Russian national consciousness. Agursky also views the greater part of late imperial Russian history in terms of functionalist sociology. In this period he sees once again the rupture of traditional identity, the incursion of modernity and National Bolshevism as having aided in this transition. Here the "Soviet man" indicates the kind of form the new identity had taken. In this case, however, imperial- nationalism had the negative effect of isolating the ruling elite from society and the masses. The psychological approach might also explain why nationalism had a certain appeal for the political Right in this period (i.e., the requisite need of the ruling elite, the Orthodox Church, and the declining gentry to maintain the autocracy), but does not explain the reasons for the particular effect it had.

---

[312] Ibid., 407-11.

[313] Ibid., 414-18.

The function of Russian nationalism obviously varies according to context; it can be seen as an agent of class interest, a provider of identification, or a guide to action.[314] It is not intended in this work, therefore, to attempt to provide a single holistic explanation why nationalism has served a function in Russian history. As Breuilly cautions, such an attempt could only result in too large an account. Breuilly's problem lies in his unwillingness to admit that nationalism, like social cohesion, modernization, or imperialism, is an equally large concept. This should not indispose us to attempt to link it to social cohesion, modernization, imperialism or any other seemingly broad and misunderstood concepts.

The functions nationalism can serve are numerous, variously interpreted and context-specific. The question *why* nationalism serves a particular function is also problematic. For example, the contention that nationalism aids in the transition to modernity, fails to provide us with an answer to the question of *why* it does so. Any explanation would be beholden to such questions as why nationalism is exploited by nationalist leaders to defend the politics of modernization, and why such arguments win the support they do. This indicates that intentionality must also be considered.

Ideology also serves as a function of nationalism, though Breuilly cautions against understanding nationalism as ideology "in the rather crude sense of motivating people to act."[315] Rather, he argues that ideology can be related to identity need, and from this premise, nationalist ideology can be conceived as an especially potent reverberation of this need.[316] Still, Breuilly places greater weight on the importance and feasibility of nationalist ideology as it is more closely connected to nationalist policies. As a consequence of this, he restricts his assertions concerning nationalism's appeal to political, rather than a more general, identity. Furthermore, he sees the need for political identity as a fundamental constituent of effective political action. Breuilly acknowledges that this approach clearly misses much, and stresses the point that nationalist ideology should not be understood as the result of political predeterminism. Nationalist ideology tends to evolve specifically in relation to the requisite needs of political action, clearly defining its objectives and identifying potential advocates. These requirements: co-ordination, mobilization, and legitimacy relate, respectively, to the political community (active participants in political life), society (passive or inconstant participants in political life), and the international state system - the three levels at which political action occurs. Co-ordination creates a nationalist opposition; mobilization and/or legitimacy often create the real force behind that opposition.[317]

---

[314] Ibid., 418-20.

---

[315] Ibid.

[316] Ibid., 381.

[317] Ibid., 381-82.

Russian Nationalism

Despite the fact that Russian nationalism is neglected in Breuilly's work, he does state that one could describe the Official Nationality policies of Nicholas I as government-led nationalism in terms of its expansionist policies and also its internal subjugation of anti- or non-nationals. While this is true, it neglects one important point which is elicited by both Riasanovsky and Thaden: that Nicholas I's primary concern was with the maintenance of established order within the obligatory confines of the Holy Alliance. Nevertheless, Breuilly rightly contends that government-led nationalism is by and large "foreign policy framed in nationalist terms" and generally forms part of the international framework within which foreign policy is determined. However, if we consider that policy to have been attached to the domestic politics of the state, a general understanding of Russian nationalism might be provided both by structures of international relations, and through the concept of nationalism itself.[318]

Owing to the fact that official, government- or state-led nationalism is unquestionably difficult to understand, Breuilly neglects it altogether. What he terms state-led nationalism, is in fact described by many analysts of Russia as imperial-nationalism. Alexander Yanov and Andrei Amal'rik, for example, distinguish between the nationalism of small nations aspiring to freedom from imperial domination, and that of the dominant nation expressing its imperial interests.[319]

---

[318] Ibid., 7-8.

[319] Yanov, *Russian Challenge*, 14, n.2.

Thus it seems that we do a great disservice to any general discussion of nationalism by ommitting imperial-nationalism from our attempt to define nationalism proper. Imperial nationalism is one of the main contexts in which Russian nationalism, in all its complexity, can be understood. Still, Breuilly prefers to empty his general definition of nationalism of its specifically state-led content and confine it to what he terms "significant" movements, which are generally political movements against the state. This is serious negligence on his part, particularly in considering the title of his book *Nationalism and the State,* for it fails to take into account the varieties of nationalism which may, and indeed do, in the case of Russia, involve various and intricate combinations of nationalist political movements, which can be conceived in terms of action against the state, for the state, and state-led.

As Nicholas Riasanovsky explains,

> there is really no single explanation for nationalism, that there are always combinations of circumstances and exceptions...in addition to national states there are multinational ones...[one must] allow for exceptions, combinations, and various possibilities, in fact, for the uniqueness of every historical experience.[320]

There is no doubt that the complexity of nationalist dynamics can be identifed in Russia's unique historical experience, if only as roots of Russian nationalism. Beginning with the adoption of Orthodox Christianity and the concept Moscow the Third Rome; its practical political manifestation in the emergence and extraordinary expansion of the Muscovite state; the subsequent antithesis of *Sviataia Rus'* and its transcendance; the reaction of Old Believers to Europeanization; and, the development of eighteenth-century intellectual thought, which evolved in the Slavophile, Pan-Slav, and neo-Slavophile nationalist movements of the nineteenth century, ultimately reaching a most vile form of Russian nationalism in the anti-Semitic activity of the Black Hundreds and the mysticism of the gnostics.

---

[320] Riasanovsky, *Historical Consciousness*, 2.

Nevertheless, Breuilly is attempting to understand nationalism generally, by way of his restricted definition and subsequent comparative methodology, not Russian or any other nationalism specifically. But the very fact that Russia is absent from his work seems to indicate that he knows of no instances in Russian history which conform to his definition of nationalism as politics or a political movement against the state, and thus no history of nationalism, as so defined, in Russia. This is a misconception.

On the other hand, if we are to identify Russian nationalism as nationalism proper, we must consider its form. It remains unclear what Strada means by "extreme form of national consciousness" in his definition of nationalism. Clearly, the particular form/s nationalism assumes cannot be neglected. The question is, must nationalism proper assume the politically "significant" form of a mass movement? It would be a gross historical error to deny that nationalism existed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in Russia on the sole basis of percentage of mobilized population. The point is, does our definition of nationalism ultimately come down to numbers - a requisite minimum in terms of popular support? Must the impossibility of providing a generally applicable and precise figure, regarding the "nationalized" or "mobilized" population, negate the actual existence of nationalism in Russian history, as Breuilly implies by sheer negligence? In order to answer these questions, we must first determine what constitutes a nationalist movement.

National Movements

In Gellner's view,

> a nationalist 'movement' is one actuated by sentiment. Nationalist 'sentiment' is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of the political principle...which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent...or the feeling of satisfaction aroused by its fulfilment.[321]

Viktor Zaslavsky follows Gellner's approach to nationalism, an approach also adopted by Miroslav Hroch and Eric Hobsbawm, and understands nationalism as a political movement, the justification of which is drawn from a nationalist discourse. A nationalist discourse is defined as "a political doctrine", the basis of which is the following suppositions: that a corporeal entity called the nation has pronounced and distinctive characteristics; that the nation's priorities - its vital interests and system of values - take precedence over all other nations; that the nation's primary goal is the achievement of political independence in the form of a national state.

Stephen Carter also views nationalism, generally, as a political movement seeking to describe and promote the nation's interests.[322] Though he claims that Russian nationalism must be excluded from this definition because it has not taken the form of a political movement, even though it has significantly influenced Russian politics and continues, to this day, to do so, he nevertheless calls this enduring phenomenon in Russian history nationalism, regardless of form. At first glance, this appears to be a blatant contradiction. Upon closer observation, however, he clearly defines Russian nationalism as "an ethnocentric nationalism with linguistic, cultural, and religious aspirations." Ethnocentric nationalism can be variously classified. For example, as a purely preservationist form of nationalism, a caste-like rule is perpetuated by a culturally differentiated ruling group through its use of an admixture of contradistinction and homogenization. Such measures as Russification, chauvinism, and anti-Semitism serve this purpose, while the ruling group poses as the defender of the entire integrant opposed to the external world. Certainly the conservative nationalism of the political Right around the turn of the century could be classified as such.

---

[321] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 1-3.

[322] Carter, *Russian Nationalism*, 3.

Russian nationalism can also be "renewalist", the aim of which is that of preservation nationalism (i.e., perpetuation of a caste-like rule), but materializing in homogeneous cultural groups external to the main power centres and, if associated with social dissidents, leveled "against the incumbent ruler or regime." Solzhenitsyn exemplifies this kind of nationalism in the Soviet period. Finally, Russian nationalism can be classified as "expansionist, having a "dual, Janus-like quality", meaning that it is "both integrative and divisive, both modernizing and traditionalist."[323] This is more fully elaborated in our discussion of Plamenatz's Eastern nationalism, below. Breuilly is the most outstanding advocate, of those considered in this work, of nationalism as politics. As noted, he considers only movements that pose a serious threat to the state to be significant nationalist movements, and thus does not account for politically insignificant nationalist movements, despite the fact that their doctrines may be intricately developed. He does take into consideration movements with much less intricately developed doctrines, which are nonetheless politically significant. Political significance, he asserts, informs us of the importance of the movement and also qualifies the ideological role within the movement. One of these roles co-ordinates political elites' activity, thereby mobilizing mass support and legitimating the movement's political activity. In this sense, ideology provides incentive and precision, the absence of which would render impossible, operative political action. In this role, ideology is thus integral to the political movement, linking its ideas to specific contemporary political conditions.

---

[323] Ibid., 4, n.8, 10.

Clearly, Russian imperial ideology was an integral part of the Pan-Slav movement, particularly with regard to contemporary political conditions concerning the Holy Alliance. Breuilly nevertheless distinguishes this type of situation from that of a political struggle which is effectively interrupted by a nationalist movement. In the latter situation, the nationalist movement has had no prior involvement in the struggle, nor has its ideology been closely associated with the particular form taken in that struggle. Where the rhetoric of political struggle has been shaped in part by a nationalist movement, the significance of that movement will endure (as did the Pan-Slav movement after that crisis had been resolved, ultimately, by the Treaty of

Versailles), regardless of the rupture of allied associations the movement helped to build. On the other hand, where the connection between supportive allied associations and the nationalist movement is superficial and conditional, the significance of that movement will not endure. Resolution of the crisis, which was initially triggered by the nationalist movement, will cause the rapid dissipation of the movement and the reassertion of previously existing interests and political rhetoric. Breuilly does not apply this logic to Pan-Slavism, which in his view apparently did not constitute a political movement.[324] Pan-Slavism was a political movement.

Another role ideology plays in a nationalist movement is that of a guide to action, or provider of a kind of "conceptual map", which assists in relating specific interests (be they moral or material) to a more extensive realm,[325] and thus provides the means to self-identification in an international context. Ideology also arises from the need to rationalize a particular locale which cannot otherwise be understood. In this way, it both structures and describes that locale, and thus continuously vacillates between the claims of prescription and description of a given situation or set of circumstances. In the more extensive realm, obviously the scope of involvements is more complex and must be comprehended (at least by some) if they are to be effectively administered and upheld; this is especially true in the face of opposition, in which case this kind of abstraction must be vested with values.

---

[324] Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 113-14.

[325] Ibid.
See also pp. 13-14.

Hence, the accompaniment of ideology to war.[326]

It is also important to understand that "ideology both shapes and is shaped by the form political opposition takes." For this reason, it is difficult to comprehend Walter Laqueur's explicit disregard for the role of ideology in the Russian defense against the Mongol invasions.[327] Halperin, by contrast, tends to emphasize this role. Orthodoxy ideology can be seen as both a reflection of the role played by the state in contemporary politics, and as an argument about how it should be regarded. Ideology thus becomes manifest both as a justification for a particular form of political activity and as a medium for such activity. Nevertheless, it is precisely this dualistic role that ideology plays in political movements - in the capacity of both aiding and mirroring such movements - which makes the task of providing any originative generalization of the connection between political ideology and political action virtually insurmountable.[328]

The relationship between nationalist pressure groups and political movements is not considered in Breuilly's work. Although such groups are devoted to nationalist ideas, they do not seek state control, due in large part to their regard for the national state as it exists. Hence, they seek only to influence state policy. Pressure groups lack real power, though they can become movements with the acquisition of greater support, or with their alienation from the state. Thus, "the relationship between the nationalist movement and the state which it either opposes or controls" is Breuilly's primary focus. On the other hand, he does concede that, apart from a nationalist opposition seeking political independence from the state (separation), it can also seek "to reform it in a nationalist direction (reform), or to unite it with other states (unification)."[329] Having said this, however, he still neglects the case of Russia in his work. Clearly, we can conceive Pan-Slav nationalism in terms of unification. Nevertheless, while some Pan-Slav nationalists regarded themselves as unification nationalists and were referred to as such by their opponents, and while they made some form of nationalist claims and constructed political agenda which sought the realization of those claims, nationalism proper did not exist, in Breuilly's view, though nationalism of German romantic philosophy, the Russian language, Russian ethnicity, and divers other doctrines containing a nationalist constituent and all their imbricate and correlated positions did.

---

[326] Ibid., 381.

[327] Laqueur, *Black Hundred*, 3.

[328] Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 383.

Thus, it seems that nationalist doctrine is a serious matter, but also that it cannot be made the foundation for the classification of nationalist movements. The ultimate aim of these various nationalisms may be incompatible, which will indubitably limit the possibility of its realization. Although the manner in which these variously combined ideas are subscribed to must be respected, Breuilly cautions against stress on doctrine which tends to exaggerate the role played by nationalist theorists, and thus view the spread of nationalism in terms of their ability to convert others. He nevertheless does acknowledge the possibility of distinguishing elite and mass nationalism, adding that the various possibilities for organization are numerous. This he considers to be a major impairment to classification, which can produce too many categories.[330] True, but having too many categories is preferable, when attempting to classify Russian nationalism, to having no categories at all. As noted above, Russian nationalism is neglected altogether in Breuilly's work.

---

[329] Ibid., 9.

With regard to the distinction between elite and mass nationalism, he goes on to say that nationalist movements - despite a lack of active popular support - may and do "claim to speak for the whole nation" and in this sense "nationalist politics is always mass politics."[331] It is in precisely this sense that the cultural and the political combine. Breuilly nonetheless addresses the inherent difficulty in attempting to distinguish mass politics from above and from below. It is possible to identify various social and/or political changes which make mobilization possible or even necessary.[332]

> Conscription, for example, can create new contacts between state and the lower levels of rural society which may lead to support for new kinds of politics...it was conscription [in some parts of the world] which first made many people take a political interest in the world beyond their locality.[333]

Here the main idea is that national consciousness is extended and politicized. Moreover, war itself not only accomplishes this, but may indeed rupture the traditional authority and lead to the pursuit of alternative sources. Nevertheless, Breuilly distinguishes between the old age of war, invasion and political collapse, and modern nationalism, as only the latter relates to new political forms and thus those new political ideas which arise from it, which can be effectively used in times of crisis.[334] He does not consider modern urban centres and the pursuit of new identities to give rise to nationalism. Rather, they are significant aspects of the context in which nationalist movements might evolve.[335] Indeed, St. Petersburg was one such city.

---

[330] Ibid., 13-14.

[331] Ibid., 19.

[332] Ibid.

[333] Ibid., 20.

Both Riasanovsky and Dunlop, like most other scholars, support the notion of the modernity of nationalism. Furthermore, John Dunlop claims that neither tsarist nor Soviet periods in Russian history were nationalist, although "nationalist tactics were employed for political purposes from time to time."[336] However, it is critical that one bear in mind that nationalist tactics, much like a nationalist movement, cannot be arbitrarily switched on and off. Nationalism must have a more enduring and entrusted foundation for such intermittent and practical uses. It also means that nationalism cannot be so simply manipulated. Rather, nationalism evolves as various political and cultural forms of activity.[337]

Nationalist movements can, and have been in Russia, be furnished with leadership and monetary support by rulers and elites. But in order to constitute a mass movement, other more numerous social groups - the peasantry, for example - must be integrated. Such then is the distinction between elite and mass nationalism[338] and the ultimate failure of Russian nationalism in the years leading up to 1917. The Russian masses favoured socialism, whether that of Populism or Marxism-Leninism, or remained apolitical. Thus, as Szporluk contends, Marxism gained ground in Russia before nationalism.[339] This development may well be explained by the fact that the state had not evolved as a popular domain. Political activity had not been fundamentally shaped by a system of cooperation which undertook to link important social group interests to the state.[340] Hence, nationalism was also poorly developed. Implicit in Breuilly's theory is the viewpoint that nationalist political action in Russia lacked the kind of specialization which is dedicated to seizing or controlling state power, and that this also damaged the appeal of nationalist ideology.[341] Inherent in this view is an unwillingness to perceive the Russian socialist movement as the emergence of a new popular Russian national identity. Indeed, Breuilly does argue that "peasant action obviously played a crucial role in the...Russian rèvolutions but one cannot see it as a part of an organised political movement, let alone a nationalist one."[342]

---

[334]

[335] Ibid., 22.

[336] John Dunlop, "Russian Nationalism in the Twentieth Century." Paper presented at the University of Alberta, Edmonton 7 April, 1995.

[337] Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 32.

---

[338] Ibid., 33.

[339] Szporluk, *Communism and Nationalism*, 222-23.

[340] Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 81.

[341] Ibid., 225-26.

Other scholars offer Populism as evidence of the essentially nationalist stand taken by Russian socialists. Integral to this contention is the populists' perception of capitalism as an external threat, which led them to conclude that Russia (and not just the proletariat) was one of its victims. Thus, a "muted but persistent" national agenda characterized the Populist movement in Russia, despite the fact that the populists conceived of the nation in terms of the people (*narod*) and excluded the upper classes.[343] Some analysts view this as a peculiar form of mass nationalism, Agursky, for example. According to this view,

> Populism proceeded from the same source of Pan-Slavism, Slavophilism, and .like the Slavophiles, the populists worshipped the Russian people and differed only in their search for the latter's liberation. In their idealization of the Russian people, the populists absorbed Herzen's idea of the Russian rural commune, the 'obshchina', as primitive Slav communism and a means of bypassing capitalism.[344]

Strada elicits the inseparability of Russian national consciousness and reflection on socialism, thus making manifest the singular importance of Marxism in Russia. In this sense, national consciousness became more international.[345] This is an extraordinarily intricate historical logic which, paradoxically, was depicted with the eloquence of a literary master in his novels - that is, a master who idealistically and ideologically strenuously defended a distinct Russian national identity: Fedor

---

[342] Ibid., 44-45.

[343] Szporluk, *Communism and Nationalism*, 212.

[344] Agursky, *Third Rome*, 29.

[345] Buttino, ed., *Collapsing Empire*, 114-15.

Dostoyevsky.[346]

This very complexity is embodied in the phrase "Marxist in content, nationalist in form". Despite its proclamatory theoretical internationalism, Marxism nonetheless explicated the national boundaries within which the socialist struggle be carried out. Only after the victory of socialism in one country could the international obligations of the proletariat be fulfilled.[347] Though Marx and Engels strongly criticized Lasalle's conception of the workers' movement from a narrow national standpoint, they also called for the organization of workers to struggle as a class within their individual countries.[348] In so far as this class struggle was national, only in form and not in substance, Marxism provided the intelligentsia with a modern conceptual meta- or super-structure for the debate on Russia's position in world history and its future path to resume.[349] Szporluk asserts that the Witte system can easily be categorized as "an Official Nationality form of economic nationalism." Petr Struve, a Marxist turned nationalist, was the most prominent spokesman of Russian Listianism, promulgating Marx's notion of the positive role of capitalism in organizing production.[350]

Agursky claims that the nineteenth and twentieth-century Russian mystical sects, which played a highly significant role in the revolution in support of the Bolsheviks, were also "deeply nationalistic," despite their disdain of Church and state. Members of these various sects expressed extreme hostility to foreign innovations.[351] In Agursky's view, V. Soloviev (1853-1900) evinced a religious trend which freed mystical gnosticism from obscurity, and thus gave birth to the occasion for some to conceive of a Russian "spiritual revival and even redemption" in terms of "violent Bolshevik atheism". Alain Besancon draws attention to several of these gnostic trends, pointing out that the predominant literary trend - Russian Symbolism - originated in the mysticism of Soloviev, and that this trend looked to revolutionary Bolshevism as a new "religious" revival. Dimitry Merezhkovsky is held ultimately responsible for the transformation of Soloviev's paradox into an ideological weapon by advancing "the theology of revolution," which proclaimed that "providence acts through revolutionary hands." This was meant to serve "revolutionary mystics during the Bolshevik revolution." Merezhkovsky applied Soloviev's concept to terrorists. Terrorism too became a prestigious trend in the form of a broadly popular "mystical sectarianism" which disdained the Church (although not formally separated from the Church but existent within it, they nonetheless rejected religious commandments) the state, society, and legalism, and had a striking revelatory morale, hence, their "anticipation of catastrophe." In 1900, the *Khlysty* were regarded as the most treacherous of all the mystical sects, according to the Holy Synod's official report. By 1915, according to the report of a prominent missionary of the Church, the

---

[346] Ibid.

[347] Agursky, *Third Rome*, 16.

[348] Ibid., 61.

[349] Szporluk, *Communism and Nationalism*, 211.

[350] Ibid., 210.

---

[351] Agursky, *Third Rome*, 59.

Khlysty had penetrated all of Russia.

> On the eve of the revolution, Khlysty penetrated educated Russian society, undermining the very foundation of the Russian political system and producing two outstanding personalities who, each in his own way, accelerated the final collapse of imperial Russia: Grigory Rasputin (1864-1916) and Hieromonk Iliodor (Trufanov, 1880-after 1943).[352]

From the point of view of nationalism in nineteenth-century Russia, it is clear that the reform programme of Alexander II, which included economic decentralization and the introduction of some limited freedom of political expression and organization, unleashed a wide range of social and political energies. That these forces would support the reform programme was anything but hopeful, as many of those involved had other concerns. To understand how this led to revolution is to understand that the very nature of the autocratic state system which Alexander sought to reform, allowed for very little political or economic autonomy. The tsar, in effect, continued to monopolize political power.[353] In this way, the ability of nationalist opposition movements to develop was inhibited.[354] One cannot view the collapse of the imperial dynasty in terms of the rise of nationalism; rather, one should see the rise of nationalism as a rational response to the gradual breakdown of state power, as the "politics of inheritance".[355] On the other hand, the well of ideas and sentiments, from which the main objective of Russian nationalist politics has been drawn, has endured even under conditions which clearly rule out such politics. Alexander Motyl claims that "Russian chauvanism did not take nationalist form so long as Russians had an empire to rule". It is against this background that the swift conversion to nationalist politics following the collapse of the empire must, in his view, be understood.[356] Motyl seems to have wholly forgotten that anti-Jewish sentiment manifested itself in the form of extreme nationalism well prior to the collapse of the Russian empire.

---

[352] Ibid., 61.

[353] Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 346.

[354] Ibid., 348.

[355] Ibid., 350.

Though the framework for these ideas is Breuilly's which, on the whole, is excellent, the ideas themselves, as they relate to imperial Russia, are not.

Much of this chapter has been devoted to John Breuilly and, in large part, has focused on his definition of nationalism, which excludes Russian nationalism from its content. I have argued that Russian nationalist politics, or political movements in Russia, have acted in concert with the state. This kind of reciprocity is not unacknowledged by Breuilly where he states:

> There is also a state-led nationalism but defining governmental nationalism is more difficult. The term nationalist in this context often means no more than particularly offensive and aggressive policies pursued by national governments...to regard all policies of self-interest undertaken by national governments as nationalist would be to empty the term of any specific meaning.[357]

This statement might well be directed solely at Mikhail Agursky. Breuilly thus thinks it more useful to restrict governmental nationalism to two clearly defined phenomena: "externally it could refer to policies aimed at extending the territory of the state into areas which the state claims as belonging to its nation" - in other words, imperialism; "internally, one could describe as nationalist actions taken against specific groups or individuals and justified on the grounds of the anti- or non-national character of these groups or individuals."[358] Russification and anti-Semitism fit this kind if internal aggression. Hence, we can analyze the Russification and anti-Semitic policies of the Russian state in an attempt to determine their nationalist character.

---

[356] Ibid., 402, n.9.

[357] Ibid., 8.

Russification

Some scholars claim that the tsarist government adopted a conscious policy of Russification only during the reign of Alexander III (1881-1894). This policy was continued throughout the reign of Nicholas II (1894-1917). Thus, it was in this period that Russian nationalism was countenanced by the state and became an integral part of official policy.[359] Prior to this time, according to Dunlop, official policy had been formulated in the name of the tsar, who answered only to God.[360] While it is true that Russification policy was carried out under Alexander III (i.e., attempts to impose Orthodoxy in the Baltic provinces and in Poland),[361] other scholars contend that the inception of official Russification policy should be located in the second quarter of the nineteenth century. During the 1820s and 1830s, the Russian government and Church officials were particularly successful in converting to Orthodoxy important members of the Uniate clergy in the western provinces. Throughout the 1830s and 1840s, Russian national culture in Poland and in the western and Baltic provinces received strong support from Uvarov's ministry. Thaden considers this to have been the Russian government's first serious attempt at Russification - that is, to impose the Russian language, culture, and history on the younger generation of the gentry and middle classes in these provinces.[362] It is also significant that the first half of the seventeenth century is considered by Hellie to have been "one of the most xenophobic periods in Russian history." Proximate to the Time of Troubles, tsar Michael Romanov decreed that certain lands were to be held for use only by foreign servicemen (Tatars, Mordva, etc.) and not to be aggrandized by lands belonging to Slavs unless the foreigners converted to Orthodoxy. As this restriction of the land fund was advantageous to the *deti boiarskii* and *dvoriane*, they tended to encourage xenophobia on the basis of religion.[363]

---

[358] Ibid.

[359] Conquest, ed., *Last Empire*, 20-23.

[360] John Dunlop, "Russia: Confronting a Loss of Empire," Paper presented at ICCEES World Congress, Warsaw, Poland, 6-11 August 1995, 2.

[361] Buttino, ed., *Collapsing Empire*, 54, n.2.

Proximate to the Polish uprising of 1830, the Russian government was particularly relentless in its attempts to eradicate Catholic Polish culture and authority in the western provinces. Roman Catholic church schools were replaced by Russian ones; and, Russian Saint-Vladimir University at Kiev (1833) replaced the Polish university at Vilna, which was closed in 1832. The Polish language, which was taught in the state schools, was discontinued in 1836.[364] In 1839, the western Ukrainian Uniates were forcibly reunited with the Orthodox Church. Though the Baltic Germans were treated with greater consideration as a result of their personal loyalty to the tsar, the Russian government insisted upon the privileged status of the Orthodox Church and more extensive use of Russian in the schools of the Baltic provinces. Furthermore, Orthodox priests converted some 100,000 Latvian and Estonian Lutheran peasants to Orthodoxy. However, certain of the more powerful Baltic barons raised the issue, that given the peasant economic and social grievances against their German landowners, mass conversion endangered the established order in the Baltics. Concerned to maintain the existing stability, Nicholas responded with restraining measures directed at the more zealous advocates of Russian Orthodox culture in this region.[365]

---

[362] Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism*, 19-21.

[363] Hellie, *Enserfment*, 55-56.

Hugh Seton-Watson provides a psychological rationalization for at least one of the factors that contributed to the policies of Russification. This was a Russian national ideology which asserted cultural superiority over all other cultures of the empire, and the legal and moral entitlement to impose Russian culture on all others.[366] By contrast, Zubov explains that the Russians' self-perception was never associated with an understanding of themselves as a superior nationality within the empire. This wan contention is centred on the fact that Ukrainians, Baltic Germans and many other nationalities were equally represented by sheer virtue of their having participated in the service of the government as early as the seventeenth century and as late as the nineteenth century.[367] Strada inculcates this notion on the more solid basis that a sense of Russian national inferiority concerned Russia's relationship with the more advanced of its conquered nations - Poland, for example.[368] This is not to say, however, that consciousness of identity was not based on a self-perception (not altogether unfounded) of being more highly advanced than other conquered nationalities.[369] What is certain is that by the mid-nineteenth century, Orthodox Russians were acknowledged as the principal nationality within the empire, and the state was conceived as a Russian state, at least to some degree. This is exemplified by the 1905 electoral law, which predisposed Russians in the periphery by granting them the right to separate election of their own deputies. Distinct electoral meeting-houses were provided for the Russian political subdivisions in Warsaw, the provinces of the Transcaucasus, and Central Asia.[370] The term Russification assumed negative connotations which were leveled against official policy by both non-Russian nationalists and Russian liberals or socialists. On the other hand, the Russification policies of the government cannot be viewed as uniform. Despite the overall tendency toward an increasingly insolent Russian nationalism, Russification policy varied within the empire, targeting primarily Ukraine, whose claim to distinct national character was flatly rejected, and Poland. Officialdom was not at all deterred by the fact that many Ukrainians and Belorussians had adopted Catholicism and, in the Ukrainian case, had developed a separate political tradition and institutions as a result of their historical relationship with Poland-Lithuania - "the period of their supposedly forced separation from the tsar." Their reconversion to Russian Orthodoxy and the gradual destruction of the Hetmanate and Sich autonomy[371] suited the official Russian self-image. Ukrainian claims to equal status with Russia were ignored by the St. Petersburg officials. (Belorussian claims to the same were infrequent). The Pereiaslav agreement of 1654 was "interpreted in conformity with official ideology."[372] Linguistic differences between Ukrainian, Belorussian, and Russian were often attributed to Polish contamination, hence, the invocation of a similar argument that had attempted to mitigate the repression of a separate Ukrainian and Belorussian religious and political identity.[373]

---

[364] Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism*, 19-21.

[365] Ibid.

[366] Conquest, ed., *Last Empire*, 20-23.

---

[367] Buttino, ed., *Collapsing Empire*, 54.

[368] Ibid., 107-8.

[369] Ibid, 114.

[370] Ibid., 61.

Likhachev cautions against confusing Russian officialdom with the Russian people, whose own suppression may have exceeded that of any other nationality in the empire. The Russian nation, he claims, cannot be found guilty of national inhumanism, principally because its constitution has been multinational from its very inception. This is particularly true for the populations of Moscow and St. Petersburg. Russia's multinational character, he contends, has been a source of great pride to Russians (even to such rabid anti-Semites as Konstantin Leont'ev, who he claims held other nationalities in esteem). Russian culture of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries owes much to the contributions of the various nationalities.[374]

---

[371] "...those parts of Ukraine Muscovy had ruled as autonomous entities, since the seventeenth century..." (Roman Szporluk, Robert Conquest, ed., Last Empire, 1986, [Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 159-160].

[372] Conquest, ed., *Last Empire*, 159-60.

[373] Ibid.

> That the country with the most human and universal of cultures, with every reason to serve as a link between Europe and Asia, was at the same time one of the cruellest oppressors of other nationalities - first and foremost of its own, central Russian people - is one of the most tragic of historical paradoxes. To a great extent, it was the result of an agelong confrontation of people and state. And, in addition, of the polarization of the Russian character, with its urge for both freedom and power.[375]

Anti-Semitism

The second aspect of governmental or state-led nationalism Breuilly identifies as internal campaigns leveled against clearly identified groups or individuals on the basis of their anti- or non-national status.[376] In Russia, anti-Semitism can be conceived as an aspect of cultural identity, and not solely within the realm of government. Judaism inevitably appeared a problem to a fundamentally Orthodox Christian nation. Furthermore, the minority Jewish presence in Russia was culturally prominent. The inherently complex nature of relations between the Orthodox

---

[374] Likhachev, *National Nature*, 11-13.

[375] Ibid., 14.

[376] Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 8.

Christian and Jewish identities evidently moved officialdom to facilitate Orthodox Christians by adopting the "We" versus "They" divider.[377]

The government set anti-Semitic policy as early 1742, when tsarina Elizabeth expelled from the empire all Jews unwilling to convert to Orthodoxy. Catherine the Great (1762-1796) attempted to restrict Jews from central Russia by laying the foundation for the Pale of Permanent Jewish Settlement, which included the territories of Vitebsk, Minsk and Mogilev; Vilna, Grodno and Kovno; Kiev, Volhynia and Podolia; Bessarabia, Ekaterinoslav, Poltava, Tavrida, Kherson, Chernigov, and ten provinces of the Polish kingdom. Jews were also restricted from enrollment in inner-city merchant guilds and free trade and settlement by the June 1794 decree. In the early nineteenth century certain rights, such as naturalization, were granted to some Posen Jews on the basis of their wealth, education, length of residence, and willingness to assimilate Russian culture. However, the majority of Jews remained non-citizens.[378]

By the late nineteenth century, the "We" versus "They" divider had become a powerful anti-Jewish myth which assumed the form of violent anti-Semitic hate. "The Jew became the Antichrist, absent and yet omnipresent."[379] Anti-Jewish pogroms appeared in three waves. The first wave occurred during 1881-1882 in southern and eastern Ukraine. (A pogrom also accurred in Nikolaev in August 1899).[380] The second wave occurred in April and September 1903, and assumed a degree of wanton terror. In Kishinev and Homel, an estimated forty-seven Jews were killed.[381] Evidence of the scale of this massacre is provided in the detailed letters of Ber Borochov (1881-1917), leader of The Jewish Social Democratic Labour Party (Poale Zion) and devotee to the cause of Jewish self-defense against the *pogromshchiki*, to his family in America.[382] In 1904 the threat of a pogrom existed in Poltava, as is indicated by Borochov's writings.[383] The third wave occurred in October 1905 through July 1906, during which time the Black Hundreds perpetrated some seven hundred pogroms predominantly in the Pale of Settlement (twenty four were outside the Pale). In Odessa, Laqueur estimates the number of Jews killed to be three hundred; Frankel alleges that the total number killed was closer to eight hundred. Including those wounded in Odessa (Jews and non-Jews), the figure rises to nearly six thousand. In the Nezhin, Novosylkov and Kherson pogroms, no precise figure is provided though heavy casualties were reported.[384] In Ekaterinoslav, the victims totalled one hundred and twenty. In Kiev, Laqueur estimates forty six killed;

---

[377] Buttino, ed., *Collapsing Empire*, 107-8.

[378] Rogger, *Jewish Policies*, 1-4.

[379] Laqueur, *Black Hundred*, 26-27.

---

[380] Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism and the Russian Jews, 1862-1917* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 218, 592, n.193.

[381] Ibid., 155.

[382] Ibid., 335-36.

[383] Ibid., 329-36.

[384] Ibid., 149-50.

according to Frankel, that figure is one hundred.[385] In Belostok, the total number of victims ranges between sixty, eighty, and two hundred, and in Zhitomir, between twenty-nine and sixty Jews killed.[386] In addition, several thousand Jews were injured as a result of the Black Hundred pogroms. The pogroms in Ciedlec, Orsha, Simferopol, and Feodosiya, where the Black Hundreds did not exist, were perpetrated single-handedly by the police. During the civil war period (1919), seventeen hundred Jews were killed in Proskurov. This pogrom occurred at a time when the Black Hundred had ceased to exist.[387]

The pogroms were incited by local activists. Attempts to explain this massacre differ significantly, however, in terms of participation in the pogroms. Soviet historiography insisted upon the notion that workers were non-participants in these attacks, but were equally subject to them as were the Jews. Western scholarship, on the other hand, claims that the Left was seldom attacked and that railway workers and peasants were frequent and prominent participants in the pogroms.[388] Hugh Seton-Watson adds to the latter of these interpretations:

> the pogroms involved large mobs composed of the urban poor...that participants in pogroms were limited to the 'Lumpenproletariat' (the crudest and least educated workers)...[asserts] a category that defies definition...That part of the working class that was linked to a socialist party was clearly unaffected by nationalist demagogy and did not join pogroms; but to equate the whole urban labor force with the politically

---

[385] Ibid., 135.

[386] Ibid.

[387] Laqueur, *Black Hundred*, 22-23.

[388] Ibid.

> conscious socialist workers is absurd. In reality, glorification of Russia and the Russian nation, combined with hatred of Jews, made a strong demagogical appeal. Anti-Semitism operated rather effectively as 'the socialism of the imbecile', concentrating primitive anticapitalist feeling against Jewish shopkeepers, who in large parts of the empire were the flesh-and-blood capitalists with whom the urban poor most frequently came into contact.[389]

Also noteworthy is the fact that the Russian revolutionary parties seldom intruded to fight against the *pogromshchiki*.[390]

The 1905-1906 pogroms were organized by the political parties of the extreme Right which formed in the first decade of this century, and can be conceived as a conservative reaction to the celebratory atmosphere ushered in by the October Manifesto, hence, a liberal victory. Crowds which had gathered on the Station Square in Minsk, to celebrate the victory, were fired at by troops under the direct orders of Governor-General Kurlov, killing one hundred people, nearly all Jews, and wounding an estimated four hundred.[391] The Union of Russian People (URP), led by Alexander Dubrovin and then by Nikolai Markov II, dominated the parties on the extreme Right. All the radical Right had anti-Semitic programmes but the URP was especially prominent in this regard. S. An-sky (a veteran populist) blamed the government for the pogroms, which, in his view were "all organized by the government with the single goal of putting out the revolutionary fire with Jewish blood."[392]

---

[389] Conquest, ed., *Last Empire*, 20-23.

[390] Frankel, *Prophecy and Politics*, 150.

[391] Ibid., 149.

In his renowned series *The Lessons of the Terrible Days* (1905), the historian Shimen (Semen Markovich) Dubnov, one of the very first advocates of "extraterritorial self-government" in Russia,[393] elicited the similarities between the 1881 and 1905 pogroms:

> In 1881, the anti-Jewish pogroms were officially called (by the minister, N. P. Ignatev) "popular justice" and in 1905 they are officially included in the series of "patriotic demonstrations" conducted under the national flag and the tsar's portrait. Then they were justified by imaginary economic factors and now by political factors -revenge for the revolutionary activity of the Jews.[394]

Anti-Semitism in Russia, in this period, can thus be considered to be supported and indirectly incited by the ruling elite, including the tsar.[395]

Despite the conception that the action taken against Jews is an aspect of identity which inevitably presented a problem for Orthodox Christian consciousness, Laqueur contends that the URP never gained more than twenty percent of popular support,[396] though it is altogether unclear how he measures popular support. In the words of Pobedonostsev

---

[392] Ibid., 143.

[393] Ibid., 108, 171.

[394] Ibid., 136.

[395] Agursky, *Third Rome*, 113-14.

[396] Laqueur, *Black Hundred*, 26-27.

> the Jewish problem in Russia was to be solved by the conversion to Orthodoxy of one-third of the Russian Jews, the emigration of one-third, and the death of the remaining third.[397]

Nationalism

Hans Kohn has defined nationalism as a state of mind which pervades the great majority of a people, and asserts the claim that it pervades the entirety of this people. The nation-state is recognized as its ideal political organizational form and the derivation of all national productive and cultural strength and economic vigor. Thus, mankind owes his utmost loyalty to his nationality - the supposed roots of his own existence and contingent upon its prosperity.[398]

Breuilly views nationalism strictly in its political form.[399] In his view, nationalism can best be understood in terms of the nature of the modern state, which is both opposed and claimed by nationalism.[400] Nationalists assert a political doctrine founded upon the following: first, that a nation with a clearly defined and distinct character exists; second, that this nation gives priority to its own interests and values over and above those of other nations; and third, that nation must be independent, or at least have attained political sovereignty.[401]

---

[397] Riasanovsky, *History of Russia*, 395.

[398] Carter, *Russian Nationalism*, 30.

[399] Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, ix.

[400] Ibid., 15, x, xii.

[401] Ibid., 2.

In Ernest Gellner's view, nationalism can be a sentiment or a movement and is defined in terms of the nationalist principle, which holds that

> nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones, and, in particular, that ethnic boundaries within a given state - a contingency already formally excluded by the principle in its general formulation - should not separate the power-holders from the rest.[402]

This principle is violated in the following ways: the political state boundary may not incorporate all members of the nation to which they formally belong, or all members may be incorporated, but so too may some non-nationals. The political state boundary may also fail to include all, but include some nationals. Or, a nation may only comprise nationals existing in a number of states, thus preventing one state from declaring itself as *the* nation state. One violable form to which nationalist feeling is especially sensitive is a situation in which the political rulers are of a nation other than the nation of the majority ruled (i.e., nationalists held that Russia was ruled by "Germans") For nationalists, this is a salient infringement of proper political conduct and can occur through the incorporation of a national territory into a greater territory - an empire, or by the subjugation of nationals by non-nationals.[403]

Gellner also asserts that nationalism is contingent upon the state. A stateless nation obviously cannot question the congruency of its boundaries with the boundaries of other nations. A stateless nation is devoid of rulers, thus cannot question its nationality as regards the nation ruled. A stateless, hence rulerless, nation cannot be resented by the nation in its failed conformity to the requisites of the nationalist principle. According to Gellner, "Nationalists have generally fulminated against the distribution of political power and the nature of political boundaries, but they have seldom if ever had occasion to deplore the absence of power and of boundaries altogether." This, he asserts, "is a necessary though by no means a sufficient condition of nationalism."[404]

---

[402] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 1-3.

[403] Ibid.

Stephen Carter, on the other hand, altogether distorts the notion that nationalism can occur in the absence of the state, by concluding that as a result of this absence, nationalism is revealed as a cultural movement. Such are the problems inherent in the separation of politics from culture. Elie Kedourie also notes the importance of distinguishing between the cultural and the political, but further suggests that this distinction contradicts the nationalist doctrine that "the two are inextricably mixed."[405] This brings to mind Gellner's definition of nationalism, which does indeed assert the congruency of the political and the national or cultural unit. This is not to say, however, that the political principle is not consistently violated by the spirit of universalism or the aspiration to preserve cultural diversity.[406]

Like Breuilly, Seton-Watson cautions against use of the term nationalism to describe national self-interest or the aggressive policies of governments of states - in other words, imperialism and other matters of foreign policy. Rather, nationalism should be understood to mean two things: "a doctrine about political organization that puts the perceived interests of the nation above absolutely everything else; and, a movement (usually a political party or parties) whose professed aim is to promote the interests of the nation."[407] Breuilly, on the other hand, as indicated earlier in this work, does make some concession to viewing specifically state-led nationalism in terms of governmental behavior.

---

[404] Ibid., 3-7.

[405] Conquest, ed., *Last Empire*, 111.

[406] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 1-7.

Clearly, nationalism is paradoxical. One such paradox, elicited by Benedict Anderson, is the unequal political power of nationalism, on the one hand, and its philosophical poverty, even incoherence, on the other. Anderson asserts that nationalism has failed to produce its own lofty thinkers like Thomas Hobbes, Alexis de Tocqueville, Karl Marx, or Max Weber.[408] Gellner also contends that are no texts worthy of discussion when considering nationalism, on the grounds that nationalist thinkers made very little impact and were moreover dispensable; since substitutions would hardly have affected the quality of nationalist thought, their specific doctrines are unworthy of analysis.[409] Unlike most analysts of nationalism, Anderson suggests that nationalism be perceived as comparable to such categories as kinship and religion, and not as an ideology. Nikolai Ustrialov (a founder of National Bolshevism) also held that nationalism is an aesthetic category and thus fails to necessitate any rational kind of explanation.[410] Gellner agrees that nationalism is unreasonable and rationally asymmetrical. Nationalists tend to make exceptions on behalf of themselves and their own cause, which he considers to be the fundamental human vulnerability from which all other weaknesses proceed, and which contaminates nationalist sentiment, giving rise to "what the Italians under Mussolini called the *sacro egoismo* of nationalism."[411]

---

[407] Conquest, ed., *Last Empire*, 14.

[408] Szporluk, *Communism and Nationalism*, 79-80.

[409] Ibid., 79.

That nationalism might be considered an aesthetic category raises certain questions concerning whether nationalism should be considered an ideology. William H. Sewell, Jr. contends that nationalism is indeed an ideology - anonymous or transpersonal - and further suggests the means by which such identification might be achieved in relation to the substance of nationalist doctrine. Traditionally, the focus of scholarship on ideology has centred on resolute individuals whose purpose has served the specification or enactment of blueprints for change. That focus has since changed to "the relatively anonymous and impersonal operation of ideological state apparatuses, epistemes, cultural systems, or structures of feeling." Interest has thus shifted, in his view, to the interrelations of the ideological system's semantic items and may be found "in their relation to social forces, not in the conscious wills of individual actors." An aggregate ideological structure is inevitably paradoxical and discontinuous. Thus it can never be fully contained in the cognizance of a sole actor, be he a Robespierre, Napoleon, Lenin, or Mao. Nor is this structure a self-consistent blueprint, but a result of the frequently antithetical or inimmical activity of numerous actors or groups of actors. Sewell suggests this conception of ideology to historians seeking to elicit how ideas function in history. He implores that one understand nationalism as an anonymous discourse which arises out of the requisite needs of a given situation and the eventualities of a pre-existing ideology, as opposed to its systematic formulation by some theoretician. Roman Szporluk takes particular issue with this approach to understanding nationalism, and asserts that nationalism can and should be based on the study of the insights of individual nationalist theorists such as Rousseau, Fichte, Herder, and List.[412]

---

[410] Agursky, *Third Rome*, 185.

[411] Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, 1-7.

Most scholars in the field conceive of nationalism as an ideology, however. In Hans Roggers view, nationalism as ideology is founded on a particular national experience and endeavors to answer questions of morality, society, and politics. It is "an inclusive system of thought, a philosophy, a value judgement, a metaphysic", the basis of which is belief, in contradistinction to consciousness.[413] Rogger and Yanov (like other scholars) agree that the phenomenon of Russian nationalism emerged with nineteenth-century Slavophile ideology.[414] Both thinkers conform to the writings of Nicholas Berdiaev, who once proclaimed Slavophilism to be "the first truly independent Russian ideology."[415] Nevertheless, they diverge in their approaches to Slavophile nationalism. Yanov insists on the political character of this "unpolitic" period, defining Slavophile nationalism as an enduring, potent, and effective ideology, and the major adversary to traditional Russian liberalism, or Westernization. Slavophile ideology is a political dogma with a history of unmistakable rejection of the fundamental tenet of Western political theory: separation of power of the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government; and advocation of a medieval theory of the division of functions between the secular and religious powers. Its political ideal is not conceived as representative government, "but as a nation-family not requiring political guarantees" or separation of church and state, which is foreign to it. Slavophile ideology thus stands in opposition to every major prescript of modern democracy.[416] The ideology of Russian nationalism, according to Yanov, is not to be confused with patriotic emotion or chauvinist excesses.[417] Indeed, many scholars take particular care to differentiate between nationalism and patriotism. Patriotism is generally defined as a people's love of, and loyalty to, their homeland, the *patria*; nationalism is distinguished from patriotism by reference specifically to the people, or nation.[418]

---

[412] Szporluk, *Communism and Nationalism*, 79-80; Thaden, *Conservative Nationalism*, 3.

[413] Rogger, *National Consciousness*, 3-4.

[414] Yanov, *Russian Challenge*, xv.

[415] Laqueur, *Black Hundred*, 7.

Mikhail Agursky's definition of Russian nationalism focuses largely on geopolitics and emphasizes Russian reaction to having been exposed to foreign innovations, which were perceived as an external threat to its national existence. In his view, it is not accidental that Russia evolved such an aggressive nationalism in light of its "geopolitical isolation and lack of allies."[419] Like all nationalisms, the peculiar Russian version was not an obscure invention ascending from some sort of political vacuum, but a response to the threat posed by the West. Russian nationalism, in his view, thus manifested itself in the form of a "powerful phobia" leveled against Germany and the Germans in Russia in the eighteenth century. This corroborates Rogger's definition of national consciousness (as distinct from nationalism) as a reaction to exposure to foreign ways often clearly perceived as a threat, and thus reveals that aspect of nationalism which is defensive and often reactionary.[420]

---

[416] Yanov, *Russian Challenge*, xii.

[417] Ibid., xiii.

[418] Laqueur, *Black Hundred*, 3; Louis L. Snyder, *Varieties of Nationalism: A Comparative Study* (Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, 1976), 42.

Agursky borrows John Plamenatz's definition of Eastern nationalism, which argues that culturally disadvantaged peoples react not from a position of self-conscious infirmity or diffidence, but from a sense of being "less well placed" in their attempts to achieve the same ideals and progress as other closely-connected, but nonetheless separate, peoples. In such conditions, nationalism flourishes. In Plamenatz's view, nationalism is restricted to peoples who, despite their mutual antagonism and cultural discrepancies, are, or aspire to become, members of a family of nations which progress along much the same course. This is the nationalism of a people recently drawn into European civilization, hitherto foreign to them. Their traditional cultures are unfamiliar with the "cosmopolitan and increasingly dominant standards [of] success and excellence", hence, their feeling of a need to transform and raise themselves.[421] Eastern nationalism which, paradoxically, characterizes the Westernizers and the later Bolsheviks, simultaneously imitates and rejects its model. This entails two conflicting rejections: that of the foreign but dominant intruder who is to be imitated and exceeded by his own criterion; and that of tradition, which is perceived as an obstruction to progress, but nonetheless treasured as an identity.[422]

---

[419] Agursky, *Third Rome*, 6.

[420] Ibid., 6-9.

---

[421] Ibid., 7-8.

[422] Ibid., 8.

PART VIII

CONCLUSION

Russian nationalism, like other nationalisms, is a modern phenomenon. It first revealed itself in nineteenth-century Slavophile ideology. Slavophile thought evolved as a conservative utopia within the context of a Europe that was simultaneously both rejected and imitated by the intelligentsia. Russian nationalist sentiment had become manifest, however, with Peter I's Europeanization of Russia and the ascendancy of intellectual thought in the eighteenth century, the period during which "Russians found confirmation of themselves as Russians" in various ways, the most prominent of which included the development of the Russian language and a national literature. This was a period of intensified contact with key European countries. Foreign innovations in the military sphere had entered Muscovy in the latter half of the sixteenth century. Now, innovations in the arts and sciences flooded into Russia and gave rise to an identity need. Historical consciousness of identity was thus created anew.

The roots of Russian national consciousness, however, extend well into the Middle Ages and the end of Mongol rule over *Rus'* in 1480. The adoption of Byzantine Christianity and the rapid expansion of the Muscovite state were powerful factors in its evolution. At the same time, the state served as a powerful impediment to nation-building, justifying the autocracy both legally and politically, and thus denying the nation a separate existence from the state in this regard. Hence, the incubation period for Russian national consciousness to develop was several centuries long. I have attempted to develop the roots of this consciousness of identity in relation to two distinct but inseparable realms - the cultural and the political. Russian national consciousness is firmly rooted in a political meta-national existence, the Russian Empire. The roots of this political existence are the product of the imperial state. Indeed, it is possible to substantiate such connections with historical fact.

It is not possible, however, to build a general theory of Russian nationalism upon such foundations. This is due in part to the diversity of concerns, but also because any precise definition of the term itself is extremely difficult. A single, holistic account of Russian nationalism would be an impossible task. Some analysts of nationalism thus advocate restricting the term itself to politics and the state, as "there tends only to be an interest in nationalist ideas or sentiments in so far as they are taken up in political movements."[423] This has the deleterious effect, however, of excluding inter-ethnic conflicts which fail either to develop into political movements or organize for the purpose of taking state power, as well as any aggressive state foreign or domestic policies pursued by governments - the main contexts in which Russian nationalism can be best understood.

Ultimately, the term 'nationalism' is broadly used and covers many divergent entities; so many, in fact, that the literature on the subject is immense. Hans Kohn provides an invaluable account of the origins and historical evolution of nationalism, and deals with the larger issue of nationalist ideology. More recent studies vary considerably in their approaches to nationalism. Some are general historical treatments of the subject, while others focus exclusively on nationalist doctrines. Other works concentrate on nationalist sentiment and ideas, treating nationalism as having arisen from some form of consciousness of identity; while still others promulgate the notion that nationalism is the product of intellectuals. Nationalism as politics has attracted a good deal of study and some interesting comparitive efforts. John Breuilly has been extremely useful in this regard.

---

[423] Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State*, 420-21.

Clearly the scope of this work was ambitious and misses much. My intention was to provide a general investigation of the roots of modern Russian nationalism, thus placing it within a broader frame of reference. Over the course of my investigation, I was compelled to consider the context in which Russian nationalism reached its apex, around the turn of the century. This is the most critical stage in the period of Russian nationalism covered in the work undertaken and, admittedly, much is left wanting. Probably the most crucial factor in the ultimate failure of Russian nationalism in this period was the inability, or unwillingness, of the ruling elite to generate mass support for the system, and the system itself, which precluded mass participation.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Agursky, Mikhail. *The Third Rome: National Bolshevism in the USSR*. Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987.

The Lay of the Warfare Waged by Igor. Moscow: Progress Publishers [1981.]

Berlin, Isaiah. *Russian Thinkers*. London: The Hogarth Press, 1978.

Breuilly, John. *Nationalism and the State*. 2d. ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994.

Buttino, Marco, ed. *In a Collapsing Empire: Underdevelopment, Ethnic Conflicts and Nationalisms in the Soviet Union*. Milan: Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, 1993.

Carter, Stephen K. *Russian Nationalism Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990.

Cherniavsky, Michael. *Tsar and People: Studies in Russian Myths*. New Haven: Random House, 1969.

Conquest, Robert, ed. *The Last Empire: Nationality and the Soviet Future*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1986.

Dunlop, John B. *The New Russian Nationalism*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985.

_____. *The Rise of Russia and the Fall of the Soviet Empire*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.

_____. "Confronting a Loss of Empire." Paper presented at the ICCEES World Congress, Warsaw, Poland 6-11 August 1995.

Dunn, Dennis J. ed. *Religion and Nationalism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union*. Boulder and London: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1987.

Durman, Karel. *The Time of the Thunderer: Mikhail Katkov, Russian Nationalist Extremism and the Failure of the Bismarchian System, 1871-1887*. Boulder: East European Monographs, 1988.

Edelman, Robert. *Gentry Politics on the Eve of the Russian Revolution: The Nationalist Party 1907-1917.* New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1980.

Frankel, Jonathan. *Prophecy and Politics: Socialism, Nationalism and the Russian Jews, 1862-1917.* New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

Gellner, E. *Nations and Nationalism: New Perspectives on the Past.* Ithaca, New York and London: Cornell University Press, 1983.

Garraty, John A. and Peter Gay eds. *The Columbia History of the World.* New York, Evanston, San Francisco, London: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972.

Gilbert, Martin. *Imperial Russian History Atlas.* London and Henley: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978.

Halperin, Charles J. "The Ideology of Silence: Prejudice and Pragmatism on the Medieval Religious Frontier." *Comparitive Studies in Society and History* 26 (no. 3, July 1984): 442-46.

_____. *Russia and the Golden Horde: The Mongol Impact on Medieval Russian History.* Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1985.

Hellie, Richard. *Enserfment and Military Change in Muscovy.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1971.

_____. *Slavery in Russia 1450-1725.* Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1982.

_____. ed. and trans., *The Muscovite Law Code (Ulozhenie) of 1649 Pt. 1* The Laws of Russia Series 1, vol. 3. Irvine, California: Charles Schlacks Jr., Publisher, 1988.

Horak, Stephan M. "Periodization and Terminology of the History of the Eastern Slavs." *Slavic Review* 31 (no. 4, December 1972): 851-62.

Hroch, Miroslav. *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparitive Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups Among the Smaller European Nations.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Kedourie, Elie. *Nationalism.* Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993.

Kemilainen, Aira. *Nationalism: Problems Concerning the Word, the Concept and Classification.* Jyvaskyla: Kustantajat Publishers, 1964.

Kohn, Hans. *Prophets and Peoples: Studies in Nineteenth Century Nationalism.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1946.

_____. *Panslavism: Its History and Ideology.* Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1953.

_____. *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background.* New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958.

_____. *The Age of Nationalism: The First Era of Global History.* New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1962.

_____. *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History.* Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc., 1965.

Korey, William. "The Origins and Development of Soviet Anti-Semitism: An Analysis." *Slavic Review* 31 (no. 1, March 1972): 111-35.

Laqueur, Walter. *Black Hundred: The Rise of the Extreme Right in Russia.* New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 1993.

Lenin, V.I. *Questions of National Policy and Proletarian Internationalism.* Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970.

Lieven, D.C.B. *Russia and the Origins of the First World War.* London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1983.

Likhachev, Dmitri S. *The National Nature of Russian History.* The Second Annual W. Averell Harriman Lecture (13 November 1990). Columbia University.

Massie, Robert. *Peter the Great: His Life and World.* New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980.

Motyl, Alexander J. *Sovietology, Rationality, Nationality: Coming to Grips with Nationalism in the USSR.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.

Petrovich, Michael Boro. *The Emergence of Russian Panslavism 1856-1870.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1956.

Pipes, Richard. *Struve Liberal on the Right 1905-1944.* Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 1980.

_____. *The Russian Revolution*. New York: Vintage Books, Random House, Inc., 1990.

Ramet, Pedro ed. *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1989.

Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. *Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825-1855*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959.

_____. *Historical Consciousness and National Identity: Some Considerations on the History of Russian Nationalism*. New Orleans: The Graduate School of Tulane University, 1991.

_____. *A History of Russia*, 5th. ed. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Rogger, Hans. *National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960.

_____. *Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986.

Sabaneeff, Leonid. "Religious and Mystical Trends in Russia at the Turn of the Century." *The Russian Review* 24 (no. 4 October 1965): 354-68.

Sakwa, Richard. *Russian Politics and Society*. London: Routledge, 1993.

Seton-Watson, Hugh. *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977.

Shaheen, Samad. *The Communist Theory of National Self-Determination: Its Historical Evolution Up To the October Revolution*. The Hague, Bandung: W.Van Hoeve Ltd., 1956.

Smith, A.D. *Theories of Nationalism*. London: Duckworth, 1983.

Snyder, Louis L. *Varieties of Nationalism: A Comparitive Study*. Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, 1976.

_____. *Macro-Nationalisms: A History of the Pan-Slav Movements*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984.

Szporluk, Roman. *Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx Versus Friedrich List*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.

_____. *The Russian Revolution*. New York: Vintage Books, Random House, Inc., 1990.

Ramet, Pedro ed. *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics*. Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1989.

Riasanovsky, Nicholas V. *Nicholas I and Official Nationality in Russia, 1825-1855*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1959.

_____. *Historical Consciousness and National Identity: Some Considerations on the History of Russian Nationalism*. New Orleans: The Graduate School of Tulane University, 1991.

_____. *A History of Russia*, 5th. ed. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Rogger, Hans. *National Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century Russia*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960.

_____. *Jewish Policies and Right-Wing Politics in Imperial Russia*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986.

Sabaneeff, Leonid. "Religious and Mystical Trends in Russia at the Turn of the Century." *The Russian Review* 24 (no. 4 October 1965): 354-68.

Sakwa, Richard. *Russian Politics and Society*. London: Routledge, 1993.

Seton-Watson, Hugh. *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977.

Shaheen, Samad. *The Communist Theory of National Self-Determination: Its Historical Evolution Up To the October Revolution*. The Hague, Bandung: W.Van Hoeve Ltd., 1956.

Smith, A.D. *Theories of Nationalism*. London: Duckworth, 1983.

Snyder, Louis L. *Varieties of Nationalism: A Comparitive Study*. Hinsdale, Illinois: The Dryden Press, 1976.

_____. *Macro-Nationalisms: A History of the Pan-Slav Movements*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984.

Szporluk, Roman. *Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx Versus Friedrich List*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.

_____. "Dilemmas of Russian Nationalism." *Problems of Communism* 38 (No. 4, July/August 1989): 15-35.

Thaden, Edward C. *Conservative Nationalism in Ninteenth-Century Russia*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1964.

Trubetzkoy, N.S. *The Legacy of Ghengis Khan and Other Essays on Russia's Identity*. Ann Arbor, Michigan: Slavic Publishers, 1991.

Treadgold, Donald W. *Twentieth Century Russia*, 6th. ed. Boulder and London: Westview Press, 1987.

Urban, G.R. *End of Empire: The Demise of the Soviet Union*. Washington DC: The American University Press, 1993.

Walicki, Andrzej. *The Slavophile Controversy: History of a Conservative Utopia in Nineteenth-Century Russian Thought*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975.

_____. *A History of Russian Thought From the Enlightenment to Marxism*. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1979.

Yanov, Alexander. *The Origins of Autocracy: Ivan the Terrible in Russian History*. Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University of California Press, 1981.

_____. *The Russian Challenge and the Year 2000*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1987.

Zwick, Peter. *National Communism*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1983.